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My dissertation focuses on regional economic policy and the utilization of time
use data to explore economic behavior. I am interested in how regional economic
policy frequently fails to account for unintended consequences, generating impacts at
odds with intended goals and how time use data enriches our understanding of eco-
nomic behavior. I examine these research aims in three papers: I evaluate a federal
place-based economic development program for rural areas, I look at the interaction
of transportation-based policies of gasoline taxes and public transportation provi-
sion through the lens of transportation time use data, and I explore the impact of
unemployment on households’ allocation of time.
In my first paper, “The Effect of Enterprise Community Designation for Rural Ar-
eas, I perform a program evaluation of the federal Enterprise Community economic
development program for rural areas. For controls, I utilize communities who applied
for, but failed at obtaining designation as well as census tracts that border desig-
nated communities. I also attempt to identify economically similar areas through
a propensity score matching approach. In the term of evaluation, I find evidence
of capitalization of increased services and infrastructure in housing values but little
difference between the selected communities and their controls. I conclude that the
1
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impact of developing an application for such a program which can lead to local or-
ganizational structure, regardless of whether a community is successful in obtaining
designation and the benefits that go along with it, may be more important than the
program itself.
The next essay, “Pump Pressure: Income, Public Transportation and the Time
Use Response to Gas Prices, investigates the responsiveness of time spent in forms of
transportation and for different purposes to real gas price changes, the attractiveness
of public transportation in a respondents metropolitan area and their interaction. I
find the inclusion of an interaction term important in correctly controlling for the
effect of gas prices themselves and conclude policy makers should account for damp-
ening behavior impacts gasoline taxes and public transportation expansion can have
on each other. It is found that higher levels of public transportation attractiveness,
while certainly leading to more time spent in public transportation, does not lead to
lower car-based commuting time. The paper also includes a microeconomic model
that includes time use and uses empirical data to determine what income groups
may have stronger substitution or income effects.
My final essay, “Employment and Intra-household Time Allocation, also utilizes
time use data to examine the impact of spousal unemployment and time use on ones
own time use. My results are consistent with other studies in finding a very small,
but statistically significant impact of about an hour per week added worker effect.
I also construct estimates of partner spousal time use where data do not exist to
calculate marginal impacts, finding strong leisure complementarity between partners
and some substitutability of household production.
By showing the difficulty of enacting meaningful economic development policy
in rural areas and the limitations of urban transit policy, I have contributed to the
3
public finance literature by helping to bring to light the difficult realties of policy.
In addition, I have explored the time budget set in two of the papers to contribute
to public economics and labor issues on topics that generally have relied on other
sources of data to provide new light on transportation and household dynamics in
the face of unemployment.
CHAPTER II
The Effect of Enterprise Community Designation on Rural
Areas
2.1 Introduction
The trend of suburbanization that started at the end of World War II and pro-
gressed throughout the second half of the twentieth century caused demographic
changes that created problems for many communities in both urban and rural ar-
eas. As both population and employment opportunities increased in suburban areas,
large cities and rural counties both saw an emigration of population and businesses
from their communities. This caused a reduction of tax support and economic in-
frastructure that eroded growth and forced poverty rates and unemployment rates
to levels that were higher than national averages. Isolated from cultural, financial
and retail centers and facing structural changes in the agricultural and industrial
industries which had traditionally provided employment, rural areas in particular
found difficulties in sustaining economic vitality.
In addition to the massive economic revitalization efforts of urban areas of the
1970s, many states in the 1980s created targeted economic development programs
to help communities that were lagging within the state. This was usually through
a combination of grants to local communities and tax incentives for businesses. In
1993, as part of that year’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Congress established
4
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the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative, a targeted economic de-
velopment program for urban areas and rural communities across the country. Ad-
ministered jointly by HUD, HHS and USDA, the program provided block grants,
tax incentives and expertise to the designated communities that were labeled “Em-
powerment Zones” (EZ) or “Enterprise Communities” (EC). Selected communities
were then tasked with implementing community improvement strategies they had
developed themselves. The Round 1 program designations were made at the end
of 1994 with additional communities selected during later rounds between 1998 and
2001.
Using Census of Population and County Business Patterns data, I examine whether
the selection as a rural Enterprise Community during the first round provided a sig-
nificant benefit measured by the economic outcomes of their populations in 2000.
Although there has been a good deal of attention paid to the urban Empowerment
Zone designation, little research has been performed on the rural communities and
none offer cases for proper control groups. I offer a variety of possible control groups,
including communities that applied for the initial program but were unsuccessful and
communities which were successful in similar competitions in later years. I separately
identify census tracts which were similar to selected tracts based on a propensity
score match as well as counties which were potentially eligible for selection based on
observed 1990 characteristics, but were not involved in applying for the designation.
Compared to other communities which applied to this and similar programs, I find
no effects of designation on poverty or employment rates or educational outcomes
in 2000. I do, however, find some evidence of higher housing values, indicating pos-
sible capitalization of improved services such as health clinics, child care facilities
and educational training facilities or investments in community improvements such
6
as water and sewer systems or pollution cleanup. Propensity score matching yields
no clear evidence for any findings of positive impacts except for a small decrease in
the occupational concentration of the workforce. Additionally, the Enterprise Com-
munities showed slower population growth relative to control groups, although this
is not found to be statistically significant in most cases. This paper provides similar
results compared to previous research in evaluating targeted economic development
programs; that is, findings of efficacy are mixed or hard to find, but there are signif-
icant challenges in making accurate measurements. However, this paper is the first
to evaluate the rural focus of the federal EZ/EC program. I conclude with remarks
on the relative value of the control groups used and a discussion of program theory
for economic development programs in light of the results.
2.2 Program Theory and History
2.2.1 Economic Theory of Targeted Economic Development Programs
The economic theory behind spatially targeted economic development programs
depends on the tools being implemented. Targeted tax credits can be employed to
promote hiring of zone citizens or for any employees of businesses located within a
zone, lowering the cost of hiring employees. Alternatively tax benefits for capital
investment or regulatory relief can be used to lower costs of doing business. These
in turn promote business growth for both new and existing businesses and increase
employment (Liebschutz, 1995; Hyman, 1998; Snow, 2000). Some research suggests,
however, that tax incentives have little effect on business placement or alternatively
are less likely to be employed in labor-intensive firms who have smaller tax burdens
(Rubin and Zorn, 1985; Rubin, 1995). Low interest loan programs are also used to
provide credit to businesses in order to support expansion and growth.
Job training and education programs targeted towards zone residents can be used
7
to create human capital, making the area more attractive for businesses to locate.
Additionally, direct capital investments can “jump-start” the creation of jobs; di-
rectly and through the multiplier effect, these investments generate new economic
activity that can hopefully be sustained after the project has been completed (Bar-
tik, 2003). More directly, such investment also provides needed low-cost housing,
improved roads or other city structures for the community (Wilder and Rubin, 1996).
The hope is that these programs can either reverse trends of increasing poverty and
unemployment rates or revitalize a community whose economy has grown stagnant
through an emigration of human and financial capital.
The policy debate over the desirability of spatially targeted economic programs
hinges both on whether or not the programs themselves provide enough help or the
correct incentives to promote growth. The development of a national plan for rural
economic development has been difficult to achieve for decades, with a lack of con-
sensus stemming from large variation in the needs of individual communities and a
lack of agreement by national organizations developed to lobby federal government
on behalf of rural communities (Buss and Tribble, 2003). Federal assistance is tasked
primarily by the Department of Agriculture, but involves many other departments
and super-regional authorities such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. Additionally,
even if targeted economic development programs are effective, the question remains
whether the programs provide an efficient use of financial and administrative re-
sources. Supporters of the original EZ/EC legislation argued the features of local
administration found in the initiative could provide more efficient solutions to local
problems because of knowledge of where the money should be spent. Detractors ar-
gue that local corruption may reduce efficacy, or alternatively the public funds may
simply be funding intra-regional relocation of business activity (Reeder, 1996). This
8
relocation though may still be beneficial if a relative lack of alternative job opportu-
nities and economic need in zone areas are deemed to be more important problems
to alleviate (Fisher and Peters, 1997).
An additional benefit of programs such as the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise
Community Initiative is that by coming together as a community and developing a
strategic plan to address their locale’s problems, the citizens are identifying and de-
veloping human capital and entrepreneurial skills. This can foster positive conditions
for economic growth independent of any benefits provided by national or state gov-
ernments. President Clinton explicitly touted the benefits of the application process
itself to participating communities and regional conferences provided information to
local municipalities with regards to how to develop such strategic plans (Thomas,
1995; Aigner et al., 1999).
The national interest regarding locally targeted economic development programs
began in the early 1980s, but it was never implemented at the national level during
this time. Almost 40 states had some kind of Enterprise Zone program of some form
in the years leading up to the federal program(Greenbaum and Engberg, 2000; Wilder
and Rubin, 1996). Some initiatives focused on grants and low-interest bond financ-
ing to communities, but most used locally targeted economic incentives through job
training, tax breaks and access to low-cost capital markets to attract businesses to
certain communities. These attempts, however, were not without their critics. Some
researchers pointed out the dubious connection between tax incentives and business
placement given that labor-intensive firms who would bring jobs have smaller tax bur-
dens and thus less incentive to relocate based on these incentives (Glickman 1984,
Jacobs & Wasylenko 1981, Harrison & Canter 1978, Rubin & Zorn 1985, Wilder &
Rubin 1996). Wilder & Rubin (1996) surveyed the extensive literature on the effi-
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cacy of the states economic zone development programs in the 1980s and found the
programs to be generally effective in promoting investment and job creation but still
found high variability even with each states programs. They cautioned against the
development of targeted economic incentives programs without considering the im-
portance of both the planning stages of local economic development for the duration
of the program as well as the cost effectiveness of targeted grants or significant tax
breaks.
2.2.2 Legislative History
The first forms of targeted economic development strategies in the United States
came with the Model Cities program under President Johnson in the 1960s and its
successor, the Community Development Block Grant program which started in 1975
under President Ford. Both of these urban renewal programs focused on providing
infrastructure enhancements and other economic development activities to declining
cities but were not specifically targeted at localized areas of the cities (Liebschutz,
1995; Mossberger, 2000). Supply-side targeted economic development burgeoned in
England during the late 1970s and was championed most prominently by Rep. Jack
Kemp in the United States in the early 1980s (Boarnet, 2001; Liebschutz, 1995; Stoker
and Rich, 2006). The key component of early forms of these types of legislation
in Congress were tax incentives for business who operated within the designated
zones. Legislation, however, was never passed, and generally failed to elicit positive
responses from Democratic members of Congress who favored more direct forms of
government assistance and feared enterprise zones would crowd out other forms of
assistance (Hyman, 1998; Mossberger, 2000).
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2.2.3 Federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative
In light of a new-found desire among Congress to help blighted cities in the wake of
the rioting in Los Angeles in 1992, the federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Com-
munity Initiative was passed in 1993 as part of that year’s Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act (Liebschutz, 1995)1. The legislation had four aims: 1. increased economic
opportunity through job creation and entrepreneurship, 2. sustainable community
development without government intervention, 3. community-based partnerships
which bring both public and private resources together to address communities’
needs, and 4. the development of a coordinated strategic vision bringing together
all available social resources for community development (USDA, 1998). Through
strategic plans developed at the local level to achieve these goals, the program sought
to bring down poverty and unemployment levels and increase investment and busi-
ness activity in these areas. Federal bureaucratic expertise would be provided in
order to assist local leadership with their plan execution and to identify sources of
support.(USDA, 1998; GAO, 2004; USDA, 2003). Administration of the program
was done jointly through the Department of Housing and Urban Development who
oversaw urban areas, the Department of Agriculture who oversaw rural areas, the
Department of Health and Human Services for the disbursement of the funds2, and
the Internal Revenue Service who oversaw the tax benefits that would be offered to
businesses in the selected communities. Coordination was run through a Community
Empowerment Board headed by the Vice President (Rushing, 2000).
For the rural portion of the Initiative, 180 communities submitted applications
in a competitive selection process in 1994 with the USDA selecting the designated
1A similar program was passed by both houses of Congress in late 1992, but was vetoed by President Bush despite
his previous support for the bill (Liebschutz, 1995; Stoker and Rich, 2006).
2HHS was involved as the primary administrator of the Social Services Block Grant program through which funds
were dispersed to awarded communities. Funds made available through subsequent rounds of the EZ/EC program
did not involve HHS.
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communities in December of that year (USDA, 2003). Three Rural Empowerment
Zones and 30 Enterprise Communities were selected. A list of the selected Enter-
prise Communities and their state is presented in the Appendix. Communities were
defined by individual or groups of 1990 Census tracts, and all areas must have had a
minimum of 20% poverty in all tracts with at least 35% in half of the census tracts.
There were also guidelines that specified a maximum population and geographic area
as well as the criteria for selection which included “pervasive poverty, unemployment
and general distress” (USDA, 1998). Designees were selected not just on the degree
of need represented by statistical figures but also on the basis of the coherence of
their strategic plans and the degree of participation of low-income individuals and
community-based organizations (USDA, 1998; Aigner et al., 1998). The USDA also
considered both geographic and demographic diversity with and among the desig-
nated areas GAO (2004). The program expanded with more Empowerment Zone and
Enterprise Community selections in Round II which began in 1999 and Round III
which began in 2001. Round III also added a third category of communities called
Renewal Communities. Later rounds were characterized by slightly less stringent
requirements but also fewer benefits.
The governmental intervention for rural Enterprise Communities was a Social
Services Block Grant (SSBG) in the amount of $2.95 million, the ability to obtain
tax-exempt bonds, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit3 to community businesses and
preferential treatment in most competitive governmental community development
grant programs (GAO, 2010). Access to Qualified Zone Academy Bonds for capital
expenditures for educational facilities and tax incentives for private brownfield devel-
opment were also included. The three Empowerment Zones received a SSBG of $20
3WOTC provided a tax credit of 20% of the first $15,000 of wages as well as for some training costs.
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million and additional investment and tax credits (GAO, 2010; USDA, 2003). Due
to the large differences in treatment between Empowerment Zones and Enterprise
Communities and the relatively few number of Empowerment Zones for comparison,
this paper focuses primarily on the Enterprise Communities from the first round.
The main purpose of the SSBG was for use as a capital investment to leverage
against grants from other sources rather than for funding programs. That is, the
grant was to be used to help fund the administration of the strategic plans them-
selves. The SSBG accompanied with the preferential treatment proved to be the
most important aspect of the program as it allowed the community to leverage sev-
eral sources of funding together. As of June 2000, the leveraging ratio of non SSBG
funds to SSBG funds drawn down was 9.8 (USDA, 2003). By 2002 this ratio had
nearly doubled to 17.7. These funds have been provided mainly through other fed-
eral programs, state governments and from private sector investments for vocational
training programs and rural public transit projects, infrastructure improvements,
business finance and revolving loan programs and various health, child care and so-
cial programs (USDHUD and USDA, 1997; USDA, 2001, 2003). Some communities
invested in developing workspace and warehouses for new businesses to move to as
well. Communities had freedom to determine what worked best for their strategic
plan. Although the Round I designations were initially supposed to last ten years,
extensions allowed the program to continue. All rural EZ/EC designations ended in
2009.
What is critical to note is that the call for applications itself could have a signifi-
cant treatment effect. The development of the application could help a community
not only start to identify problems and potential solutions through the development
of a strategic plan for economic development, but also foster social interaction and
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cohesion as well as identify those individuals who could lead a community’s economic
and business growth efforts. The USDA advocated communities to “create a vision
of what the community wants to become in the future”(USDA, 1998). For com-
munities who can no longer depend on agriculture or manufacturing for economic
survival, this presented an opportunity and catalyst for everyone to come together
and enact change.
This idea led the USDA to grant “Champion Community” status to those commu-
nities that were not selected as Enterprise Communities. The Champion Community
program was informal within the department but granted similar (but necessarily
less) expertise and preference in grant competition solely within the USDA. It is
unclear the extent to which communities took up the USDA on their offer, but it
provided communities with some assistance in executing their plans for development
without the SSBG and tax incentives. Indeed, several designated Champion Com-
munities were selected as Enterprise Communities in later rounds of the program in
1999 and 2002. In 1999, the Champion Community program was formalized and any
rural community was permitted to apply for designation with a developed strategic
plan. In both cases, the social cohesion that led to the development of an applica-
tion is an important aspect of the treatment of community designation, representing
the non-random selection process. This presents difficulties to the researcher who
wishes to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of the programs themselves through
community designation.
2.3 Previous Research on Targeted Economic Development Programs
2.3.1 Evaluations of Previous Programs
No rigorous statistical study has been published on the effects of the Enterprise
Community or Champion Community program on rural communities. Two-thirds
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of states, however, had targeted economic development programs prior to the imple-
mentation of the federal legislation (Papke, 1993), resulting in a significant body of
literature that sought to evaluate the efficacy of these local programs. As reported
in Papke (1993) and Wilder and Rubin (1996), both the results and the methods
used to obtain the results have been mixed. Wilder and Rubin (1996) reported a
consistent finding in many studies of job growth and increased investment, but that
the growth was more apparent outside of urban areas. They note the concern of
the quality of jobs that may be moving to these areas as well as the correct inter-
pretation of increased investment. Businesses may not necessarily be responding to
the incentives (infrastructure improvements or tax breaks) that an enterprise zone
may offer so much as the fact that the designation acts as a signal to businesses of
a favorable relationship between a committed government and local enterprise. Re-
searchers used a variety of tools, including surveys, state and locally-collected data,
descriptive reports and cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the efficacy of programs run
by various states (Wilder and Rubin, 1996).
Bondonio and Engberg (2000) examine the impact of state Enterprise Zone pro-
grams on local employment in five states. They use the policy and outcome data
from California, Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania & Virginia and employ random
growth rate and propensity score approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
grams as well as their sensitivity to funding amounts. They were unable to find
employment growth related to the designation of zones. Greenbaum and Engberg
(2000) perform a similar analysis on housing markets as well employment outcomes
for enterprise zones for the same states and find similar results. Papke (1994) found
statistically significant reductions in unemployment but also in property holdings for
business for Indiana Enterprise Zones, which may have been a result of the inventory-
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based nature of the tax incentives.
Researchers occasionally come to different conclusions for the same program, even
using the same data making it difficult to inform policy makers (Ham et al., 2010).
Additionally, variability in precision can generate estimates which are consistent with
each other but can lead to different conclusions on findings of effectiveness4. Boarnet
(2001) in particular stresses the need to educate policy makers about the importance
of control groups in determining the relative importance of conflicting research, us-
ing his own experience in evaluating New Jersey’s Enterprise Zone program as an
example.5
2.3.2 Evaluations of the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Pro-
gram
Oakley and Tsao (2006) and Busso and Kline (2008) both use a propensity score
matching process to evaluate the urban Empowerment Zone program using Census
data but come to different conclusions. Oakley and Tsao (2006) found little or only
modest improvement in Zone areas while Busso and Kline (2008) find substantial
improvements in employment rates and housing market prices. Ham et al. (2010)
attribute the difference could possibly be due to Oakley and Tsao (2006)’s use of
1980 data as controls, but notes the reasoning is unclear and the larger issue is that
specification can lead to different results given the ambiguous nature of the treatment
both in theoretical application, magnitude of effect and geographic impact. As far as
this author has found, Ham et al. (2010) represents the only analysis examining the
effectiveness of the Enterprise Community program, although they only examined
the urban communities with such designation. They did however, examine the three
4For example, O’Keefe (2004) which finds a statistically significant short run increase in employment growth for
California state enterprise zone, while Neumark and Kolko (2010) does not, although they do mention at least one
specification provides a confidence interval which includes O’Keefe’s estimate.
5Rubin and Wilder (1989) found large job creation as a result of the program using business survey data, but
Boarnet and Bogart (1996) found no difference when actually comparing zone and non-zone communities.
16
rural Empowerment Zones in conjunction with the urban designees. In both cases,
they find positive and statistically significant impacts on employment and poverty.
HUD published a study that sought to evaluate the efficacy of the EZ/EC inter-
vention in urban areas over the first half of the life-time of the program, 1995-2000
(Herbert et al., 2001). This interim report, however, only evaluated six enterprise
zones. The study found higher job growth than same-city control tracts with similar
characteristics in four of the six they examined and commissioned a survey which
suggested sharp increases in business ownership rates by residents in all six zones.
GAO (2006) also performed an evaluation of urban Enterprise Zones but determined
it could not attribute declines in unemployment and poverty rates within the zones
to the program. One other study undertaken by researchers at the North Central
Regional Center for Rural Development found increased loan availability in all but
a few of the rural EZ/ECs, a decline in high school drop out rates in about a third
of the communities and increase involvement of community groups in participating
in the local EZ/EC corporation during the study period of 1994 to 1997 (Aigner, et
al 1998). The study however provided no control group for comparison.
2.4 Data Description
The communities selected as Enterprise Communities and Champion Communi-
ties were defined by 1990 census tracts. The tracts were determined using the USDA
EZ/EC website6 and through a USDA FOIA request for the Champion Communities.
At least two communities which were awarded Enterprise Community or Empower-
ment Zone status in later rounds were identified as Round 1 Champion Communities
based on information found on the USDA website but were not included in the FOIA
6The original website (http://www.ezec.gov) is now offline, although the USDA Rural Development website
(http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/BCP-EZEC-Home.html) hosts some of the original information about the communi-
ties. Old versions of the EZ/EC website can be accessed using the Wayback Machine at http://www.archive.org.
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request. It is possible, then that the list provided may be incomplete. Future re-
search will seek to better information about the identification of Round 1 Champion
Communities and subsequent Champion Community status designation when it was
officially formalized in 1998. Additionally, I identified the tracts belonging to com-
munities which were designated as Enterprise Communities or Empowerment Zones
in later rounds in 1998 or 2001 as well as communities designated Renewal Commu-
nities, another type of designation established in 2001. Although this paper does not
evaluate those programs, I do use them as a possible control group in one part of
the analysis as the application of their programs falls primarily outside of the years
of evaluation.
Census Bureau policy is to maintain a fairly even population for each tract, which
necessitates changes in the shape and sizes of many tracts between each decennial
census so the list had to be updated to identify affected 2000 tracts. The compiled
list of tracts was compared to the Census Bureau’s Census Tract Relationship Files7,
which identify 1990 Census tracts which have been split or combined to form different
2000 Census Tracts. Affected tracts remained designated so long as the 2000 tract
consisted of at least 50% of a designated 1990 tract by population. Additionally,
some tract numbers as reported by the USDA as Champion Communities could not
be used since they did not exist, providing further indication that the list supplied
may not have been completely accurate. As a result, three Enterprise Community
tracts and twelve Champion Community tracts did not have appropriate 2000 tract
analogues to assign for analysis. This left a total of 156 tracts from 30 communities
designated as Enterprise Community tracts and 506 tracts designated as Champion
Communities8. I also identified tracts which bordered Enterprise Community areas
7http://www.census.gov/geo/www/relate/rel tract.html
8The information received from the FOIA request did not provide the groupings of the tracts by application or
by community and indicated this information was not available.
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by examining spatial maps of the communities.
1990 and 2000 Census data was obtained from the Geolytics/Urban Institute
Neighborhood Change Database, which allows users to generate 1990 Census statis-
tics for 2000 tract boundaries, permitting cross-year comparisons. While I would
have liked to have used 1980 data to control for long-term trend differences between
tracts, this information is not available for most designated tracts as many rural
areas such as the ones the Enterprise Community program targeted did not have
identifiable census tracts for 1980. The variables used from the 1990 and 2000 Cen-
sus of Population include measures of population, area, poverty, employment, welfare
use, income and education. Population means and standard deviations can be found
in Table 2.1. The “Occupational Concentration Index” (OCI) is a measure of the
concentration of particular types of jobs as measured by the employment statistics
of the Census of Populations9. It is the sum of the squares of the percentage of
jobs by type as a fraction of total employment. Like the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex, a larger number suggests a higher concentration of workers within particular
job types. Whether the result of homogeneous labor supply or a lack of variety of
jobs, I suggest that a low variety of occupation opportunities is an indicator of a
lack of business vitality and development. Dependence on a single large employer
which may induce a low OCI may have some benefit to a community as a second-best
option, but business variety promotes market competition and conditions on the de-
mand side of the labor market among employers that can lead to higher wages and
employment. I recognize, however, that the nature of industries and labor markets
in rural communities does not necessarily make this a strong metric of labor market
9The Census splits 16 and over employed persons into 9 occupations: 1.professional and technical occupations,
2.executives, managers and administrators, 3.sales workers, 4.administrative and clerical support, 5.precision pro-
duction, craft and repair workers, 6.operators, assemblers, transportation and moving material workers, 7.non-farm
laborers, 8.service workers, and 9.farm, forestry or fishing workers.
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strength.
I also utilize County Business Patterns data of total employees and total payroll,
calculating the payroll per employee for various years before and after treatment.
This value is assigned to each tract within the county. While this is likely not an
accurate measure of economic activity at the tract level, it is relevant as a measure-
ment of available job quality in the area near the enterprise community of which zone
citizens can take advantage. Considering tract level business establishment data is
not available, it may be also be a best approximation of a tract level measure of job
quality, however it may not be a very good one. Figure 2.1 charts the ratio of 1990
tract level unemployment for the Enterprise Communities with their county level
unemployment which shows a skew above a ratio of 1 with a mean of 1.25 and a me-
dian of 1.16. Of note, however is that two enterprise communities in particular, La
Jicarta in Arizona and Halifax/Edgecombe/Wilson in North Carolina include tracts
with 7 of the 9 largest ratios. Regardless, I utilize this measure to control for the
quality of jobs available before and after the designation. A desire for better yearly
data for population and economic statistics is strong, but only recently has such
data been made available for urban areas through the American Community Survey.
Systematic nationwide data collection for rural areas outside of the Decennial Census
of Populations has and likely will remain a problem for many years to come.
2.5 Evaluation
In addition to problems of acquiring data for these types of area, part of the
reason it is difficult to perform econometric analysis for program evaluation pur-
poses for economic development programs is identifying a proper control group. If
an identified control group is identical to the treatment group on observed and un-
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observed variables, a simple difference-in-differences approach would be appropriate.
However, the concern with any such evaluation is that assignment is not random.
Unobservable variables then could affect treatment assignment which in turn could
affect future outcomes, biasing estimates of the effectiveness of the program itself.
Additionally, there is the problem of identifying eligible communities that would be
similar enough to form a comparison group if the program had not been applied. It is
important to account for these factors to prevent assignment of program effectiveness
(or ineffectiveness) to economy-wide trends that may be the real drivers of economic
outcomes; frequently, locally produced reports claiming jobs produced fail to account
for these counterfactuals at all, generating misleading results (Bartik, 2002).
To alleviate the first concern about non-random assignment, I utilize three con-
trol groups: tracts which received Champion Community designation after failing to
be named Enterprise Communities in Round 1, tracts from rural communities that
received Enterprise Community or some other federal zone designation in later years
and all census tracts in states which hosted an Enterprise Community. In order to
make comparisons against communities which are most similar to Enterprise Com-
munities on observables related to designation selection but who did not generate
strategic plans, I identify two comparison groups of areas that had not received any
federal economic development zone designation. I perform a propensity score match-
ing approach and separately identify comparison counties through manual selection
using statistics identified as related to eligibility and selection for designation.
In subsections 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, I seek to identify the treatment effect of Enter-
prise Community designation for communities which are pre-disposed to developing
and following through with strategic plans. In subsections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5, I identify
the treatment effect for the treated communities but will not account for the unob-
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served variables related to having resources available to generate an application. The
interpretation of the two types of comparisons will be different. The comparisons
to similarly treated communities measure the effect of the Enterprise Community
program designation, conditional on applying for the program, or alternatively, con-
ditional on the community having the capabilities of developing a strategic plan. The
comparison made on communities matched on observables related to designation se-
lection measure the combined effect of both developing a strategic plan necessary
for application for a federal targeted economic development program as well as the
effect of the program itself. Since the quality of their strategic plans (as judged
by the USDA) was a factor in selection, these estimates could be biased upward, if
USDA-judged higher quality strategic plans are more effective10.
2.5.1 Comparison to Champion Communities
By identifying tracts that were part of communities which applied but did not
receive designation, I can control for aspects of communities which further the gen-
eration of applications and strategic plans in the first place. The summary statistics
in Table 2.1 show Champion Community tracts as slightly better off in 1990 than
Enterprise Community tracts, although not substantially so. Poverty and unem-
ployment rates are somewhat lower in Champion Communities, although median
incomes and housing prices are slightly lower as well. The communities are fairly
similar on initial economic characteristics, but the true value of Champion Commu-
nities is their ability to act as controls for the unmeasured variable of applying for
Enterprise Community status and developing a strategic plan. Certainly it is true
that Champion Communities would execute and further develop their strategic plans
to varying degrees; as discussed above, it is unclear what the actual ”alternative”
10Of course, this bias could also run in the opposite direction
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treatment these communities received. However, this comparison helps to control
for the unmeasured ”strategic plan” effect which should be correlated with positive
economic development and growth and would upwardly bias the estimates of any
positive effects of the Enterprise Community designation.
Table 2.2 shows the raw means differences between the 1990 and 2000 Census mea-
surements of the eleven outcome measures examined in the analysis for the Enterprise
Communities and various potential control groups. Group mean differences denoted
in bold are significantly different from the Enterprise Community mean (column 2)
at the 95% confidence level. Without controlling for 1990 levels, tracts located within
Enterprise Communities face smaller increases in median home values compared to
all other types of tracts and larger decreases in government assistance rates com-
pared to Champion Communities and tracts which border Enterprise Communities.
Additionally, poverty rates and unemployment rates also decline more compared to
border tracts. On average, Enterprise Communities also grow slower in population
than other designated tracts and statistically significantly lower than surrounding
tracts and the rest of the country.
To control for the difference in 1990 levels between different types of communities,
the following equation is estimated:
Y2000i = α + βECi + γX1990i + εi, (2.1)
where Y2000i represents the 2000 outcome variable of tract i, ECi is an indicator
variable representing Enterprise Community status for tract i, X1990i is a vector of
1990 characteristics. A list of the controls utilized in the regressions in this section
can be found in the Appendix and whose coefficient estimates will not be reported for
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space.11 These include employment, education, poverty and racial characteristics as
well as Payroll per Employee for the parent county of the tract reported by County
Business Patterns for 1988, 1990 and 1992. The payroll per employee is used as a
measure of the quality of jobs in and around the tract. All 1990 estimates of the
relevant 2000 outcomes used for evaluation are used as controls in all estimation
procedures utilizing Equation 2.1.
Table 2.3 shows the results of this regression for eleven 2000 outcome variables on
Enterprise Communities and Champion Communities only. The top row of each half
includes all identified tracts designated as Champion Community in Round 1, while
the bottom half of each row is restricted to Champion Communities which did not
receive any other program designation in later years. The coefficients estimate the
effectiveness of the Enterprise Community relative to the informal USDA Champion
Community program.
Among these communities who applied for Enterprise Community designation,
achieving selection has no effect unemployment and overall poverty outcomes of
2000. An increase in housing values is found to be significant using both identifi-
cations of Champion Communities with EC designation generating a 4% increase.
Since uncontrolled difference-in-differences comparison showed a smaller increase in
median home value prices over the time frame, there is strong indication that the
designation is providing some of the effect. Also, significantly larger decreases in the
government assistance rate shown by the differences-in-differences approach disap-
pears when controlling for 1990 observables. There are also weak indications that
EC designation improved child poverty rates and median family incomes compared
to unselected communities, with results more favorable to Enterprise Communities
11Coefficient estimates for the controls from this and any other regression are available upon request.
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compared to the difference-in-differences comparison. Differences on educational
measures are small and not significant. Population changes are smaller in designated
communities relative to Champion communities, but the effect is not statistically
significant.
The increase in median housing values may be based on the expectation that
the Enterprise Community designation will generate economic growth in the future
but the lack of any findings of improvement in unemployment or poverty rates is
troubling. More likely, the differential increase in housing values represents a cap-
italization of increases in services or infrastructure improvements available to resi-
dents of designated tracts as a result of the Enterprise Community status. The 2000
Executive Summaries filed with the USDA of several of the Enterprise Communi-
ties reported utilizing funds for improvements of sewer and water systems as well
as funds to rehabilitate the existing housing stock. Additionally, many communities
developed job training and education programs and several increased the availabil-
ity of public transportation (USDA, 2001). These improvements may or may not
generate improvements in employment or poverty conditions in long-term; it may
be conditional on the ability of these communities to sustain funding for programs
after outside funding is exhausted. However, they do make the community more
attractive, which in turn can increase housing values.
The lack of differences seen in unemployment and poverty rates are not entirely un-
expected considering a significant reason Champion Communities were not selected
is because they were better off than their Enterprise Community counterparts. Even
if the Enterprise Communities achieved gains, Champion Communities could have
achieved parallel gains based on unobservables that generated their rejection, such
as not showing significant enough signs of distress. If communities employed long
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term strategies, especially given the goal of the initiative which was to promote self-
sufficiency, progress may also take time to develop. One final interpretation is that
the benefits of Champion Community status, which originally was informal USDA
assistance and some preferential treatment for grant programs within the depart-
ment (as opposed to government-wide for Enterprise Communities), were providing
similar effects as the Enterprise Community status.
2.5.2 Comparison to Any Rural Federally Designated Community
Equation (2.1) was then estimated on the population of identified tracts which
received Champion Community12, Enterprise Community, Empowerment Zone or
Renewal Community designation during any round of selection in 1994, 1998 or
2001. The results of those regressions are found in Table 2.4. The interpretation
of the reported coefficient on Enterprise Community designation is the effect of the
program relative to communities who had then and future capabilities to apply for
USDA economic development programs. A more appropriate control group would be
tracts from any community which applied for any USDA designation during the three
rounds of competition to distinguish the benefit of making an application relative to
generating a successful application. Inquires into such information suggested it was
not available.
Unemployment, poverty rates and educational outcomes fail to show any evidence
of an effect of Enterprise Community designation, although again we see some signs
of housing values increase. Again, this indicates there may be some capitalization
of improved services or infrastructure as a result of the funding produced by the
designation and the magnitude is similar to that found when compared to just the
12This current draft uses an incomplete list of Champion Communities when the program was formalized in 1999-
2000, culled from the original FOIA request and lists of current Champion Communities on the USDA website. The
author is in the process of trying to acquire a more complete list for this paper and potential future research on the
efficacy of the Champion Community program.
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Round 1 Champion Communities. Additionally, there is a statistically significant
increase in payroll per employee of 1.8% for Enterprise Communities, indicating some
evidence that positive labor market outcomes are occurring as a result of designation.
The increase in payroll per employee is also larger and more precisely estimated
compared to the CC only regression, but may also indicate the members of the
other selected programs may have had worse economic outcomes during the 1990s
compared to EC communities and thus were more attractive for future program
selections in later years.
2.5.3 Comparison to All Tracts and Neighboring Tracts
To examine the effect the Enterprise Community status relative to all other com-
munities and to investigate the existence of any potential spillover effects into neigh-
boring communities, I then estimate the following regression on all tracts in states
that held a round 1 Enterprise Community designee:
Y2000i = α + β1ECi + β2CCi + β3SURRECi + γX1990i + εi. (2.2)
Indicator variable CCi denotes if a tract is located with an identified Champion Com-
munity and SURRECi denotes if a tract is located on the border which surrounds an
Enterprise Community designated tract. If the regression is properly specified, these
regressions can provide estimates of the effect of Enterprise Community designation
compared to any other tract (although this would be inclusive of the “strategic plan
effect”) as well as any average spillover effects to neighboring communities. Economic
theory does not suggest these spillover effects should necessarily be in any particular
direction. If the targeted nature of the program only attracts “local” investment
and business from neighboring communities and thus only facilitates an (economy-
wide) inefficient transfer of economic activity, the spillover effect could be negative.
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Conversely, if the program generates new economic activity, there could be positive
spillover effects.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide the results from the eleven 2000 outcomes with and
without state control variables. Enterprise Community designation appears to pro-
vide strong declines in the unemployment rate, increases in median family income,
declines in occupational concentration and declines in poverty. However without
1980 data, it is unclear if these results are merely displaying regression to the mean.
Each coefficient estimate for the surrounding tracts are of the same sign, but of
smaller magnitude relative to the designated tracts, possibly indicating some posi-
tive spillover effects. It is also important to note that the EC and CC coefficients for
all regressions in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 also have the same sign indicating both programs
on an empirical basis are performing the same functions on the outcomes, even if the
relative degree is unclear.
2.5.4 Propensity Score Matching
The above approaches compared tracts within Enterprise Communities to tracts
within other communities that established the capability of forming a community
group to develop a strategic plan and implement it. They then show the effect of the
EC status relative to communities what had applied and/or been accepted for federal
programs that required a strategic plan. Outside of the informal help provided by the
USDA to the Champion Communities, the implementation of the later rounds of des-
ignation did not occur until at least 1999, so any differences found can be attributed
to the effect of the EC designation for this subset of communities. As discussed in
the program history, however, the inducement to generate a strategic plan is part
of the social benefit of having these types of competitions. Another useful estimate
for policy makers then is the value of the Enterprise Community program inclusive
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of any effect generated by forming a local economic development corporation. The
propensity score matching and “matched” county approaches provide estimates of
such an effect by identifying control groups of similar communities to those which
were recipients of the initiative, but who did not apply. This wla
Propensity score matching was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and
detailed in Wooldridge (2002) and Heckman et al. (1997). It aims to act as a random-
ization process by estimating the conditional probability of selection into the program
based on pre-treatment observables and then compare each treated tract with one or
more untreated tracts that have similar estimates of the likelihood of selection. In
general, in a program evaluation, one is interested in the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) which is defined as:
ATT = E[Y (1)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 1], (2.3)
where Y(D) represents the result of the outcome variable and D equals one if tracts
are treated and 0 if they are not. The researcher’s problem is that the outcomes
of the treated if they had not been treated needed to calculate E[Y (0)|D = 1] are
not observed. The estimates found in the three sections above do provide a control
group that can be used to identify the ATT but only when the treatment is defined
as receiving designation given you have developed a strategic plan. Those tracts
are not useful measures of untreated tracts if we want to also estimate the effect of
making a strategic plan as well. Since we cannot measure the untreated outcome of
the treated, one alternative equation to consider then is the difference between the
treated outcome of the treated and the untreated outcome of the untreated :
E[Y (1)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 0] = ATT + E[Y (0)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 0]. (2.4)
This equation states that the observed difference between the treated and untreated
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is equal to the average treatment effect on the treatment plus any selection bias
occurring due to selection not being random. If the Conditional Independence As-
sumption is satisfied, then the selection bias is zero and we can simply examine the
difference in outcomes of the treated and untreated. In this context, the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption does not require selection to be completely random
as would be required for a simple comparison, but does statet that the likelihood
of Enterprise Community designation depends on pre-treatment observed variables.
The propensity score approach estimates a probability of selection based on these
observed variables and then a researcher chooses a selection process to match des-
ignated tracts with undesignated tracts that have similar likelihoods of selection. If
the probability of selection is correctly estimated and appropriate matches are found
for the estimated propensity scores, the selection process will satisfy the Conditional
Independence Assumption.
The Conditional Independence Assumption will be violated if the goal is to solely
estimate the impact of the program as each of designated tracts were part of com-
munities who must have generated an application and the variables which cause
application generation are unobserved. However, if we redefine the treatment to
include having the local social capital and interest to develop a strategic plan that
helped obtain designation, the necessary support from state and local governments
as well as the Enterprise Community program itself, it may be more reasonable to
attribute unobserved selection bias to randomness. Given this definition, the propen-
sity score approach will still produce a valid estimate for the average treatment on
the treated (ATT).
I employ the matching process using the STATA command psmatch213 using
13 E. Leuven and B. Sianesi. 2003. “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propen-
sity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing”. http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/
bocode/s432001.html. Version 4.0.3.
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nearest neighbor with replacement and radius matching separately. I choose to use
replacement with nearest neighbor matching as there are only a small number of
untreated tracts which can be used to match when propensity scores are high. This
will reduce selection bias by not forcing a matches that may be far away in propensity
score (as would occur without replacement) but will increase the variance of the
estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005). Radius matching is used to increase the number
of available matches for comparison by choosing all untreated matches within a
certain radius of the propensity score of the treated tracts. This process also will
increase the variances of the estimates (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
Only designated tracts which were located within the common support were uti-
lized in order to make proper comparisons. Observations whose propensity score
were higher than the maximum score of the untreated tracts were dropped. An ini-
tial logit regression was run to estimate the probability of a tract being selected as
an Enterprise Community. The logit was performed using all tracts located in states
which had an Enterprise Community14, excluding communities which were used in
the control group for Subsection 2.5.2.
As performed in propensity score matches evaluating the urban Empowerment
Zones in Oakley and Tsao (2006), Busso and Kline (2008) and Ham et al. (2010),
including 1980 or earlier data controls for long-term trends which show that there
are significant difference between selected and unselected or matched communities
in long term trends. For example, if selected communities have seen unemployment
and poverty rising faster compared to matched communities, even if 1990 levels are
similar, this could bias the results of the Enterprise Community towards showing
no effect or a detrimental effect on these outcomes. Unfortunately, my choice of
14Using tracts for all states did not materially affect the results of the logit regression, but could potentially increase
the likelihood of ”matched” tracts being dissimilar on unobservables and thus were not used.
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data in utilizing the NCDB prevents the use of 1980 Census data for many rural
areas. Future extensions or refinements of this research may seek to address this
shortcoming using alternative data sources, however in addition to using the log pay
per employee for 1992 in the selection regression, I also include the change in growth
in pay per employee for the county in which the tract is located from 1988-1992.
The inclusion of this variable will help control for the possibility that trends in labor
market strength are part of the ”general distress” that was an element of selection.
The results of the initial logit regression with the covariates used to estimate the
probability of selection are found in Table 2.7. Most variables have the expected sign
on probability of designation; coefficient estimates of unemployment, government as-
sistance rates and poverty rates are positive and pay per employee is negative. Oddly,
proportion of those living below 50% of the poverty line is negatively correlated with
selection, however this may indicate extremely poor communities may not be in eli-
gible rural areas or do not have the social capital for development of an application.
As per Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity score matching is valid if se-
lection on observables the matching is successful in identifying control tracts which
are similar on the variables identified that are used for selection. Tables 2.8 and
2.10 show the means of the treated and control groups and reduction in bias due to
the matching procedures. Radius matching is performed with a caliper of size .01,
meaning all untreated tracts within a propensity score of .01 of each treated tract are
used for comparison. No significant differences for any of the utilized 1990 variables
were found. Additionally, low pseudo R2s and chi-square tests for joint-significance
of the probit model of selection run on the matched samples also support the claim
the model controls for the covariate bias well.
Tables 2.9 and 2.11 show the results of the difference in means of the treated tracts
32
and the entire sample for 2000 outcomes and the difference in means of the treated
tracts and matched tracts evaluation of the statistical significance of the average
treatment effect on the designated communities. No outcome shows any significant
difference between the enterprise communities and the matched controls in the one-
to-one matching procedure, while the radius matching finds statistically significant
differences with lower median housing values, lower payroll per employee for the
treated tracts and increased occupational diversity. The propensity score matching
finds no effect for Enterprise Community status on employment. The radius matching
also finds mild increases in poverty and government assistance rates and decreases
in population growth indicating a detrimental effect of designation. Alternatively,
the propensity score specification does not control for long term trends and the
enterprise communities may be tasked with reversing long-term declines that the
matched communities were not facing. Unreported results examining the estimate
of the difference in differences between 1990 and 2000 outcomes as opposed to the
reported difference in means do not show meaningful differences in results.
2.5.5 “Matched” Counties
The application process, implementation and evaluation of Empowerment Zones
and Enterprise Communities has been made difficult by the fact that the initial round
required specific boundaries for population, area size and poverty levels for included
tracts. This meant that certain tracts located near the application tracts were ex-
cluded from the program who otherwise would have culturally, politically or econom-
ically would be considered part of the “community.” Additionally, analysis generally
has to be performed on a tract by tract basis since communities are rarely defined by
any political boundary. This also makes difficult the act of identifying “communities”
which could have applied for the program but did not. Spatially identifying groups
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of tracts likely ignores political or economic boundaries which may have made such
community forming appropriate or inappropriate and frequently, the tracts of actual
Enterprise Communities were not contiguous and located across multiple counties
or even states. Further discussion of how this may affect the interpretation of the
results of this evaluation is found in the last section.
In further pursuit of identifying groups of tracts that could have applied but did
not, I examined the 1990 characteristics of counties to determine which counties
may have been eligible to apply. Although actual Enterprise Communities generally
spanned several counties, or alternatively only covered a fraction of a single county,
county-level governments frequently helped oversee the reigning local development
corporation in charge of the Enterprise Community, making it an appropriate and
convenient grouping of census tracts to examine. After identifying counties that
were likely eligible for application, I then compared them to “Combined Enterprise
Communities” consisting of population-weighted average or total statistics of each
communities’ designated tracts.
I examined the 1990 statistics of each county and eliminated any county which
did not pass certain justified rules I created based on 1990 Census characteristics.
Counties must have an overall poverty rate above 30%. By rule, all Enterprise
Communities must have 25% poverty in 90% of tracts and 35% poverty in half of
tracts. Included counties must have a density below 100 persons per square mile.
This ensures the county is sufficiently rural and in practice, all but one Combined
Enterprise Communities had density below 100. Total county Area need to be below
5000 square miles. By rule, all applied communities had a maximum of 1000 sq. mi.,
although this was not followed in practice; some Combined Enterprise Communities
surpassed this amount. Total county population was required to be below 100,000
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persons; all Combined Enterprise Communities had populations less than 100,00 and
by rule the maximum population was to be 30,000, but again this was not followed
strictly. Additionally, government assistance rate for the county needed to be above
5%. There was no rule for this for the application, but communities did need to
provide a general indication of distress and all Combined Enterprise Communities
showed take-up rates above 5%.
Two other rules were employed to ensure the selected counties were similar to those
selected but did not receive a treatment. All counties which included census tracts
that received some other rural federal zone designation such as later round Enterprise
Community, Empowerment Zone or Renewal Community or any identified Champion
Community from any round were removed. Additionally, counties for which the
population was more than 20% American Indian were excluded. Communities that
primarily consisted of American Indian reservations were not eligible for Round 1,
although they were for subsequent programs and were frequently selected.
This left fifty “matched” counties for comparison with the thirty combined enter-
prise communities. A comparison of 1990 summary statistics can be found in Table
2.12. No County Business Patterns data are used since there was no way to assign
a relevant figure to the Combined Enterprise Communities with any degree of accu-
racy. Many Enterprise Communities consist of tracts from several counties and, as
discussed previously, the data is as useful as a measure of labor market quality within
the designated tracts, but instead as a measure of quality in the county-wide area of
the tracts. The table does show significant differences between the two sets of coun-
ties/communities, with the matched counties exhibiting much lower average housing
values and average family incomes as well as higher poverty and welfare rates. So, on
average the “matched” counties were likely worse off than the combined enterprise
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communities. This matching did not produce communities with similar statistics as
the propensity score matching; however this was not the intent. The intent was to
identify communities which on several metrics met the eligibility requirement but did
not apply. On observables, the higher levels of distress may point to a community
without the social capital or leadership to generate an economic development plan
for application. Although the high variability of county and combined Enterprise
Community density does not show a statistically significant difference between the
means of the two groups, the mean of the “matched” counties is 60% less than that
of the enterprise communities. The lower density could conceivably be a deterrent
to the political and social relationships needed to generate a strategic plan.
Table 2.13 shows the results of regressions estimating Equation 2.1 on the “matched”
counties and combined enterprise communities with the same 1990 controls15 used as
the previous regressions except average housing values and family income are used
for the county/community and no County Business Patterns statistics. The only
significant difference between 2000 outcomes for the two groups when controlling
for 1990 observables is found in the OCI which is significantly smaller for combined
enterprise communities. Additionally, signs for the Enterprise Community designa-
tion for unemployment, high school dropout rate and poverty rates are all positive,
possibly indicating the program’s effect was either negligible or detrimental. A more
likely possibility however is that the “matched” communities may have experienced a
reversion to the mean that surpassed the Enterprise Communities due to their lower
initial standing, however utilizing earlier data would provide a better confirmation
of such a phenomenon.
15See Appendix for list.
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2.6 Discussion
The results of the above evaluation do not show a significant effect of the pro-
gram on unemployment during the time frame examined, but there are signs that the
program may have provided positive benefit. Median home values were significantly
higher in enterprise communities compared to communities which which applied but
were not successful in receiving designation in the first round as well as higher than
communities which received similar designations in future rounds of competition
in 1999 and 2001. It is possible then that either that there was an improvement
in housing quality or housing values capitalized increases in social services and in-
frastructure improvements funded by the Enterprise Community program. These
increases in housing prices parallel similar findings in urban Empowerment Zones by
Busso and Kline (2008). Population trends, however, in the last half of the 1990s
relative to the control groups indicate that the selected communities were successful
in sustaining population growth in line with other communities. Further examina-
tion of the population changes of subgroups in a longer timeframe will provide a
better picture as to whom the communities may be attracting or repelling relative
to others.
These estimates are appropriate for determining the average treatment effect of
being awarded designation conditional on applying as they control for having the
capability to develop and actualizing strategic plans for submitting an application.
As this process could generate positive benefits itself, the estimates from the first
two comparison groups are most closely related to the actual effect of designation.
It is unclear whether Champion Community status or future program designation
would bias these estimates in a particular direction. Champion communities may
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be better off relative to Enterprise Communities by virtue of them not establishing
enough economic distress for selection, but also may not have developed an attrac-
tive enough strategic plan. Similarly, future designated communities may have seen
further decline in the 1990s inducing them to apply in later rounds or ”creaming” of
the first round of Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community selection led them to
be selected with better economic conditions. Observed sample means from 1990 sug-
gest the control tracts from the first two comparison groups were better off compared
to Enterprise Communities leading to downward bias for estimates of any beneficial
effects of designation. That said, a variety of 1990 controls were used and coefficient
estimates for the effect on unemployment and poverty rates were small in magnitude.
Compared to all tracts in states with an Enterprise Community, designation ap-
pears to have a significantly negative effect on unemployment, poverty and occupa-
tional concentration and a positive effect on median family income. However, this
estimate does not control for the “application effect” and may also include the effect
of having the capability to make a strategic plan. The combined effect then would
be expected to be of larger magnitude compared to the estimates from the first two
control groups. While this could be attributable to mean reversion, it may support
the claim made by President Clinton and others that the application effect generates
benefits to the community even if the effect of the program itself can’t be found. Ad-
ditionally, the magnitude of the increase in median housing values was lower when
compared to all tracts and not statistically significant. However, this could still be
consistent with the other regressions if housing values are increasing at higher rates
in non-treatment tracts and the effect of the zone designation kept pace with those
increases whereas it would have fallen behind otherwise.
Signs on indicators for tracts which border Enterprise Communities have the same
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sign as designated tracts which may indicate intra-community transfers of business
activity are not occurring as warned about in Bondonio and Engberg (2000). It could
be argued that this is less likely to occur in rural areas since the costs of moving a
business and employees between tracts is much larger in rural compared to urban
areas due to increase distances between population centers. However, it may still be
possible that transfers of business activity are occurring on a larger spatial area than
examined.
The propensity score matching and “matched” county procedures also did not
produce identifiable differences as a result of Enterprise Community designation for
unemployment or poverty levels. Both procedures showed decreases in occupational
concentration, indicating workers are reporting participating in a wider variety of
types of jobs and potentially a wider variety of industries that could promote long-
term stability. Interestingly, the radius matching propensity score approach found a
significant reduction in median housing values associated with enterprise community
designation which may call into question the results from the OLS comparison group
regressions. If there was a significant positive effect of both the leadership required
to form an application and the designation itself, it could be expected that the
results from the propensity score matching would be greater than the comparison to
Champion Communities. However, this did not occur.
It is important to revisit the question of whether we should expect economic
changes due to this program in the first place. As discussed in the program theory
section, the Enterprise Community Initiative for rural areas consisted of employer
tax credits and a start-up grant to leverage for other sources of money in local
private of public sector as well as preferential treatment in federal grant programs
across the government. Although the specific program designs were developed by
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local communities, federal government administrators and local agencies themselves
frequently touted the successes of job training programs, housing construction and
revolving loan funds for businesses (USDHUD and USDA, 1997; USDA, 2001). Other
grant money was available through alternative competitive processes in which they
were provided preferential treatment, but the availability of federal funds is limited
to the scope of the programs. This may or may not be restricting in practice, but
the local development corporations are working under more constraints than a large
lump sum grant.
It is also possible that any tax benefits may not be effective. In reports gener-
ated by the GAO and HUD on the urban Empowerment Zones, they found large
businesses, in particular those with over 500 employees, were much more likely to
be aware of and take advantage of tax credits (GAO, 1999; Herbert et al., 2001).
This is credited to having better expertise to tax filing and having the profits that
necessitate using the tax credit, and thus it is unclear if this then is useful to smaller
businesses in rural areas to the extent we would see employment growth.
This choice of how the address local problems of unemployment and poverty was
made at the local level in hopes of better taking advantage of local institutional
knowledge and to avoid a “one fits all approach.” A GAO interim report of ur-
ban Empowerment Zones cited poor economic conditions and lack of human and
physical capital as problem areas the local stakeholders wanted to address (Herbert
et al., 2001). However, while there were varying combinations of promoting busi-
ness versus workforce development being put forward as tools for achieving their
primary goals, the communities sought these tools with the secondary purpose that
they would also in turn allay crime, racial problems or physical conditions. The
report noted, though, stakeholders frequently remained ambiguous about how that
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was to occur. Rural enterprise communities report a variety of different approaches
such as training for loan procedures for businesses and potential homeowners and
creating business centers to educate businesses owners on federal programs and tax
incentives. Decreasing the costs of employment for workers were also made possible
through transportation arrangements, child care and skills training (USDA, 2001).
While the application of programs was not consistent across communities, the
statistics used for the selection process and the choice of programs developed by
communities indicated business and employment growth and poverty alleviation were
main concerns for local and national stakeholders. This paper’s findings of little
evidence of improvement in these areas once control groups are identified may be
disconcerting for policy makers. Empirically, however, Bondonio and Greenbaum
(2007) describe how null-mean impact analysis may bely more complex processes
taking place. They note increases in employees, sales and capital investment by new
and existing businesses could actually be offset by zone-induced closures by inefficient
businesses, leaving behind stronger firms. That said, “foot-loose” low-wage business
may take advantage of tax incentives to relocate and then move on when a better
offer arrives (Rushing, 2000). Another type of bias that could occur is that growing
firms are more likely to take advantage of the tax benefits and other assistance
provided by targeted economic programs, but these firms are more likely to grow in
the absence of such benefits, providing an upward bias on the effects of the program
Bartik (2002). It is unclear, however, if these theories and findings would apply in
the same fashion to rural communities.
A related empirical question raised by the above findings is if differentiation in
funding levels generated by the local communities produces disparate outcomes by
2000. I collected the total funds obtained by each Enterprise Community as reported
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in posted Annual Reports from 2001 from the USDA EZ/EC website.16. Table 2.14
reports the same 9 (non CBP) 2000 outcomes with the following regression using the
same 1990 controls as in Table 2.13:
Y2000i = α + βln(Fi) + γX1990i + εi (2.5)
where Fi is the reported funding. The estimates show increases in funding have a
positive effect on average housing values in the community, but also positive effects
on poverty rates. To interpret these results, it is important to note that decisions
on funding, which were based on applications made to governmental grant programs
after designation, may be made based on poverty conditions that were more closer
in measure to the 2000 Census than 1990. It is very possible then that Enterprise
Communities with larger increases in poverty during the 1990s may have indicated
higher distress levels that resulted in more funding. As such, it is unclear what
direction the causality would go. Additionally, while higher housing values may indi-
cate growth or a capitalization of future expected growth, it may also be correlated
with sources of human capital that would attract private investment into the devel-
opment corporations or grant money from state or federal governments. It should
be noted that an examination of the correlation between funding and 1990 levels
showed evidence only HS graduation rate (ρ = −.419) and proportion of population
that was white (ρ = 0.483) were related to the amount of funds. A regression of 1990
statistics on funding showed no significant correlation. It is unclear, however, that
marginal funding levels would have an affect on 2000 outcomes as employment and
anti-poverty programs could take months or years to establish and years for evidence
of effectiveness to develop.
16See footnote 6.
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2.6.1 Strategic Plan Development
Another issue to consider is that developing the initial strategic plans was prob-
lematic for many communities. Thomas (1995) detail the problems in developing the
strategic plans, including inconsistent lists of plan elements communities could in-
clude that were provided by the federal government and contradicting advice made by
HUD and USDA representatives about what was important for the application eval-
uation. Additionally, many communities experienced difficulties establishing local
community development corporations to be the lead organization, particularly if it
was not being done at the county level. Aigner et al. (1999) cite problems specifically
within the rural areas with building trust within a variety of potentially competing
stakeholders as well as differing communities that do not fall along tract boundaries
competing with each other within a zone/community. Later on, many rural enter-
prise communities reported turnover in the staff and leadership of the lead economic
development corporation as a inhibitor to progression in executing their strategies
(USDA, 2001). In rural areas, it is clear a relative scarcity of entrepreneurial skills
and leadership ability can make locally administered development plans problematic.
Conversely, rural communities also experience idiosyncratic problems which require
locally tailored solutions such as resistance from militia groups in the Lake County
EC, Michigan, drought and damage caused by the Cerro Grande Fire in the La Ji-
carta EC of New Mexico and interracial conflict in the North Delta Mississippi EC
and Northeast Louisiana Delta EC (USDA, 2001)
Another hurdle some communities faced was determining the boundary definition
of their communities. Only half of the selected communities were wholly within
a single county. Communities ranged from being defined by a single tract (Santa
Cruz, CA and East Prairie, MS) to 10 tracts spanning 6 counties (Central Savannah
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River Rural EC in Georgia). Of those ranging over multiple counties, several were
still contiguous, although most were not. The political processes which generated
these boundaries were constrained by the program’s tract-level and community level
poverty requirements17. This could generate problems for the implementation and
efficacy of any strategic plan. If tracts which are more economically healthy are
not included, stakeholders, political entities, and community organizations in those
tracts or whose constituencies may lie in both included and non-included tracts may
be less willing to provide resources. Additionally, if selected tracts do not represent
a clear social community, both implementing and measuring the impact of health,
vocational and child care programs (among others) may be problematic. The tract
residency of those in need, the tract location of where such services are desired (say,
near a place of work) and the tract location of where such services could be most
effectively provided (for example, near an existing health care facility) may all be
different.
On the other hand, the political reasoning to prevent non-high-poverty tracts
from being included does provide some suggestion that allowing for more pre-existing
well-defined communities is not necessarily beneficial for the intended targets of the
program. Presumably, high-poverty tracts are targeted because they are the ones
most in need. If tracts with less poverty are included, stakeholders from those tracts
may end up being more likely to dominate strategic plan and community development
board decisions. Additionally, the inclusion of several stakeholders over a wide range
of political communities may generate regional cohesion and cooperation which may
not have otherwise existed18. Of course, disagreements over disparate priorities could
17Thomas (1995) details the difficulties similar federal requirements generated for applicants of the urban Empow-
erment Zones.
18During the application process, states varied as to their level of involvement. Some local communities recieved
no help from the state in their application formation while other states took the lead in community formation.
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certainly evolve from such discussions as well.
An example that illustrates further potential trade-offs of using poverty-rate-
restricted tracts or existing political boundaries is the employer tax credit. If busi-
nesses are encouraged to move from non-designated to designated tracts as a result,
this is a gain for the designated tract, but possible efficiency reducing for the overall
community, particularly if the move is simply across town or across county. If a
larger or more coherent geographic area is used, such distortions (within the local
economy) may be avoided and businesses may still seek to hire additional workers.
The distortion could even go the other way as business, despite the tax credit, avoid
designated communities because of stigma that they are economic deficient in some
way. Additionally, if efficiencies of agglomeration economies exist locally, providing
incentives for business and individuals to remain within or move to selected tracts
instead of relocating to more dense and potentially more economically sustainable
locations could stunt the development of the regional economy.
Therefore, the analysis performed in this paper may be affected by the choice
of tract eligibility requirements. The results measure the impact of generating an
application and receiving designation conditional on the communities meeting the
tract-level requirements described by Congress. The results do not control for differ-
ences between and within Enterprise Communities, Champion Communities and un-
applied communities faced in application and community formation because of these
requirements. As mentioned above, reversion to the mean for the highest-poverty
tracts might theoretically overstate the effectiveness of the program. However, the
lack of freedom in selecting an eligible community’s boundaries, which arguably is
contrary to the stated goals of local decision-making and autonomy could impact
the efficiency of the development and execution of any strategic plan and make it
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more difficult to take advantage of agglomeration economies. Future research on the
long-term impact of this program could include a more detailed understanding of
how the decisions over EC boundaries were made, in addition to examining the im-
pact of geographic size, community contiguousness, and the use of existing political
boundaries on relevant economic outcomes.
Lastly, a closer examination of the economic impact of spending in rural areas re-
veals that, although programs like the EZ/EC do allow communities to develop plans
that are specific to their location, many “traditional” programs which are frequently
used in urban areas are not necessarily appropriate for rural communities (Hyman,
1998; Deavers et al., 1986). Kilkenny (2010) outlines the difficulty of program design
and program evaluation for rural communities while pointing out the incoherence of
current economic theory surrounding programs which seek to alleviate rural poverty
and promote economic development. She notes transportation infrastructure spend-
ing in rural counties tends to promote urbanization of populations rather than rural
development, although many Enterprise Communities focused efforts not on improv-
ing roads, but improving access to public transportation that allowed for increased
mobility to jobs around the region (USDA, 2001). Additionally, job training pro-
grams can frustrate workers who cannot find local jobs and can result in such higher
human capital workers emigrating to urban locations and construction of low-income
housing may actually decrease mobility for the poor by discouraging them to move
to locations where they may have better opportunities Kilkenny (2010). In one case,
the community is worse off for losing the newly skilled worker and in the other case,
the low-income family may be worse off by remaining in the community. Elements of
both types of programs frequently appeared in the strategic plans of the Enterprise
Communities (USDA, 2001). Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) provides further evidence
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a national place-based economic policy is just as likely to do more harm than good.
Thus, spatially-targeted policies which may improve the overall economic status of
communities may not be the most beneficial policies for individual inhabitants or
vice versa.
In this paper, I propose a variety of possible control groups to identify the impact
of being awarded rural Round 1 Enterprise Community designation. I find increases
in housing values compared to communities which were unsuccessful in their appli-
cations, but little evidence of unemployment or poverty differences between those
groups or control groups identified through matching procedures. Identifying the
efficacy of these programs is not just important in retrospect, but also because such
programs continue to be implemented. For example, Congress implemented the Gulf
Opportunity Zones over wide swaths of Louisiana, southern Mississippi and western
Alabama in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and (Stoker and Rich, 2006). I intended
to continue this research by improving the identification of Champion Communities,
identifying specific policies individual communities enacted to empirically identify
best practices as well as utilize 2010 Census data to better evaluate the rural de-
signees for all rounds of competition of the EZ/EC Initiative. As data availability
continues to improve, it is important that researchers of evaluations of economic
development programs in rural areas work to correctly identify which programs are
effective in improving the economic outcomes of residents and have external validity
and what policies are inefficient in their execution.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1:
Histogram of Ratio between 1990 Tract and County
Unemployment Rates for Round 1 Enterprise Communities
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Table 2.1:
Summary 1990 statistics of Undesignated Tracts, Round 1 EC Tracts, Round
1 CC Tracts, Tracts Bordering Round 1 EC Tracts and Rounds 2 and 3 EZ,
EC and RC Tracts
Undesignated R1 R1 R1 EC Round 2&3
EC CC Border EZ/EC/RC
1990 Total Population 3826.4 3870.0 3839.8 3965.8 3475.5
(1734.1) (1702.3) (1553.4) (1635.9) (1655.0)
1990 Median Housing Values 88190.7 38423.9 36311.7 50693.0 37370.2
(82311.6) (18911.3) (20321.7) (40067.6) (34156.4)
1990 Unemployment Rate 0.0687 0.137 0.121 0.0870 0.140
(0.0534) (0.0697) (0.0457) (0.0417) (0.0697)
1990 Median Family Income 32943.6 18933.2 18586.5 25086.4 18049.2
(18108.0) (7628.8) (7179.5) (9197.7) (8939.5)
1990 Poverty Rate 0.135 0.361 0.352 0.225 0.361
(0.124) (0.0972) (0.0992) (0.0899) (0.122)
1990 Child (> 18) Poverty Rate 0.173 0.469 0.433 0.291 0.452
(0.165) (0.126) (0.126) (0.122) (0.146)
1990 HS Dropout Rate 0.115 0.164 0.167 0.133 0.161
(0.108) (0.0929) (0.103) (0.0815) (0.0951)
1990 Prop. 25+ with no HS deg. 0.253 0.494 0.454 0.406 0.451
(0.149) (0.108) (0.131) (0.122) (0.123)
1990 Occ. Concentration Index 1586.7 1526.5 1495.8 1467.8 1498.7
(421.6) (342.4) (235.9) (240.8) (335.4)
1988 Pay Per Employee 19.91 14.45 15.12 15.10 14.58
(4.054) (2.501) (3.526) (2.861) (2.897)
1990 Pay Per Employee 21.21 15.16 16.03 15.94 15.55
(4.373) (2.518) (3.730) (2.956) (3.286)
1992 Pay Per Employee 23.14 16.70 17.52 17.50 16.94
(4.863) (2.539) (3.808) (3.051) (3.311)
1990 Welfare Assistance Rate 0.0791 0.205 0.171 0.126 0.195
(0.0821) (0.0730) (0.0705) (0.0563) (0.0883)
1990 Prop. Black 0.121 0.369 0.235 0.214 0.248
(0.230) (0.311) (0.286) (0.234) (0.303)
1990 Prop. White 0.805 0.578 0.711 0.723 0.612
(0.256) (0.294) (0.275) (0.235) (0.321)
1990 Prop. Hisp./Latino 0.0809 0.0980 0.120 0.0814 0.0940
(0.158) (0.265) (0.259) (0.215) (0.243)
1990 Prop. 25+ with BA 0.198 0.0754 0.0999 0.100 0.0920
(0.149) (0.0359) (0.0997) (0.0649) (0.0531)
1990 Elderly Poverty Rate 0.127 0.338 0.305 0.254 0.338
(0.112) (0.131) (0.124) (0.116) (0.153)
1990 Population Density 5078.1 617.5 823.2 307.2 642.6
(11592.2) (1361.0) (1786.7) (1097.8) (1832.9)
1990 Prop. >65y 0.129 0.141 0.130 0.138 0.132
(0.0737) (0.0395) (0.0509) (0.0482) (0.0500)
1990 Prop. Child <18y 0.254 0.311 0.288 0.283 0.312
(0.0699) (0.0439) (0.0707) (0.0426) (0.0639)
Observations 64176 156 506 302 360
Note: Undesignated tracts included tracts not otherwise included in another column from states that
included an Enterprise Community. See Appendix for listing.
Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.2:
2000-1990 Difference in statistics of Undesignated Tracts, Round 1 EC Tracts,
Round 1 CC Tracts, Tracts Bordering Round 1 EC Tracts and Rounds 2 and
3 EZ, EC and RC Tracts
2000-1990 Undesignated R1 R1 R1 EC Round 2&3
Variable EC CC Border EZ/EC/RC
Unemployment Rate -0.00530 -0.0251 -0.0211 -0.00980 -0.0254
(0.0416) (0.0621) (0.0496) (0.0411) (0.0609)
Log Median Family Income 0.509 0.434 0.492 0.392 0.587
(0.515) (0.295) (0.422) (0.309) (0.636)
Log Median Home Value 0.526 0.425 0.496 0.461 0.531
(0.553) (0.273) (0.419) (0.347) (0.663)
OCI 219.3 188.3 223.1 225.1 245.8
(272.4) (263.2) (204.5) (246.3) (433.1)
Log Pay Per Employeea 0.342 0.302 0.303 0.311 0.295
(0.0848) (0.0867) (0.115) (0.100) (0.106)
Poverty Rate -0.00327 -0.0709 -0.0650 -0.0316 -0.0662
(0.0559) (0.0699) (0.0701) (0.0614) (0.0855)
Child Poverty Rate -0.008 -0.0890 -0.0834 -0.0360 -0.0719
(0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.096) (0.133)
Welfare Assistance Rate 0.00572 -0.0187 -0.00254 -0.00267 -0.0180
(0.0423) (0.0730) (0.0586) (0.0460) (0.0698)
Hs Dropout Rate -0.0150 -0.00895 -0.0274 -0.00725 -0.0214
(0.111) (0.107) (0.106) (0.104) (0.114)
Proportion No HS degree -0.0487 -0.0977 -0.0917 -0.0920 -0.0866
(0.0652) (0.0567) (0.0584) (0.0676) (0.0682)
Log Population 0.1137 0.0225 0.0442 0.0873 0.0535
(0.3300) (0.2040) (0.3052) 0.2568 (0.2351)
Observations 64176 156 506 302 360
aDifference calculated for 2004-1994.
Mean of each difference with standard deviation in parentheses.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Logit Regression for Propensity Score Estimation
VARIABLES Logit Odds ratio
log 1990 Tract Population 0.491** 1.633**
(0.204) (0.333)
log Tract Area 0.383*** 1.467***
(0.0621) (0.0911)
1990 Unemployment Rate 2.935 18.82
(1.909) (35.92)
1990 Poverty Rate 10.47*** 35,367***
(2.521) (89,171)
1990 HS Dropout Rate 0.0692 1.072
(0.965) (1.034)
log 1990 Median Home Value -0.246 0.782
(0.281) (0.220)
log 1990 Median Fam. Income 0.465 1.592
(0.381) (0.607)
1990 Car Ownership Rate 3.639** 38.06**
(1.525) (58.04)
1990 Prop. 25+ with BA 3.739 42.04
(2.431) (102.2)
1990 Prop. 25+ with HS degree -5.509*** 0.00405***
(1.333) (0.00540)
1990 Occupational Concentration Index -0.00108*** 0.999***
(0.000364) (0.000364)
1990 Prop. < 50per of Poverty Line -8.326*** 0.000242***
(2.472) (0.000599)
1990 Prop. > 200per of Poverty Line -4.387** 0.0124**
(1.932) (0.0240)
1990 Prop. Black 6.369*** 583.2***
(1.055) (615.4)
1990 Prop. White 5.074*** 159.8***
(1.089) (174.1)
1990 Prop. Hisp./Latino 3.266*** 26.20***
(0.697) (18.26)
1990 Welfare Assistance Rate 3.604** 36.74**
(1.795) (65.96)
Log 1992 Pay Per Employee -3.281*** 0.0376***
(0.559) (0.0210)





Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Nearest Neighbor Matching Bias Reduction Evaluation
1990 %reduct t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t-stat p-value
Log Population Unmatched 8.148 8.154 -1.2 -0.14 0.89
Matched 8.151 8.162 -2.1 -82.5 -0.19 0.85
Log Tract Area Unmatched 3.713 1.338 120.0 14.43 0.00
Matched 3.719 3.620 5.0 95.8 0.41 0.68
Unemployment Unmatched 0.137 0.069 111.6 16.77 0.00
Rate Matched 0.136 0.129 12.5 88.8 0.93 0.35
Poverty Unmatched 0.361 0.139 207.0 23.74 0.00
Rate Matched 0.361 0.357 3.6 98.3 0.28 0.78
High School Unmatched 0.164 0.122 41.7 4.91 0.00
Dropout Rate Matched 0.163 0.158 5.2 87.5 0.49 0.63
Log Median Unmatched 10.47 11.03 -93.1 -9.34 0.00
Housing Value Matched 10.47 10.52 -8.2 91.1 -1.05 0.29
Log Median Unmatched 9.784 10.189 -82.9 -8.55 0.00
Family Income Matched 9.785 9.809 -4.8 94.2 -0.55 0.59
Car Ownership Unmatched 0.808 0.900 -88.4 -10.19 0.00
Rate Matched 0.808 0.815 -6.7 92.4 -0.55 0.59
Percent with Unmatched 0.075 0.188 -107.4 -9.77 0.00
College Degree Matched 0.076 0.079 -3.4 96.9 -0.78 0.44
Percent with Unmatched 0.506 0.736 -177.0 -19.24 0.00
HS Degree Matched 0.508 0.507 0.6 99.7 0.07 0.95
Occupational Unmatched 1526.5 1559.3 -10.1 -1.35 0.18
Concen. Index Matched 1526.7 1527.2 -0.2 98.3 -0.02 0.99
Percent with Inc. Unmatched 0.159 0.061 144.1 18.91 0.00
below 50% Pov. Matched 0.159 0.158 0.7 99.5 0.05 0.96
Percent with Inc. Unmatched 0.358 0.673 -212.6 -21.40 0.00
above 200% Pov. Matched 0.359 0.353 4.1 98.1 0.48 0.63
Percent Black Unmatched 0.369 0.128 87.9 13.00 0.00
Matched 0.371 0.401 -10.9 87.6 -0.79 0.43
Percent White Unmatched 0.578 0.800 -81.3 -11.04 0.00
Matched 0.575 0.556 7.1 91.3 0.54 0.59
Percent Hispanic Unmatched 0.098 0.072 12.0 2.17 0.03
Matched 0.092 0.079 6.0 49.7 0.50 0.62
Gov't Assistance Unmatched 0.205 0.083 162.8 19.76 0.00
Rate Matched 0.206 0.195 14.4 91.2 1.10 0.27
Log Payroll Per Unmatched 2.804 3.097 -162.5 -17.93 0.00
Employee 1992 Matched 2.804 2.802 1.2 99.3 0.10 0.92
1988-1992 Diff. in Unmatched 0.053 0.027 29.2 4.49 0.00
! Pay Per Emp. Matched 0.054 0.074 -23.0 21.0 -1.21 0.23
Sample Pseudo "2 p>"2
R2
Unmatched 0.426 850.63 0.00














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Radius Matching Bias Reduction Evaluation
1990 %reduct t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t-stat p-value
Log Population Unmatched 8.148 8.154 -1.2 -0.14 0.89
Matched 8.148 8.159 -2.0 -75.2 -0.18 0.86
Log Tract Area Unmatched 3.713 1.338 120.0 14.43 0.00
Matched 3.717 3.416 15.2 87.3 1.16 0.25
Unemployment Unmatched 0.137 0.069 111.6 16.77 0.00
Rate Matched 0.131 0.127 7.5 93.3 0.52 0.60
Poverty Unmatched 0.361 0.139 207.0 23.74 0.00
Rate Matched 0.355 0.333 20.2 90.2 1.39 0.17
High School Unmatched 0.164 0.122 41.7 4.91 0.00
Dropout Rate Matched 0.163 0.157 6.0 85.7 0.53 0.60
Log Median Unmatched 10.47 11.03 -93.1 -9.34 0.00
Housing Value Matched 10.48 10.54 -10.2 89.1 -1.09 0.28
Log Median Unmatched 9.784 10.189 -82.9 -8.55 0.00
Family Income Matched 9.804 9.835 -6.3 92.4 -0.64 0.52
Car Ownership Unmatched 0.808 0.900 -88.4 -10.19 0.00
Rate Matched 0.808 0.820 -11.6 86.8 -0.86 0.39
Percent with Unmatched 0.075 0.188 -107.4 -9.77 0.00
College Degree Matched 0.077 0.093 -15.2 85.8 -2.11 0.04
Percent with Unmatched 0.506 0.736 -177.0 -19.24 0.00
HS Degree Matched 0.513 0.539 -20.2 88.6 -1.80 0.07
Occupational Unmatched 1526.5 1559.3 -10.1 -1.35 0.18
Concen. Index Matched 1523.2 1539.7 -5.1 49.7 -0.44 0.66
Percent with Inc. Unmatched 0.159 0.061 144.1 18.91 0.00
below 50% Pov. Matched 0.155 0.147 12.9 91.0 0.88 0.38
Percent with Inc. Unmatched 0.358 0.673 -212.6 -21.40 0.00
above 200% Pov. Matched 0.366 0.401 -23.2 89.1 -2.02 0.05
Percent Black Unmatched 0.369 0.128 87.9 13.00 0.00
Matched 0.369 0.356 4.8 94.6 0.34 0.73
Percent White Unmatched 0.578 0.800 -81.3 -11.04 0.00
Matched 0.578 0.594 -6.0 92.6 -0.45 0.65
Percent Hispanic Unmatched 0.098 0.072 12.0 2.17 0.03
Matched 0.085 0.073 5.9 51.1 0.50 0.62
Gov't Assistance Unmatched 0.205 0.083 162.8 19.76 0.00
Rate Matched 0.202 0.188 19.0 88.3 1.26 0.21
Log Payroll Per Unmatched 2.804 3.097 -162.5 -17.93 0.00
Employee 1992 Matched 2.812 2.846 -18.8 88.5 -1.42 0.16
1988-1992 Diff. in Unmatched 0.053 0.027 29.2 4.49 0.00
! Pay Per Emp. Matched 0.053 0.059 -6.6 77.3 -0.37 0.72
Sample Pseudo "2 p>"2
R2
Unmatched 0.426 850.63 0.00





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.12: Summary statistics for ”Matched” County Comparison
”Matched” Counties EC ”Counties” Difference P-value
Population 13512.5 45522.3 -32009.8*** 0.000
(11322.1) (25675.9) (4167.4)
Avg. Housing Value 39711.3 59339.1 -19627.8** 0.001
(6360.8) (40910.4) (5877.3)
Unemployment Rate 0.0972 0.0914 0.00584 0.407
(0.0317) (0.0280) (0.00701)
Avg. Family Income 24845.9 29714.7 -4868.8*** 0.000
(2740.4) (4769.7) (838.3)
Poverty Rate 0.348 0.231 0.117*** 0.000
(0.0426) (0.0610) (0.0116)
Child Poverty Rate 0.452 0.304 0.147*** 0.000
(0.0623) (0.0754) (0.0156)
Elderly Poverty Rate 0.334 0.246 0.0880*** 0.000
(0.0651) (0.0919) (0.0176)
HS Dropout Rate 0.114 0.139 -0.0251* 0.035
(0.0522) (0.0473) (0.0117)
Prop. 25+ with no HS degree 0.449 0.407 0.0415** 0.010
(0.0608) (0.0779) (0.0156)
OCI 1365.3 1304.2 61.15* 0.019
(123.0) (85.18) (25.52)
Gov’t Assistance Rate 0.167 0.128 0.0396*** 0.000
(0.0460) (0.0361) (0.00983)
Percent Black 0.287 0.193 0.0936 0.102
(0.270) (0.198) (0.0567)
Percent White 0.648 0.732 -0.0835 0.085
(0.217) (0.190) (0.0479)
Percent Hispanic 0.195 0.101 0.0932 0.143
(0.299) (0.222) (0.0630)
1990 Prop. 25+ with BA 0.101 0.102 -0.000648 0.940
(0.0394) (0.0324) (0.00854)
Population Density 23.39 69.14 -45.76 0.064
(21.48) (170.7) (24.36)
Percent Elderly 0.155 0.137 0.0173* 0.022
(0.0323) (0.0319) (0.00743)
Percent Children 0.299 0.285 0.0137 0.067
(0.0328) (0.0305) (0.00739)
Observations 50 30
See text for column definitions.
Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pump Pressure: Income, Public Transportation and the
Time Use Response to Gas Prices
3.1 Introduction
The economic value that urban transit systems generate are the result of economies
of scale from both the manufacture and provision of transportation as well as the
increased ease of labor mobility within a region and potentially reducing environmen-
tally harmful emissions. Transit expansion has also been shown to contribute both
to migration of low income individuals towards such areas as well as economic de-
velopment and property value increases in newly serviced neighborhoods (Glaeser et
al., 2008; Bowes and Ihlanfeldt, 2001; Gibbons and Machin, 2005; Hess and Almeida,
2007). Public provision and support of transit systems are justified by policy mak-
ers based on these arguments as private enterprises are not be able to generate the
economies of scale to see low enough average costs for sustainability and profit maxi-
mization are not likely to lead to pricing and market targeting decisions that generate
as much of the desired externalities.
In addition, fuel taxes are implemented by policy makers for both the reason of
reducing driving to reduce emissions as well as to provide general revenue. This
tax revenue is frequently earmarked to provide funding for highways and roads or it
can contribute to the support of other forms of transportation. Utilization of funds
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towards highways frames the gasoline tax as a “use” tax instead of a Pigouvian tax
that is attempting to capture the cost of the negative externality of the emissions.
Indeed, maintaining and expanding the road system through gasoline tax revenues
will reduce the efficacy of such a tax as a means to reduce driving.
Besides potential connections through funding, there is another economic interplay
between these two transportation policy spheres. Increasing the efficacy, scope and
speed of a public transportation system should induce increased ridership. It is
unclear, however, how such an event would change the incidence and effect of a
subsequent change in gasoline prices as a result of an increase in gasoline taxes
(or market forces, for that matter.) One prediction would be that the relatively
attractive mass transit system could generate greater levels of substitution when
higher gas prices occur. This would strengthen any marginal effects of gas taxes on
reducing driving behavior. On the other hand, the relatively more attractive system
may have already induced substitution for gas price elastic travelers, regardless of the
current gas prices. That is, the elasticity of car travel with respect to gas prices may
be much lower in areas with more attractive public transportation systems. Those
who continue to drive do because of their needs or tastes. In addition, better public
transportation may attract residents who are highly elastic with respect to driving.
From a statistical standpoint, this would increase the average elasticity in these
cities, but further separate the difference in elasticity in times of low gas prices and
times of high gas prices. Separately, roads travelled by those who switched to public
transportation could become more attractive during the new equilibrium transition,
resulting in little to no change in overall driving as new driving trips emerge.
Thus, the theoretical question of whether an increase in public transportation
capacity/efficacy dampens or heightens the effect of gas prices on car travel is am-
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biguous. This is an interesting empirical question to examine because a larger effect
of gas prices strengthens a policy case towards higher gas prices on environmental
grounds as reduced usage leads to lower carbon emissions. A lower effect of gas prices
weakens such a case and implies only higher revenues. This may be desirable as a
funding option, but does not reduce emissions. Indeed Parry and Small (2009) find
that while public transportation funding is efficiency improving overall, it is very
much a second-best solution to gasoline taxes in the reducing the externalities of
automobiles. The advent of more fuel-efficient automobile technology does help, but
fossil-fuel based sources of gasoline and electricity are still projected to be standard
for decades to come. In the realm of public transportation policy, if funding for pub-
lic transportation expansion is linked to higher gas taxes, but higher gas prices are
leading to increasingly inelastic usages of car travel that, for practical or preference
based reasons are not substituted towards public transportation, then this could be
viewed as an unfair policy. Taste based reasons for driving can be important, and if
gas taxes are perceived as a form of use tax, earmarking associated revenue for al-
ternative transportation modes could be politically unpopular. Further, low income
drivers may not have access to the public transportation system where they live or
work and lack the ability to change the locations of either.
In this paper, I find that the interaction effect of public transportation actu-
ally dampens the effect of gas prices reducing car travel, primarily through re-
duced leisure-purposed travel with no evidence of an interaction effect on work-based
travel. Public transportation increases the effect of gas prices on car travel time for
those making between $75,000 and $100,000, reversing a trend seen for other income
groups. In addition, public transportation availability dramatically increases the ef-
fect of gas prices on public transportation travel time for those in the lowest income
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group. These results suggest that there is significant interplay between public trans-
portation availability and policies which affect gas prices that results in behavioral
changes which can differ significantly for different segments of the population.
3.2 Previous Research
Many researchers have examined the elasticity of demand for gasoline in the
United States, with data being generally being culled from household expenditure
surveys like the US Consumer Expenditure Survey or through consumption inter-
views. Meta-analysis of US based surveys show an average estimate of slightly above
-0.5 (Dahl and Sterner, 1991; Espey, 1996) with short-run elasticities of demand
historically between -0.2 and -0.4 (Hughes et al., 2008; Puller and Greening, 1999;
Espey, 1998). Espey (1998) also found that elasticity estimates were falling in more
recent years and Hughes et al. (2008) found a short-run elasticity that was much
smaller around -0.05 using data from the early 2000s. If demand for gasoline has
become more inelastic over time, it is worth investigating how a predicted increased
income effect would manifest itself in other household decisions concerning expen-
ditures and time use behavior. More recently, Ferdous et al. (2010) expanded the
use of Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data to model household expenditure
responses to exogenous increases in transportation expenses. They found reductions
in food, savings and expenditures in automobile and home-based durable goods and
related maintenance.
Identifying the distributional impact of increased gas prices due to taxation or
market forces is also useful to determine the relative regressivity of tax changes.
Inelastic demand may result in gas price increases having a larger impact on low-
income households as a percentage of income, but several papers have noted that
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increases in gas prices such as via a tax are not actually as regressive as expected.
Higher-income households drive much more than lower-income households (Poterba,
1991; West, 2004), however whether a change is regressive or not depends on if you
use a definition based on total welfare impact or as a proportion of income or wealth.
Bento et al. (2009) and Nicol (2003) also estimate differential effects of changes in gas
prices or taxes on different subgroups. Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) determined
there to be an income elasticity of gasoline close to zero at lower incomes, suggesting
a “subsistence” level of gasoline consumption. This paper provides further evidence
of such a hypothesis and may provide further evidence as to what income levels
generate demand for gasoline consumption above subsistence level.
The analysis of public transportation subsides by Parry and Small (2009) suggest
they are efficiency increasing, although they do not address distributional aspect
of the welfare gains. Haire and Machemehl (2007) examined cross-price elasticities
of various forms of public transportation for five cities and calculated an average
elasticity of .24, although estimates for individual modes and cities varied widely.
Conversely, Winston and Maheshri (2006) argues every transit system reduces overall
welfare except for San Francisco’s BART. While I do not comment on the overall
welfare improving qualities of existing transit systems, I do provide new evidence
on how different income groups are utilizing public transportation and the extent to
which it is used as an alternative when adjusting to rising gas prices using national
data.
While there is a large literature examining the macroeconomic impact of oil and
gasoline prices on economic growth and demand, there has been less research at-
tempting to estimate the impact of gas prices on individual behavior outside of au-
tomotive and gasoline purchases. Edelstein and Kilian (2009) examine consumption
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shifts due to changes in energy prices, suggesting they are magnified by higher savings
rates caused by consumer pessimism on top of the negative shock to discretionary
income. Gicheva et al. (2007), looking at CES and retail-level data in California
found little decline in gasoline consumption itself; they found elasticities of expendi-
tures on food-away-from-home indicating a substitution on food consumption based
on an income effect. Additionally, grocery purchases were more likely to be made on
on-sale items when gasoline prices rose. Similar research by Courtemanche (2009)
linked obesity rates with decreased gas prices, estimating a permanent one dollar
increase in gasoline prices could reduce obesity by as much as 10% through increased
exercise and a reduced number meals eaten outside the home.
The use of time use data has not been fully exploited, particularly in the United
States where the BLS has only maintained a yearly survey since 2003, and there is
a call to implement the data in general in economics as well as in transportation
research (Hamermesh et al., 2005; Hamermesh, 2009; Pendyala and Goulias, 2002;
Bhat and Koppelman, 1999; Michelson, 2005; Joyce and Stewart, 1999). That said,
there is some suggestion time use data is limited in its usability in the U.S. as data
are limited to one individual in a household with no consumption data and time
duration/participation rates may not provide adequate measures as to the relative
utility of any of the activities chosen by a respondent (Pollack, 1999; Juster, 2009).
These objections can be also be made of consumption data, but there is incredible
value in approaching policy analysis using a dimension of human choice and behavior
that has been generally ignored in economic research.
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3.3 A Model of Time Use and Transportation
The modeling of consumer behavior to include a time budget was first popularized
by Becker (1965). Along with Lancaster (1966), they introduced the idea of a utility
function maximizing not over solely goods, but over “commodities” or “activities”,
which are functional combinations of the properties of consumer goods and/or the
time spent with those goods. These commodities each have a cost in terms of the
prices of the goods involved and the time allocated towards them. Individuals or
households maximize their utility subject to a monetary budget and the natural
limit of hours in the day. These themes were quickly picked up and refined by
forcing minimum time lengths, modeling in travel behavior or allowing for monetary
savings (DeSerpa, 1971; Oort, 1969; Small and Verhoef, 2007).
The model1 which underlies the empirical analysis is based on maximizing utility
utilizing a dual budget line with each activity requiring both a financial outlay to pay
for the goods and services necessary and a time budget line. In addition, activities
outside the home have a travel requirement which necessitates additional monetary
and temporal costs. This travel requirement can be satisfied through various modes,
each with their own financial cost per mile. There are only three such transportation
technologies: via car (regardless of driver), via public transportation (bus, train, or
subway) or via self-propelled means (walking or biking).
For simplicity, I assume the speed of each technology is constant, so the use of
a price per mile or a price per unit of time is directly related. This then does not
allow for intertemporal substitution of transportation (and their associated activities)
based on relative temporal price differences. “Rush-hour” public transportation may
have more frequent service or more expansive service compared to the weekend, while
1In addition to the above referenced papers, the model is also inspired by Johnson (1966) and Evans (1972).
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congestion on roads are likely different during the same times. I comment on the
impact this may have on the interpretation of the empirical estimations in Subsection
3.6.5. Suppose individual i gains utility through expenditures on goods, time spent
in various activities and through location attributes generated by miles traveled. A
non-separable utility function has the form of:
U = U(Xi,Ti,Mi), (3.1)
where Xi is a vector of goods and services which can be purchased utilizing the
price vector P, Ti is a vector of time spent in various activities and Mi represents
total miles traveled. Both goods and services and miles traveled enhance activity
utility but come a cost of both time and money. Ti specifically does not include time
spent traveling which is denoted by the vector’s elements, ti.
There exists two budget lines and a definition of M as a linear function of the
time spent in various modes of transport. The monetary budget line is as follows:




where Ii represents the individual’s income and cj represents the financial cost per













where gj is the speed of transportation mode j.

















λcj + τ = µgj ∀j, (3.8)
As stated above, to simplify, suppose there are just three modes of transportation,
automobile (1), public transportation (2) and self-propelled means (3).
This means:
M = g1t1 + g2t2 + g3t3. (3.9)
We can differentiate this initially with respect to c1 which, while modeled as the















can be substituted out by recognizing it is the ratio of the marginal indirect
utility of the cost of car transport and the marginal utility of miles. The former can
be shown by virtue of the envelope theorem to be equal to
∂V
∂c1
= −λt1, while the
latter is simply µ from Equation 3.7. This can give us an expression for the change















Since gj are in units of miles per hour, these are positive as would be the time
spent in car travel. Shadow prices are also considered to be positive. If the effect
of higher gas prices is weakly higher amounts of time spent in public transportation
and self-travel, then it is assured that there will be a negative effect of gas prices
on car travel. The possibility that the cross-price elasticity of gas on other forms
of travel is negative is theoretically possible due to the income effect. If demand
for car travel is sufficiently inelastic, less travel may be incurred in the other forms.
Additionally, if car travel is necessary for income producing activities and higher gas
prices result in an income shocks necessitating more car travel, the total effect could
be positive. In that case, car-based travel of this form would be similar to a Giffen
good, suggesting though that this is behaviorally unlikely.
Commuting is required for people to move from home to work. The value of such




), which represents the monetary value per mile of transport, would be
higher. This would generate smaller effects of gas prices on commuting time. It
should be noted that this would be true of all transportation technologies as well.
Another reason may be preference-based; individuals might simply prefer driving
or car-based travel over public transportation or biking/walking. The latter might
also not be possible due to location and distance between home and their travel
destinations, such as work. Lower levels of income should induce preference-based
inelasticity to no longer dominate, but may induce necessity-based inelasticity. In
the latter case, individuals may have exhausted all means already to substitute away
from car-based travel.
Similarly, we can also derive an expression of the effect of car transport on the

















can be substituted out by recognizing it is the ratio of the marginal
indirect utility of the speed of public transportation and the marginal utility of miles


















Based on the result of the envelope theorem, there is a change of t1 in total miles
(M), but the distribution of time for each mode could still change. Time spent
in car travel will not clearly fall, but it will take the opposite sign as the change
in time spent in public transportation or walking. While it seems likely for public
transportation to rise, it is important to recognize that miles are desired, not travel
time, so less travel time in public transportation (but the same number of miles)
could induce less time in public transport and even more time car transport if that
extra time is allocated towards income producing activities, leading to an income
effect on car travel dominating the substitution effect.
A further statistic of interest is the partial derivative of equation (11) with respect
to g2 and the partial derivative of equation (13) with respect to c1. These expressions
should be identical and represent the effect of the efficacy of a public transportation

































As described above, this sign of this expression is uncertain because of two op-
posing factors. Increased public transportation attractiveness makes substitution
towards its use more likely and thus cause magnify the negative effect of gas prices
on driving. At the same time, however, higher public transportation usage could
induce remaining car usage to be more inelastic causing a dampening of the effect
of gas prices. Empirical analyses can lead to a better idea as to how this is actually
playing out and if this effect differs for different income groups.


















This provides an expression to determine the value of speed as the ratio of the
effect of an increase in the speed of public transportation on car time use over the
effect of higher gas prices on time spent in public transportation. The data I use in
this paper do not include information about the actual speed of public transportation,
or the specific cost of a unit of time in car travel for that matter, but this framework
could be a useful structure to investigate the value of travel speed across different
cities and populations in future research.
3.4 Data Sources and Scope
3.4.1 ATUS data
I utilize data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS)2, administered by the
BLS, which consists of full-day diaries of respondent’s activities and allocations of
2http://www.bls.gov/tus
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time. Respondents are selected from outgoing rotations of the Current Population
Survey (CPS). Each yearly sample is nationally representative and stratified by day
of the week, with roughly a quarter of the sample diaries taken for Saturday and
Sunday and a tenth of the sample for each weekday.
The ATUS reports each primary activity a respondent participates in during their
survey day as well as the location of each activity and whom they were with. This
allows me to identify not just the time spent traveling, but for what purpose and
by what means. The BLS provides survey files that include the amount of total
time each respondent spends in each activity, and I performed a similar aggregation
per respondent to include similar values for the time spent in each location and
transportation mode, as well as the number of incidences of each activity. In addition,
ATUS provides a variety of demographic and household information collected at
the time of the survey as well as many reported from the final month of the CPS.
Respondents were matched with their CPS interviews to determine the Core Based
Statistical Area (CBSA) for those living in one. My analysis will be restricted to
the years 2005-2009. Activities are also combined to form estimates for travel time
with a primary purpose for Work3, Leisure4 and Other Activities 5 BLS coders assign
travel back home with a purpose related to the last activity.
At the introduction of the ATUS, researchers did examine to identify the accuracy
of the data generated with regards to transportation and specifically with respect to
the existing National Household Travel Survey which questions respondents solely on
the trips made using a travel diary. Past research had suggested trip-based surveys
such as the NHTS would under-estimate travel relative to activity-based surveys such
3This is time coded from ATUS category 5 - ”Work & Work-Related Activities”
4”This includes time coded in ATUS categories 11 through 15 including ”Eating & Drinking,” ”Socializing,
Relaxing & Leisure,” ”Sports, Exercise & Recreation,” ”Religious and Spiritual Activities” & ”Volunteer Activities”
5This is time spent in any other activity.
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as ATUS since activity-diaries required respondents to account for every moment of
the day (Harvey, 2003). However, Bose and Sharp (2005) found aggregate estimates
from both surveys to be similar. Srinivasan and Yennamani (2010) argues this may
have been due to changes in the NHTS instrument which probed for underreported
travel activities. Those authors compared data from both surveys more closely and
found certain demographic segments generate more trips reported per person with
the ATUS survey relative to the NHTS, but others demonstrate fewer trips reported.
Such differences however were not large.
3.4.2 Other data sources
I match the respondent with the monthly retail gas prices for the respondent’s
state reported by the Federal Highway Administration (FHA). The FHA reports this
data by adding the federal and state taxes to the wholesale price collected by the
Energy Information Administration (EIA). For respondents living in an identified
CBSA, I use the American Community Survey (ACS) estimate of the percentage
of commuters who use public transportation as a measure of the attractiveness and
utilization of the local public transportation infrastructure. The estimate is the 5
year average over the time span 2005-2009. As such all respondents included in my
data live in metropolitan areas of at least 100,000 residents. State-level unemploy-
ment rate is utilized as well, as reported by the BLS. Specification checks utilize
Urbanized Area level measures of density, population, passenger miles traveled and
public transportation operating expenses reported by the National Transportation
Database of the FTA. Those data are described in more detail in that section.
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3.4.3 Description of sample selection
Between the years of 2005 and 2009, ATUS collected diaries from 50,952 respon-
dents. Excluding respondents for which state-month gas prices were unavailable from
the FHA data yields 50,728 diaries6. Of these, 42,795 live in metropolitan areas with
a reported estimate for consumer public transportation utilization and 37,128 have
a reported household income. Table 3.1 shows selected summary statistics for this
sample and the income bins that are used for analysis. As expected, the lowest in-
come group is much more likely to be female, retired and without the presence of
a partner in the household. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present mean average-day7 activity
times for the weighted sample for each income bin. The five income bins are collapsed
from categories reported from the CPS. Of note from Table 3.2, those making over
$100,000 travel almost 140 minutes more per week than those making under $25,000,
with a great deal of that coming from more commuting behavior due to being much
more likely to be working. They do however travel for leisure and other activities
more as well. Both leisure and other travel do not increase much with household
income except for those in the highest household income bracket. Leisure time how-
ever declines with income (primarily a result of a decline in television watching), a
product not just of increased work time but also increases in other time categories
as well, indicating television may be an economically inferior activity.
Since these are not broken down by day of week, each of these should be regarded
as the daily average over an entire week. The type of activity recorded is based on
the primary activity in which the respondent reports participating.8 As such, the
644 respondents from Arizona and 11 from New Hampshire were excluded in late 2008 as well as entirety of the
District of Columbia respondents.
7An average day is not the same as a “typical” day. It represents a daily average of weekly time use.
8For example, if a person is reading articles online with a laptop while also watching television, only one activity,
whichever the respondent states as primary, will be recorded. Listening to the radio or music is known to be
chronically underreported since the vast majority of such activity is performed as a secondary activity.
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ATUS will under-report secondary activities9. Abraham et al. (2006) detail other
issues involved with data collection for the ATUS, citing the length and burden of
the survey in suggesting bias could be introduced if those who respond to the survey
have time habits which differ from non-respondents. While I do not correct for that
source of bias, results of any study using ATUS data should be interpreted with this
in mind.
3.5 Price Elasticity of Gas
I initially check to see if the data from ATUS is comparable to data used from
consumption surveys by estimating the elasticity of car-based travel (Ti) with respect
to gas prices using the following equation:
ln(Ti) = α0 +η1ln(Pst)+η2Ait+η3Pst∗Ait+η4Xi+η5Ust+η6Dt+δt+ρs+εi. (3.18)
Here, Pst represents the three month moving average for the real price of gas for
the state of the respondent in the month of the reported diary, Ai is the ACS-
reported estimate for percentage of commuters in the respondent’s MSA utilizing
public transportation, Xi is a variety of individual and household characteristics,
including employment and retiree status, age, age squared and educational attain-
ment of the respondent and the presence of a partner, any children, or a child aged
5 or under in the household. Ust is the unemployment rate of the diary month and
state of the respondent and Dt is a set of date controls for month, day of week and
whether the diary day was a holiday. Year dummies are not used as they are severely
auto-correlated with the price of gas.
9Although I am not making use of this aspect of the data, one noteworthy exception is that the ATUS interviewer
will specifically ask and record secondary activities as they relate to child-care where appropriate.
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Column 1 of Table 3.4 reports the elasticity for the entire sample. For all individ-
uals, the elasticity of car-based travel time to gas prices is -0.098, which is lower than
some older studies, but consistent with more recent ones which have noted a more
recent shift towards inelastic behavior (Hughes et al., 2008; Davis and Killian, 2011).
One important point to note is that travel time and gasoline purchases utilized by
previous studies do not directly correspond to my measures and I have not included
proper controls for the possibility of increased traffic congestion over this time pe-
riod. I expect elasticities calculated using car travel time would be lower than those
utilizing consumption as marginal trips would likely be of the kind which could be
incorporated into trip chaining, or alternatively would be close to the respondent’s
home. Such marginal trips would likely be of the type utilizing routes that suffer
from low gas mileage, particularly in the suburban and urban areas to which I had
restricted the sample. These trips would thus have a lower travel time to gasoline
consumption ratio than the average trip.
Splitting up the elasticity calculations by income group, however, illustrates large
differences in responsiveness for different income levels. Those making between
$25,000 and $50,000 report an elasticity near -0.1 as the total gives, but the elas-
ticity is close to zero for those within households making below $25,000 and those
making above $100,000. This is consistent with the theory suggesting a more in-
elastic demand due to the ability to afford the most-preferred mode or prior actions
taken to already engage in the lowest cost means for necessary transportation due
to income constraints. The remainder of households, those making between $50,000
and $100,000 report much higher elasticities around -0.15 and -0.18. Thus those
middle-income households making between $25,000 and $100,000 are more likely to
be making transportation decision that result in less marginal time spent in auto-
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mobile use than the ends of the distribution. These results will also correspond with
later findings showing that those in the lower end of the income spectrum are likely
already utilizing the lowest cost possible travel and those in the highest income bin
are the least likely to substitute transportation patterns as they are more likely to
absorb price shocks.
The bottom half of the regression reports the elasticity with public transportation
usage and its interaction with log gas prices. This has varying effects on the reported
elasticities of the income groups, but on average public transportation usage in the
metropolitan area brings car travel time elasticities closer to zero. This is primarily
driven by the individuals in the $75,000-$100,000 household income group who also
report the highest base elasticity. It could very well be the case that demand is more
inelastic in areas with higher levels of public transportation if public transportation
is already being utilized where possible, bring usage closer to the “subsistence” level
of gasoline consumption.
3.6 Transport Behavior
To determine the effect of gas prices changes, public transportation availabil-
ity/utilization and their interaction on the amount of time spent in various modes
and purposes of travel, I estimate the following equation:
Ti = α0 + β1Pst + β2Ait + β3Pst ∗ Ait + β4Xi + β5Ust + β6T + δt + ρs + εi (3.19)
with the same added regressors as above. Gas prices used are in real dollars, so
reported estimates of β1 are in changes in time per dollar. The choice to use a linear
specification comes from most participants reporting zero for many of the travel
activities, which would cause problems in utilizing a log function for time. A log-
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linear relationship with log prices could also have been estimated, but the results
from a linear estimation provide for an easier interpretation of the coefficients.
To determine the effect of gas price level changes and public transportation avail-
ability/utilization on the likelihood of certain modes or purposes of transportation









Each of these two regressions were performed on the entire sample and on the five
different subgroups of income in $25,000 increments for respondents for which income
was reported. Robust standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level. As
discussed above, time spent traveling was divided into three different purposes: work,
leisure and other. Time was also aggregated into three different modes, by car (as a
driver or passenger), by public transportation (via rail or bus, excluding ferries), and
by self-propelled means (walking, running or biking). Other modes of transportation
not listed were not aggregated, but are included in total time spent traveling for
various purposes, although these amounts are negligible.
The choice of OLS over a Tobit estimation is deliberate. Time use data frequently
include a large number of “zeroes” in the diary period (one day) and do not include
all information about the frequency of activities unreported (or reported, for that
matter) over a week or even over an “average day”. This is particularly true as
weekend and weekday routines are frequently very different for most individuals.
A Tobit model would then seem appropriate, incorporating some latent demand to
participate in an activity but for which it was not reported. This however belies
an awkward way of thinking about the decision of how time is allocated since it
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would assume the process of deciding to participate in an activity is the same as the
choice as its length. An alternative approach would be to estimate the probability
of performing an activity and length in a two-step regression to be included in the
appropriate causal regression (Cragg, 1971).
Stewart (2009) simulated the performance of these approaches for time use data,
finding that the Tobit estimates were much more biased, particularly as the number
of instances of an activity declined. OLS estimates were the most unbiased even as
compared to the two-step approach but all three performed well as more data were
available through longer diary periods. He noted Foster and Kalenkoski (2010) found
similar properties of the biased result of the Tobit model when diary time was small.
In light of the short diaries in ATUS, I have decided to report the OLS estimates of
the above regression which will show the average effect of the interested covariates
on the time use in question.
3.6.1 Value of the included interaction effect
To determine how useful the included interaction effect is in estimating the com-
bined effect of gas prices and public transportation availability, Table 3.5 provides
results from the above regression by first reporting the coefficient of the real price
of gas from a regression that does not include the public transportation or interac-
tion variable, then provides results by including just the public transportation usage
variable and finally by including all three variables10. These results are repeated in
the four columns for time spent on all travel, car travel, public transportation and
self travel and for the four rows for time spent on all purposes of travel, and three
specific purposes of transport: work, leisure and all other travel.
The magnitude of the coefficients for the effect of real gas prices on travel time do
10Similar results for income bins used in following analyses are available upon request
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not change significantly with the inclusion of the public transportation variable, but
both the coefficient on gas prices and public transportation exhibit large changes once
the interaction variable is included. For example, in examining travel via any mode
for any purpose in the upper-left most square, I find that higher gas prices actually
have an effect that is two-thirds greater when accounting for public transportation
and its interaction. Further, public transportation usage in the metropolitan area
has no direct effect except through its interaction with gas prices. That is, higher
levels of public transportation usage for the population result in less of an impact of
gas prices on total travel time for survey respondents. Similarly, higher levels of gas
prices lead to increases in total travel time if public transportation usage is higher in
the respondent’s metropolitan area. Interaction effects don’t always matter, however,
particularly in the case of commuting (second row), regardless of mode of transport,
indicating a general trend that the existence of public transportation already induces
mode substitution in work-based travel. Further changes in gas prices do not make
such an effect stronger.
3.6.2 Mode of Travel
The third column in each cell of Table 3.5 provides a summary of the OLS co-
efficients resulting from regressing time spent on all travel, car travel, public trans-
portation and self travel on the real price of gas, public transportation usage and
their interaction, along with all other control variables described above. These re-
sults are then broken down into each of the three different purpose types. All travel
is reduced by about 4.5 minutes per average day or around a half-hour a week for
a one dollar increase in the real price of gas. Total time traveling in a car is re-
duced even more than this amount at 4.6 minutes per average day, with small and
statistically insignificant increases occurring in time spent in public transportation
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and self-transport. Increased public transportation availability/utilization does not
increase total travel time, but this is due to decreases in car travel time (0.85 min
per week) being offset by increases in public transportation and self-transport time
(0.31 and 0.39 minutes per week respectively). Over all respondents, increases in
public transportation availability dampens the negative effect of gas price increases
on overall travel time with interaction effects being weakly positive for all modes.
This may reflect respondents living in metropolitan areas with higher levels of pub-
lic transportation utilization also being closer to the “subsistence” level of driving.
This would mute the elasticity of car travel with respect to gas prices as opposed to
increasing the effect of higher gas prices.
For all respondents, the effect of an increase in real gasoline prices does not result
in large shifts in travel behavior for commuting. A statistically insignificant 0.69
minutes per average day (4.8 min/wk) decline in time is reported for driving along
with a 0.31 minutes per average day (2.2 min/wk) increase in public transportation
time. Slightly larger, but also statistically insignificant declines in the duration of
non-commuting, non-leisure based travel are also found. The amount of time in
leisure-based travel, however, falls among all modes, with 2.85 minutes per average
day (20 min/week) of a total 3.4 min per average day (23.7 min/week) coming from
a decline in car usage. Again, the interaction variable has a dampening effect on the
decline indicating larger MSAs, or at least those with more public transportation
may have more easily accessible services and business which require less need to
reduce travel time or for which gas expenditures are less of a component of overall
travel expenditures and household expenditures as a whole. Other travel shows little
change across modes of transport, totaling an average of less than 4 minutes decline
per week across all respondents.
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Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results of the OLS and logit regressions for each
of the three types of modes of transport. The logit provides insight as to whether
changes are being made on the intensive or extensive margin. These tables present
odds ratios instead of coefficients for easier interpretation with their relevant t-
statistics. The reported estimates for the real gas price, for example, are interpreted
as the ratio of the likelihood of travel participation between the average gas price
and one where the price is one dollar higher. The provided measure is not precisely
estimated, as the estimation is only accurate at the margin, however it still provides
some measure of extensive margin changes caused by gas price changes. As an exam-
ple, a ten cent increase will correspond with one tenth the log difference between the
reported odds ratio and one. OLS regressions present results in minutes per average
day. The signs of this interaction effect differ significantly over the various income
groups, which may reflect the concomittant suburban/urban differences. Without
intra-metropolitan area variation, theis may be a source of omitted variable bias
when interpreting the coefficients.
Car travel time falls with increased gas prices and increased metropolitan area
public transportation usage for all income groups, although higher gas prices don’t
necessarily reduce car travel participation rates. Odds ratios range from 0.81 to
1.24 for different income groups, none are statistically significant and there is no
clear trend based on income. Increased public transportation availability does in-
duce declines in car travel times and induces smaller reductions in car travel overall
with respect to gas prices. The opposite is found for income groups of those mak-
ing less than $25,000 in income and between $50,000 and $75,000. Respondents in
these ranges exhibit larger negative effects of gas price on car travel on both the
extensive and intensive margins as public transportation increases. Respondents in
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these income ranges may be more likely to be forced to switch when possible due to
income effects. Alternatively, the location of housing and employment for those in
this income range makes them more able to take advantage of substitution oppor-
tunities, but also have preferences towards driving if gas prices are low. This would
result in larger reductions in car travel when gas prices increases, as well as have a
larger a negative interaction effect when accounting for public transportation. Both
income categories exhibit positive interaction effects on public transportation and
self-propelled travel, however estimates for the $50,000 and $75,000 are just outside
the range of statistical significance at the 95% level.
Higher gas prices do not necessarily lead to overall higher use of public transport.
For those in lower income groups, we see higher likelihood of using public transporta-
tion, but a lower usage rate for those making above $50,000. The interaction effect
is strongest with those making under $25,000 indicating a strong substitution effect
towards that mode of travel, however the likelihood of using public transportation is
not increasing. Similar results are found for self-travel. The next section separates
out the purpose of travel which allows us to tell a richer story about why these usage
patterns may be happening.
3.6.3 Purpose of Travel
Tables 3.9 and 3.8 present the results of the logit and OLS regressions for each
of the three different travel purpose types: work, leisure and other. There are small
but statistically insignificant increases in the likelihood respondents travel for work-
related activities and similar decreases in likelihood of travel for leisure related activ-
ities as gas prices increase. Indeed, as I will show later, this may be some indication
that people are participating in work related activities more often as gas prices in-
crease. Declines in leisure activity travel as a result of higher gas prices are greatest
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for those making less than $25,000 and those making between $75,000 and $100,000.
Public transportation availability does not seem to have any effect on work, but has
a small but significant negative effect on participation in leisure travel. Since overall
leisure travel time declines as well, this may be the result of trip chaining or “clus-
tering” of leisure activities when public transportation is more available. This would
explain both coefficients and also why there is very little effect of public transporta-
tion on leisure travel of those making above $100,000 who would be theoretically less
susceptible to both substitution and income effect related changes. For those making
less than $100,000, the interaction effect on leisure travel time is positive, indicating
higher levels of public transportation induce smaller declines in leisure travel based
on higher gas prices.
Table 3.10 show changes for work travel, where there is little change across all
categories as this is generally considered to be of inelastic demand. There is some
indication that car participation rates decline as public transportation availability
increases, but not for all income groups. There is little indication that more pub-
lic transportation make public transportation more likely to be used as gas prices
increase. That is, while increases in real gas prices increase the likelihood of using
public transportation to work, having more than another city does not indicate such
rises would be larger. Self travel is more likely to be used for lower income groups
as gas prices increase regardless of public transportation levels, but for those making
between $50,000 and $100,000, such self-transport is less likely to be true.
Leisure travel participation rates in a car decline for certain income groups as seen
in Table 3.11, and for each of these there is evidence of higher participation rates in
public transportation as gas prices increase. For the second income group making
between $25,000 and $50,000, just a 10 cent increase in the gas price is estimated to
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increase public transportation participation by 11 percent11.
For other travel in Table 3.12, participation rates for car travel change very little as
gas prices increase. Public transportation and self travel is more likely to be utilized
by the second income group, as further evidence they practice transport substitution
as gas prices increase. However, for income groups above $50K, increase in real gas
prices induce much less participation (although not statistically significant). It is
unclear why this would be, but it is clear that the travel for these activities is much
more inelastic for those with lower household incomes. This is substantiated by the
positive (or alternatively less negative) effects estimated for the low income groups.
3.6.4 Income groups
Of the respondents reporting household income between $0 and $25,000, there
is an positive direct impact of gas prices on work travel across all modes of trans-
portation, although it is imprecisely estimated. Of note, they are the only income
category to exhibit this sign. An increase in work travel time is much more plau-
sible for low income individuals who, due to an increase in difficulty in traveling to
work because of higher gas prices putting a strain on their limited resources, may
need to take more circuitous and time intensive routes or may need to increase the
number of instances of work itself. These increases are small and only total about 6
minutes per week. Similar results are found for other travel which is likely to also be
derived from an inelastic demand. However as public transportation usage increases,
the interaction coefficients are large and positive for public and self transportation
for other travel, indicating substitution towards more time-intensive transportation
modes for this type of travel demand. Each additional percent metropolitan area
public transportation usage results in an extra 0.6 minutes combined per dollar in-
11This is calculated by taking the tenth root of the presented odds ratio of 2.87 which is for a dollar increase.
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crease in gas prices. A public transportation usage measure of 6% would yield an
extra 25 minutes of such travel per week for a dollar increase in gas prices. Leisure
travel is negatively affected by an increase in gas prices, although this is mitigated
as public transportation is utilized in the community.
Respondents reporting household income between $25,000 and $50,000 report a
pronounced shift from car to public transportation and self-transportation that is
even larger in magnitude, a result of this group traveling more in general and also
they are more likely to take advantage of a substitution effect. That is, those who
are at the lowest incomes are much more likely to take advantage of the lowest cost
method, regardless of the price of gas due to their income and relatively lower value
of time. Car travel declines by 4.8 minutes per day (34 minutes per week) while
travel by public or self transportation increases by 19 minutes per week on average.
The popularity of public transportation usage has a positive effect on the impact
of gasoline prices indicating the measure may be correlated with car-based leisure
travel in some way for this subgroup.
As above, there is little change in work travel for those making between $50,000
and $75,000 if gas prices increase but total declines of about 37 minutes per week
between leisure and other travel. Interaction effects are fairly large for overall car
travel, with a 6% metropolitan public transportation usage resulting in a 3.2 minutes
per day decline in car usage per dollar increase, on top of the baseline measure. This
would result in an about a 50 minute decline in car usage per week for a dollar
increase in gas.
This measure is of the same magnitude for the next income group at $75,000
and $100,000, but with the complete opposite sign. A 6 percentage point increase
in metropolitan public transportation usage would result in a 3.1 minutes per day
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increase in car usage per dollar increase, but this is from a much higher decline of
-10.2 minutes per day baseline estimate. It is unclear what the major locational or
preference differences between these two income groups would be; it may come from
major differences in levels of suburbanicity or locational decisions relative to public
transportation. These effects are mainly manifested within leisure travel which has
positive interaction effects in this income group for all mode categories. A omitted
variable possibility may be that in metropolitan areas which have both high public
transportation usage and high gas prices, leisure travel is also high. This may explain
the strange behavior on these interactions. Another possibility is that if we continue
the story that these households may be located in areas with lower amounts of public
transportation, it may be that the cost of living is lower in those areas or possibly
they may be located closer to work, both of which would dampen the negative income
effect.
Those with the largest income levels illustrate small effects across the board. They
are more likely to use public transportation, which may be a result of being more
likely to have homes or jobs in urban centers (relative to those in the immediate
lower income bin) as well as a higher preference for such travel. Overall though,
they actually look most similar to the lowest income group, indicating that they
would also not see very much of a change in transportation habits, although for the
opposite reason of having enough income and/or wealth to absorb any increase in
gasoline prices.
The model described above predicted that an increase in gas prices would lead to
a reduction in activities for which gas consumption is a complement towards other
substitutable activities. For our empirical analysis, this meant a reduction in car
travel and, due to differing signs for the substitution and income effects, an unclear
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prediction on travel using public transportation or self-propelled means. For travel
derived from an inelastic demand, such as for commuting, it would be much more
likely to see only substitution effects. A better availability of public transportation,
which is assumed from a higher estimate of utilization of public transportation in
the metropolitan area, should make substitution easier but it would also result in
households already taking advantage of lower-cost transportation options and be
closer to necessary “subsistence” car travel. Therefore, the predicted sign for the
interaction of public transportation and gas prices was undetermined.
It is clear from the regression analysis that low income individuals rely on public
transportation when living in areas where public transportation systems are more
utilized, but those making below $25,000 do not necessarily utilize public transporta-
tion much more when gas prices increases. This is likely because they are already
exploiting their lowest cost options for transportation and any changes in trans-
port behavior is found towards bike/walk modes. Additionally, it is those in the
lower-middle class making between $25,000 and $50,000 that switch towards pub-
lic transportation the most. Further, this particular subgroup also appears to make
such transportation substitutions for leisure travel as well, or at the very least display
evidence that their substitution effect surpasses any negative income effects due to
increases in gas prices. The welfare benefits of public transportation, in the context
of rising gas prices, appear to benefit this second income group more than the others,
although the lowest income group does appear to rely on public transportation more
heavily than all other groups regardless of the gasoline prices. There is also strong
indication that the highest income group, those making above $100,000 utilize public
transportation for work and leisure travel more as gas price increase, although such
changes are small in the context of the larger amount of transportation they partici-
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pate in. It is also clear that those in the middle-to-upper middle class households do
not utilize public transportation as much as a substitute when gas prices increases,
either because of a residential or occupational location choice within a metropolitan
area away where it is not useful for them or for other preference reasons.
As they are less likely to display evidence of substitution in transportation choices,
the $75,000-$100,000 income group thus exhibit the largest evidence of income ef-
fects by being the group which displays the largest increases in at-home leisure of
television watching. Television watching, it should be noted, generally is an inferior
activity (the time spent doing so declines with income). Thus, large increases in tele-
vision watching, whose proliferation and zero marginal cost make it an ideal baseline
replacement leisure source, is a sign of large negative income effects. By that singular
metric, it is the upper middle class which bears a strong share of the burden of gas
price increases in terms of time use behavioral changes. The lower middle incomes,
however, of working much more when gas prices increase, presumably giving up pre-
vious time which was spent either doing unpaid work which is passed to someone
else or remains undone, or alternatively giving up leisure time.
3.6.5 Sensitivity Checks
To determine if the results of the above regressions are robust to alternative
specifications and other measures of public transportation attractiveness, I perform
the OLS estimation procedure outlined by Equation 3.19 in three alternate ways. I
use the same data but exclude cities with the highest level of public transportation
usage, I introduce a measure of metropolitan area density and I use alternate an data
source to measure public transportation usage and attractiveness. These results can
then be compared to Tables 3.6 and 3.8 to determine if the estimates are sensitive
on the choice of sample or data.
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One concern about the above results is that they are driven by respondents in
cities with high levels of public transportation attractiveness. To determine if this
is a concern, the regressions on the major travel time categories were re-estimated
without respondents who live in the metropolitan areas with the five highest levels
of public transportation utilization based on the ACS estimates12. These cities con-
stitute about 16% of the sample and each has a metropolitan public transportation
utilization estimate of above 10%. While reduced sample size leads to higher stan-
dard errors, this exclusion of a large source of social consistency that might exist
across respondents within a metropolitan area is a significant contributor to larger
standard errors as well.
Results from these regressions are found in Tables 3.13 and 3.14. Some of the
largest differences in coefficient estimates occur at incomes below $50,000 and above
$100,000. Strong effects which are generated at the full sample between $25,000 and
$50,000 are seen at the lowest income bracket without the excluded cities. For the
lowest income category, this could be a result of differences in nominal incomes as
well as a result of a higher economic requirement to have access to car within a given
metropolitan area. Relative to suburban and rural areas, parking generally requires
either a higher monetary cost for a parking spot or a temporal cost to find available
parking in urban areas. It may be the case that the poor in those excluded cities are
particularly inelastic with respect to gas prices (due to a lower need to have a car in
the first place), resulting in higher responses to car travel and public transportation
in remaining cities. Since most of the decline in travel time due to gas prices is
generated to to leisure-based car travel, it appears that the declines are related to
transportation that can be avoided.
12These metropolitan areas are New York, NY, Chicago, IL, Washington, DC, San Francisco/Oakland, CA and
Boston, MA.
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Those respondents from households in the highest income category also appear
to be more elastic with respect to gas prices when the public transportation heavy
cities are excluded. Incidentally, most of the difference appears to also be derived
from leisure-based car travel, which are displayed as large responses in both specifi-
cations for the $75,000 to $100,000 income levels. Presumably, this may be due to
high and low income households being more likely to be located in city centers in
these metropolitan areas relative to others. Each of those five cities are known for
high property value neighborhoods in addition to higher levels of access to public
transportation. Work-based travel appears to be slightly more responsive to both
gas price and public transportation variability in the excluded sample.
It is still the case, however, that the interaction effect is very strong amongst the
poor for public transportation utilization and it appears to be driven by non-work
related travel. This implies that switching to public transportation or self-propelled
means is an important element of low income respondent’s response to higher gas
prices. Much smaller changes for work-related travel could be the result of already
sourcing the lowest cost means of transport for such purposes or that the value of
their commuting time is much more important than for travel time associated with
other purposes. These overall effects could also be generated by intra- or inter- city
migration of poor households who know they could specifically benefit from public
transportation to areas where higher levels of public transportation availability and
usage exist.
As a second specification check, additional regressions were performed utilizing
density of the metropolitan area as an explanatory variable. These results, presented
in Tables 3.15 and 3.16 generated only small changes in the coefficient estimates.
Density has a substantially positive impact on the transportation time of the poor
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via walking or biking; an increase in density of only 100 persons per square mile
can lead to additional 1.88 minutes per day (13 minutes per week) of self-propelled
travel. Thus, the measurement of the effect of gas prices and public transportation
is robust to the inclusion of density.
There may also be a concern that the variable being used as a proxy for public
transportation attractiveness is unreliable. The ACS estimate of public transporta-
tion usage is itself subject to sampling and statistical error and average usage for
commuting may not necessarily be an appropriate proxy for overall attractiveness.
The ACS measure was used because its geographic identification by CBSA is the same
as that used by the CPS, as opposed to the Urbanized Areas of the NTD. While ACS
city-level estimates are not considered accurate on a yearly bases, the availability of
an average estimate of public transportation usage for 2005-2009 matches would be
more accurate. can be connected with the relevant time frame for the sample.
The ACS measure, however, only measures usage for commuting and could be
sensitive to the sampling design and the ability of the ACS to generate a represen-
tative sample. Usage measured in this limited way may not necessarily be the best
proxy for attractiveness which could also be dependent on the attractiveness of the
road and highway infrastructure. It would be reasonable to believe regional road and
public transportation system attractiveness is correlated with each other, although
it is unclear the direction such a relationship would go.
To determine if the results are dependent on this measure, I utilize two alternative
measures of public transportation attractiveness, usage and availability from the Na-
tional Transportation Database (NTD), administered by the Federal Transportation
Administration (FTA). Public transportation authorities report a variety of annual
metrics for collection. In recent years, the FTA has reported some of these measures
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by Urbanized Area, collecting data from different transportation modes and systems
from the same metropolitan area into one measure. I utilize the earliest agglom-
eration provided by the FTA from 2008 and apply it to the ATUS sample. While
variation in individual years may be preferred, arguably 2008 would be the most
appropriate year to use during the sample time frame (2005-2009) as it included the
largest variation in gas price and macroeconomic conditions.
Urbanized Area classification was then matched up with the CBSA classification
of respondents in the ATUS sample. A very small number13 of relevant CBSA did not
have available data provided in the NTD. The number of passenger-miles and total
operating expenses per metropolitan area were divided by population to generate
per capita measures for 2008. Both are strongly correlated with the 2005-2009 ACS
public transportation usage estimate; passenger-miles per capita has a correlation of
0.8913 and operating expenses per capita has a correlation of 0.8586. Excluding the
five cities above with the highest ACS public transportation usage, these correlations
are 0.785 and 0.794, respectively.
Results of regressions on time spent traveling by mode and purpose performed
using these measures in place of the ACS estimates are found in Tables 3.17 - 3.19.
The differences in relative units and measurement techniques, do not allow for easy
economic comparison of the results, however, there is significant overlap between
these estimates and those found in Tables 3.6 and 3.8 with regards to statistical sig-
nificance and relative magnitudes between income categories. All three appear to be
measuring the same statistical changes, providing evidence the economic measure-
ment of the coefficients is closely related to metropolitan area attractiveness.
One final concern is the assumption that the relative speeds of each of the modes
13Sample size falls by 79 or 0.00187%.
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of transport could result in biased results. Public transportation service expansion
may more likely target commuting behavior and thus its usefulness relative to driving
are different for different modes or days of the week. This paper does not empirically
seek to show such concerns are necessarily invalid, but fruitful future research might
seek to show how intertemporal differences in the relative prices of transportation
affect the choice and timing of activities. However, for the purposes of this paper,
each regression includes a control for the day of the week, and to the extent the
utilized measures of transportation usage and attractiveness differentially effect each
purpose, they are estimated separately. The interpretation of the coefficients that
proxy for public transportation attractiveness is that they represent the average effect
of how public transportation is implemented across all respondents, including inter-
and intra-city differences.
3.7 Policy Implications
3.7.1 Public transportation as an enhancement to the advantages of agglomeration
One important reason to measure the differential effects of gas prices and public
transportation lies in the the importance of public transportation for low income
individuals. As Glaeser et al. (2008) noted, a key influence of poor individuals’
attraction to cities is for their better public transportation. Given the poor appear
to have much larger impacts of travel reduction with respect to gas prices when
the largest cities were excluded, there would appear significant advantages for the
poor in expanding public transportation in other cities. While the theoretical impact
of public transportation on improved employment prospects has been touted, they
have been limited in their empirical findings. Fan et al. (2012) and Blumenberg and
Manville (2004) argue that this could be the result of the difficulty in measuring
transit effectiveness and controlling for intervening factors as well as simply a failure
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of actual transit policy to be responsive to this need. Fan et al. (2012) find strong
evidence of increased job accessibility in the expansion of light rail in the Minneapolis
metropolitan area. According to the estimates generated in this paper, increased
public transportation usage and spending generate more work-based travel. This
may be because public transportation is less time efficient than driving (but more
convenient or cheaper to attract its use), but at the same time, the results suggest
that higher public transportation attractiveness could encourage more labor market
activity.
In light of this, decisions of new service could improve employer and employee
matching by ensuring such connections are made, even if such service does not neces-
sarily connect the central business district with outlying residential neighborhoods.
While this appears to be an obvious statement, most subway and train systems,
which are generally much faster than via bus, do not have lines which do not traverse
through the central business district. Even New York City’s extensive subway system
does not include any subway lines which connect the outer boroughs while avoiding
Manhattan. In lieu of new lines, liberal density zoning around public transportation
stations and hubs, particularly for industries that employ low wage workers, could
improve the effectiveness and attractiveness of existing systems.
Such benefits also exist with respect to leisure based activity. The largest declines
in transportation due to higher gas prices come from leisure-based car travel. This
appears to be true for respondents in both middle income and lower income house-
holds. Higher levels of public transportation appear to reduce the negative impact
of gasoline prices on travel for leisure more than any other purpose. This could be
in part due to the denser nature of metropolitan areas with higher levels of public
transportation and thus, income effects of higher gas prices would be lower, but this
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persists even when income is controlled for.
Higher levels of public transportation usage reduces overall leisure travel time and
reduces the impact of gas prices on leisure travel. This is consistent with it facilitat-
ing leisure travel more efficiently and making it more inelastic with respect to gas
prices. This provides evidence that public transportation facilitates leisure-based eco-
nomic activity to the extent local economies depend on leisure time (and presumably
money) being spent in the local economy as opposed to activities at home. Again,
allowing for density of commercial activity around public transportation facilitates
improved economic activity and heightens any advantages public transportation pro-
vides. This paper provides arguments for proponents of both density and expansion
of public transportation that both would be economically beneficial and it would
appear, purely from the perspective of household time use decisions, it would pro-
vide benefits in a progressive manner. The estimated interaction effects suggest the
economic benefits would only increase if real energy prices rose in the future.
3.7.2 Impact on environmental policy
One of the goals of gasoline taxes, in addition to collecting revenue to offset the
external damage of carbon emissions, is to reduce carbon emissions themselves. One
argument used against increases in such taxes at the federal or state level is that
such taxes are regressive. As noted earlier, research indicates this is true when
regressivity is measured based on the proportion of income devoted to gasoline for
drivers as opposed to the overall welfare impact. The estimates of the impact of gas
prices from this paper support such an argument as well. As noted in the description
of the model, the welfare losses associated with an increase in the price of gas can be
shown to be proportional to the number of vehicle miles traveled by the individual.
While those data are not available in my sample, there are data on the amount of
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time spent driving. By utilizing a series of assumptions to make conversions, I can
construct a crude measure of welfare loss.
Table 3.21 presents the incidence measure for a 10% increase in the price of gas
from a starting price of $2.50. Measurements are made for each of the income bins
as well as for different levels of the ACS measure of public transportation in the
respondent’s metropolitan area. The first row represents the welfare loss per year
due to the price change and the second row represents this welfare loss as a percentage
of income. These were calculated by first estimating the average number of minutes
per day of car-based travel per income group for a price of $2.50 and for different
levels of metropolitan public transportation usage. The lost consumer surplus of the
$0.25 increase was generated by dividing the miles per day by 60 (to get hours per
day), multiplying by an average speed of 25 miles per hour and dividing by an average
miles per gallon of 23. This generates welfare lost per day and this was multiplied by
365 to get yearly loss. Since individual income levels are not known, the consumer
surplus to income ratio was generated using the midpoint of each grouping, with
$150,000 being used for the upper bin.
The results of this paper then also show that public transportation availability
may help alleviate such concerns about regressivity and may make higher gasoline and
carbon taxes more politically feasible. West (2004) examines the alternate impact
of vehicle-based tax or subsidy plans geared towards reducing emissions and finds
that most would be even more regressive than gasoline taxes. Parry and Small
(2009) note that distributional concerns are likely more efficiently addressed through
the general tax and benefit system, but provide strong evidence that existing public
transit subsidies are warranted on overall efficiency grounds. Seen in this light, public
transportation subsidies can also reduce the regressiveness of gasoline taxes.
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Bento et al. (2009) as well note that if gasoline tax revenue is directed back towards
lower income individuals, the plan can be progressive. The concern, however, is that
such a plan might not actually reduce carbon emissions. It is unclear, both from this
paper and others, that gasoline prices will actually reduce emissions to a significant
amount. While Davis and Killian (2011) do note longer horizons might lead to
increased effects of gasoline taxes, they estimate the short run effect of a 10-cent
increase in gasoline taxes would result in emissions falling by roughly one half of the
normal US year-to-year increase. Applying their methods to the data in this paper
would likely generate results even smaller depending on the relationship between
travel time and gasoline consumption14
Public transportation provision could then be a more attractive and useful means
in reducing automobile usage relative to taxes and subsidies as it can induce migra-
tion patterns that reduce driving needs as well as substitution for existing residents.
Utilizing gas tax revenue to subsidize public transportation as is more common in
European countries, as opposed to subsidizing highway construction, may enhance
the reduction of carbon emissions. The results of this paper suggest, however, that
remaining drivers will be more inelastic for preference based reasons (as opposed to
economic), so there may be limits to reducing driving, and thus carbon emissions, in
this fashion. Additionally, research devoted to the impact of public transportation
on congestion and driving has found little evidence for that to be the case (Downs,
1962; Cervero et al., 2002; Duranton and Turner, 2011; Lee and Senior, 2013). Such
studies are usually performed at the metropolitan level, however, and do not re-
flect the impact investment in public transportation might have on larger regional
or national level.
14Their finding is extrapolated from their estimate of a 10 cent gas tax reducing gasoline consumption by 1.3%.
My estimates suggest a 10 cent gas tax reduces time spent in car travel by .46 minutes per day. This is 0.6% of the
mean car travel time.
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Finally, this paper does not account for changes in the composition of driving,
particularly with respect to increases in the incidences of commuting with another
individual. DeLoach and Tiemann (2012) presents evidence from the ATUS of higher
gas prices leading to an increase in carpooling during the same time frame as this
study, but admit the results are fairly modest.
3.7.3 Health policy
Gas taxes may impact health through the substitution of transportation to modes
with positive health externalities. Courtemanche (2009) found a link between in-
creased gas prices and a decrease in obesity. The results of the paper are mixed
in that respect. An increase in gas prices does induce an increase for most income
groups in biking and walking as a transportation activity, although notably there is
a negative effect (of marginal statistical significance) effect for those making between
$50,000 and $75,000 and $75,000-$100,000. This negative result persists when den-
sity is controlled for as well. This is likely due to a negative income effect generating
less demand for travel overall15. Additionally, it should be noted that if minimal
changes in such behavior occur for at-risk groups, such as the households with lowest
income, they may be making other substitutions which will not show up in time use
data that could negatively affect their health. For example, poorer eating habits
may occur by shifting towards grocery purchases of sale items and lower cost foods
which tend to be lower in quality (Gicheva et al., 2007).
Low income individuals are more likely to rely on public transportation and thus
feel less of a burden of increases of gas prices, but when such availability does not
exist, they are also likely to have inelastic demand and a lack of wealth to absorb
15As a reminder, this categorization only includes walking or biking for transportation purposes. Unincluded
results of similar regressions of gas prices on time spent in sports and exercise activity yield no clear trend in either
direction.
102
income effect shocks. The relative inelasticity of low income travel behavior found
is consistent with this interpretation. As such, they would then face an incredible
burden of finding a way to pay for transportation as well as their other needs relative
to those with higher incomes. Thus, a wider variety of transportation options would
have positive impacts on the ability of low income individuals to achieve healthier
outcomes.
The time use data is a valuable resource to complete a picture of responsive-
ness to market changes that previously has been examined only with consumption
data. Based on the results from this paper, income groups may vary greatly in their
response to gas prices, and their activity decisions matter greatly in how those re-
sponses are manifested. Public transportation allows individuals to utilize a lower
cost option than driving, but the changes are not always economically or statisti-
cally significant and the income effect caused by continued usage of gasoline or related
goods and services can lead to negative impacts on all means of transportation as
people stay home for activities. This can impact economic activity both in terms
of choices of leisure as well as options for employment. This paper provides does
not provide evidence that public transportation significantly reduces overall driving
nor does it increase the effectiveness of gasoline taxes in doing the same. That said,
there is value in public transportation in reducing welfare losses associated higher
gas prices. In addition, there is the potential for increased economic activity when
land use policies enable housing and commercial development in areas where public
transportation is already servicing.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Demographics by Income
Variable $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+ ALL
Age 47.0 44.5 42.7 42.0 42.4 43.9
Female 0.64 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.56
Any HH Children 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.47
Child Under 6 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.23
HH Partner 0.26 0.44 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.54
Employment Status
Employed 0.494 0.686 0.763 0.791 0.802 0.700
Retired 0.211 0.146 0.080 0.056 0.040 0.112
Not in Labor Force 0.431 0.267 0.197 0.171 0.172 0.254
Educational Attainment
no HS degree 0.392 0.280 0.135 0.077 0.117 0.151
High School 0.296 0.341 0.187 0.095 0.081 0.227
Some College 0.192 0.306 0.223 0.137 0.143 0.270
Bachelor’s 0.072 0.205 0.220 0.185 0.318 0.225
Prof. Degree 0.048 0.133 0.177 0.186 0.457 0.127
2005-2009 ACS estimate
of public trans. utilization 4.67 4.81 4.96 5.71 7.05 5.39
Observations 7,441 9,842 7,230 5,028 7,587 37,128
Sample Proportion 0.200 0.265 0.195 0.135 0.204
Proportions reported in all cases except for age.
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Table 3.2: Weighted Mean Travel Times in Minutes per Average Day
Variable $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+ ALL
Total Travel 76.11 82.56 88.12 89.74 95.36 85.94
(75.08) (74.69) (79.35) (80.90) (85.49) (79.10)
Car Travel 58.11 71.81 78.76 79.85 83.06 73.81
(62.34) (66.38) (70.86) (71.84) (69.08) (68.38)
PubTran Travel 5.643 2.950 2.274 2.352 2.458 3.177
(31.94) (19.33) (16.78) (17.50) (18.03) (21.62)
Self Travel 10.72 4.859 3.454 3.518 3.466 5.294
(36.51) (21.15) (17.48) (18.46) (16.23) (23.51)
Work Travel 11.88 15.11 17.02 19.52 19.04 16.23
(31.79) (31.32) (34.24) (38.61) (39.96) (35.02)
Leisure Travel 28.18 29.35 31.35 30.88 33.06 30.47
(51.99) (49.00) (54.41) (57.67) (56.54) (53.49)
Other Travel 36.05 38.10 39.76 39.34 43.25 39.23
(51.72) (55.52) (56.42) (55.80) (62.35) (56.52)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Weighted Mean Activity Times in Minutes per Average Day
Variable $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+ ALL
Sleeping 538.0 517.5 505.6 501.2 497.7 513.0
(147.6) (134.2) (125.0) (118.2) (112.5) (129.9)
Working 131.5 185.0 202.7 208.7 206.4 185.3
(217.3) (246.6) (254.0) (252.6) (255.9) (246.9)
Eating/Drinking 62.14 66.38 69.87 70.52 77.23 68.99
(49.52) (49.95) (50.39) (49.76) (52.76) (50.76)
Socializing/Leisure 313.6 277.2 249.8 233.3 222.3 262.0
(208.5) (189.7) (176.3) (164.4) (161.6) (185.3)
Sports/Exercise 14.14 17.71 21.49 24.91 29.80 21.17
(50.77) (57.74) (63.61) (68.03) (71.06) (62.26)
LEISURE ACTIVITIES
Television and movies 181.5 156.2 135.4 121.6 110.4 143.1
(171.9) (149.3) (136.0) (120.2) (113.6) (143.7)
Playing games 10.97 10.41 9.803 8.116 8.202 9.640
(49.22) (46.86) (45.43) (37.61) (39.47) (44.50)
Reading 21.80 21.10 19.23 20.37 23.78 21.32
(59.49) (55.76) (49.00) (48.57) (51.97) (53.61)
Computer use (exc. Games) 6.249 8.176 8.402 9.884 9.261 8.287
(34.86) (36.41) (34.16) (36.90) (34.54) (35.38)
Socializing 6.724 7.628 8.585 7.778 9.319 7.999
(43.54) (45.02) (47.40) (43.01) (48.46) (45.67)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 3.4: Estimated Elasticity of Car Travel Time
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
Real Price Gas ($) -0.0976∗∗∗ -0.0212 -0.102∗ -0.177∗ -0.152 0.0181
(0.0274) (0.0717) (0.0428) (0.0667) (0.0880) (0.0524)
Real Price Gas ($) -0.132∗∗∗ -0.0142 -0.148∗∗ -0.119 -0.269∗∗ -0.0430
(0.0219) (0.0850) (0.0435) (0.0756) (0.0927) (0.0576)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.0372∗∗∗ 0.00973 -0.0529 0.0691 -0.120∗∗∗ -0.0491
(0.00945) (0.0408) (0.0371) (0.0381) (0.0282) (0.0261)
Interaction 0.00746∗∗∗ -0.00141 0.0112 -0.0129 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.00899
(0.00181) (0.00758) (0.00679) (0.00696) (0.00543) (0.00489)
Observations 40000 6344 9265 6976 4860 7371
Standard errors in parentheses






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Mode
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.609∗∗∗ -2.400 -4.852∗∗ -4.142 -10.18∗∗ -0.933
(0.854) (2.750) (1.796) (2.947) (2.919) (2.181)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.849∗∗∗ -0.584 -1.788∗ 0.548 -1.292∗∗∗ -0.849∗
(0.228) (0.451) (0.765) (0.432) (0.350) (0.385)
Interaction 0.231∗∗∗ -0.136 0.634∗ -0.536∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.303∗
(0.0599) (0.187) (0.289) (0.189) (0.149) (0.143)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.0790 0.383 1.515 -0.808 -1.183 0.403
(0.288) (1.079) (0.826) (0.527) (0.595) (0.688)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.314∗∗∗ -0.125 1.190 0.120 -0.150 0.642∗∗∗
(0.0850) (0.260) (0.603) (0.128) (0.233) (0.0989)
Interaction 0.0739 0.432∗∗∗ -0.239 0.140 0.179 -0.106
(0.0432) (0.119) (0.169) (0.0833) (0.100) (0.0717)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.108 0.753 1.193 -1.209 -1.104∗ 0.684
(0.366) (1.309) (0.966) (0.655) (0.480) (0.695)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.389 0.172 1.302∗ -0.0550 -0.131 0.770∗∗
(0.211) (0.365) (0.624) (0.176) (0.233) (0.257)
Interaction 0.0252 0.340∗ -0.313 0.171 0.167 -0.210∗
(0.0472) (0.147) (0.203) (0.0995) (0.0876) (0.0913)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.7:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Participation Rates
by Mode
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.990 1.020 0.814 1.228 0.938 1.236
(-0.22) (0.20) (-1.19) (0.95) (-0.19) (0.82)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.930∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.976 0.985 0.913∗
(-4.26) (-3.54) (-4.31) (-0.64) (-0.39) (-2.14)
Interaction 1.001 0.992 1.023 0.969∗∗ 0.987 1.004
(0.14) (-1.45) (1.63) (-3.25) (-1.06) (0.34)
PUB.TRANS. TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 1.044 1.174 1.474∗ 0.842 0.583 0.906
(0.42) (0.91) (2.16) (-0.78) (-1.84) (-0.31)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.096∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗ 1.011 1.170∗∗∗
(6.71) (2.81) (5.03) (2.73) (0.18) (3.73)
Interaction 0.999 1.009 0.976∗ 1.016 1.024 0.985
(-0.33) (1.35) (-2.54) (1.69) (0.82) (-1.11)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 1.049 1.018 1.266∗ 0.945 0.940 1.033
(0.83) (0.18) (2.47) (-0.46) (-0.44) (0.19)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.052∗∗ 1.037 1.142∗∗∗ 0.978 1.019 1.080∗
(2.72) (1.36) (5.64) (-1.38) (0.59) (2.21)
Interaction 0.999 1.012 0.969∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗ 1.004 0.990
(-0.21) (1.30) (-4.55) (3.28) (0.37) (-0.67)
Observations 42690 7414 9589 6844 4578 6892
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.8:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Purpose
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
ALL TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.490∗∗∗ -2.504 -3.827 -6.110∗ -9.377∗ 0.161
(1.000) (2.931) (2.037) (2.763) (3.681) (3.271)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.0811 0.0767 0.144 0.391 -1.103 0.390
(0.143) (0.694) (0.489) (0.451) (0.715) (0.453)
Interaction 0.334∗∗∗ 0.323 0.341 -0.0822 0.716∗ 0.127
(0.0913) (0.333) (0.198) (0.180) (0.292) (0.249)
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.376 0.848 -0.488 0.0257 -0.861 -0.427
(0.484) (0.838) (1.027) (1.355) (1.733) (1.408)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.313∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.388∗ 0.662∗∗∗ -0.111 0.178
(0.0858) (0.202) (0.164) (0.174) (0.231) (0.319)
Interaction -0.00722 -0.163∗ 0.00972 -0.145 0.0948 0.0530
(0.0517) (0.0793) (0.0672) (0.0997) (0.111) (0.178)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -3.397∗∗∗ -3.979∗ -1.939 -3.339∗ -7.622∗∗ -0.124
(0.765) (1.736) (1.635) (1.605) (2.476) (2.162)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.365∗ -0.330 -0.0927 -0.374 -1.157∗∗∗ 0.259
(0.156) (0.519) (0.757) (0.274) (0.249) (0.407)
Interaction 0.237∗∗∗ 0.229 0.154 0.119 0.758∗∗∗ -0.0743
(0.0635) (0.233) (0.346) (0.148) (0.141) (0.215)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.717 0.626 -1.400 -2.796 -0.894 0.712
(0.749) (2.193) (1.774) (2.110) (1.874) (2.277)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.0283 -0.229 -0.151 0.103 0.165 -0.0465
(0.118) (0.583) (0.450) (0.404) (0.485) (0.414)
Interaction 0.104 0.257 0.177 -0.0561 -0.137 0.148
(0.0645) (0.246) (0.218) (0.185) (0.194) (0.175)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.9:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Participation Rates
by Purpose
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 1.064 1.039 1.028 1.229 1.111 1.040
(1.36) (0.33) (0.34) (1.45) (0.69) (0.36)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.003 1.028 0.995 1.029 0.967 0.991
(0.34) (1.45) (-0.28) (0.84) (-0.65) (-0.59)
Interaction 0.997 0.988 1.004 0.989 1.006 1.000
(-0.91) (-1.37) (0.52) (-0.58) (0.30) (-0.00)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.934∗ 0.886 0.937 0.981 0.809∗ 1.000
(-2.24) (-1.42) (-0.92) (-0.22) (-2.40) (0.00)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.985∗ 0.986 0.992 0.976∗ 0.948∗ 1.018
(-2.56) (-0.74) (-0.40) (-1.99) (-2.12) (0.70)
Interaction 1.005 1.005 0.999 1.006 1.026∗ 0.993
(1.70) (0.57) (-0.06) (0.86) (2.27) (-0.66)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 1.025 1.053 0.994 0.933 1.139 1.044
(0.64) (0.67) (-0.08) (-0.58) (1.09) (0.42)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.998 0.974∗ 0.996 0.993 1.041∗∗ 0.991
(-0.37) (-2.54) (-0.23) (-0.41) (2.96) (-0.59)
Interaction 1.000 1.012∗ 1.000 1.001 0.980∗∗∗ 1.007
(0.07) (2.45) (-0.04) (0.09) (-3.31) (0.90)
Observations 42795 7438 9842 7229 5024 7582
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: Effect of Gas Prices and PT on Work Travel by Mode
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.060 1.077 0.988 1.260 1.141 1.015
(1.32) (0.77) (-0.15) (1.66) (0.94) (0.14)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.990 1.017 0.946∗ 1.051 0.963 0.976
(-1.36) (0.69) (-2.17) (1.83) (-0.91) (-1.63)
Interaction 0.992∗ 0.971∗ 1.010 0.967∗∗ 1.000 1.001
(-2.56) (-2.52) (0.96) (-2.85) (0.00) (0.16)
CAR TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -0.692 0.122 -0.953 0.163 -0.951 -1.019
(0.371) (0.707) (0.861) (1.323) (1.659) (0.756)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.0121 0.156 -0.236 0.511∗ -0.0458 -0.345
(0.109) (0.206) (0.241) (0.208) (0.235) (0.212)
Interaction -0.00581 -0.0917 0.0884 -0.214∗ -0.0112 0.153
(0.0356) (0.0829) (0.0794) (0.0856) (0.121) (0.0936)
PUB.TRANS. TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.155 1.271 1.188 1.168 0.598 1.355
(0.98) (0.85) (0.52) (0.34) (-0.94) (0.70)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.136∗∗∗ 1.120∗ 1.200∗∗∗ 1.128∗ 1.073 1.266∗∗
(5.90) (2.53) (4.40) (2.17) (1.08) (3.18)
Interaction 0.995 0.994 0.983 1.020 1.017 0.974
(-1.01) (-0.46) (-1.34) (1.13) (0.56) (-1.28)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) 0.315∗ 0.415 0.619 0.100 -0.566∗ 0.686
(0.148) (0.456) (0.433) (0.409) (0.269) (0.528)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.232∗∗∗ 0.218 0.568∗ 0.194 -0.145 0.314∗∗
(0.0404) (0.127) (0.256) (0.115) (0.0815) (0.0978)
Interaction -0.0130 0.0141 -0.113 -0.00192 0.118∗∗ -0.0562
(0.0133) (0.0390) (0.0698) (0.0318) (0.0365) (0.0624)
SELF TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.037 1.087 1.595∗ 0.867 0.543 1.137
(0.35) (0.32) (2.20) (-0.66) (-1.74) (0.36)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 0.907∗ 0.972 1.165∗∗
(5.22) (2.64) (4.72) (-2.40) (-1.15) (2.91)
Interaction 1.003 0.987 0.973 1.068∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗ 0.975
(0.72) (-1.24) (-1.81) (3.39) (2.86) (-1.29)
SELF TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) 0.0148 0.0836 0.264 -0.153 -0.138 0.0220
(0.0576) (0.267) (0.235) (0.107) (0.225) (0.151)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.0346 0.137∗∗ 0.196 -0.0942 0.00940 0.0396
(0.0274) (0.0418) (0.127) (0.0769) (0.0482) (0.0537)
Interaction 0.00921 -0.0366∗ -0.0445 0.0679 0.0177 0.00250
(0.00765) (0.0167) (0.0500) (0.0435) (0.0184) (0.0270)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.11: Effect of Gas Prices and PT Leisure Travel by Mode
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 0.953 0.934 0.876∗ 1.049 0.844∗ 1.028
(-1.81) (-0.80) (-1.99) (0.65) (-2.15) (0.33)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.973∗∗∗ 0.978 0.947∗ 0.992 0.960 0.996
(-3.54) (-0.92) (-2.47) (-0.65) (-1.80) (-0.33)
Interaction 1.003 0.992 1.011 0.992 1.015 0.998
(1.51) (-0.63) (1.30) (-1.52) (1.63) (-0.34)
CAR TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -2.849∗∗∗ -2.785 -3.046∗ -2.129 -6.576∗∗ -0.646
(0.686) (1.672) (1.249) (1.399) (2.365) (1.604)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.488∗∗∗ -0.280 -0.902 0.0297 -1.048∗∗∗ -0.170
(0.0996) (0.332) (0.480) (0.266) (0.257) (0.249)
Interaction 0.178∗∗ -0.0231 0.364 -0.166 0.634∗∗∗ 0.0359
(0.0509) (0.147) (0.234) (0.111) (0.139) (0.126)
PUB.TRANS. TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.161 1.156 2.868∗ 0.721 1.174 1.393
(0.94) (0.44) (2.54) (-0.65) (0.30) (0.66)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.115∗∗∗ 1.065∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.052 1.047 1.460∗∗∗
(6.85) (2.16) (3.80) (1.38) (0.57) (11.84)
Interaction 0.990 1.000 0.948∗ 1.022 1.015 0.898∗∗∗
(-1.59) (0.02) (-2.32) (1.42) (0.40) (-5.39)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -0.0270 -0.0183 0.876 -0.386 -0.0660 0.325
(0.254) (1.075) (0.511) (0.446) (0.223) (0.283)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.0742 -0.0714 0.373 -0.0611 -0.0497 0.310∗
(0.0402) (0.194) (0.200) (0.0970) (0.0540) (0.129)
Interaction 0.0216 0.152 -0.0965 0.0741 0.0659∗∗∗ -0.102∗
(0.0124) (0.0916) (0.0722) (0.0576) (0.0174) (0.0488)
SELF TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 0.958 0.937 0.928 0.929 0.806 1.070
(-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.50) (-0.38) (-1.05) (0.33)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.041∗ 1.020 1.075∗∗ 0.982 0.999 1.108∗∗
(2.29) (1.18) (2.84) (-1.23) (-0.04) (3.07)
Interaction 1.000 1.011 0.988 1.026∗∗ 1.013 0.982
(0.07) (1.38) (-1.42) (3.10) (1.00) (-1.12)
Observations 42786 7410 9785 7142 4872 7480
SELF TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -0.127 -0.0874 -0.126 -0.152 -0.462 0.0117
(0.102) (0.279) (0.221) (0.294) (0.362) (0.205)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0432 0.316∗∗∗ -0.0225 -0.0281 0.208∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0545) (0.0362) (0.0594) (0.0492) (0.0664)
Interaction -0.0104 0.0439 -0.0936∗∗∗ 0.0402 0.0314∗ -0.0627∗
(0.00791) (0.0277) (0.0138) (0.0217) (0.0142) (0.0266)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.12: Effect of Gas Prices and PT on Other Travel by Mode
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.013 1.072 0.951 1.001 1.078 1.041
(0.42) (0.96) (-0.74) (0.01) (0.54) (0.42)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.973∗ 0.958∗∗ 0.961 0.989 1.001 0.977
(-2.29) (-3.19) (-1.11) (-0.75) (0.10) (-1.45)
Interaction 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.992 0.990 1.007
(-0.04) (-0.68) (0.04) (-0.88) (-1.51) (1.32)
CAR TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -1.067 0.264 -0.853 -2.176 -2.656 0.731
(0.737) (1.834) (1.623) (2.189) (1.637) (1.682)
Public Trans Usage (%) -0.373∗ -0.460 -0.650 0.00638 -0.199 -0.334
(0.180) (0.349) (0.616) (0.307) (0.338) (0.326)
Interaction 0.0588 -0.0212 0.182 -0.157 -0.109 0.114
(0.0592) (0.117) (0.243) (0.155) (0.115) (0.129)
PUB.TRANS. TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 0.910 0.955 1.143 0.665 0.680 0.844
(-0.70) (-0.19) (0.48) (-1.03) (-0.57) (-0.45)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.058∗∗∗ 1.056 1.119∗∗∗ 1.034 1.055 1.156∗∗∗
(3.72) (1.71) (4.57) (0.98) (0.80) (3.77)
Interaction 1.009 1.025∗ 0.994 1.025 1.000 0.980
(1.83) (2.41) (-0.69) (1.68) (0.01) (-1.22)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) -0.209 -0.0135 0.0210 -0.522∗ -0.551 -0.608
(0.145) (0.434) (0.367) (0.228) (0.371) (0.387)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.00819 -0.272 0.249 -0.0133 0.0455 0.0183
(0.0255) (0.176) (0.157) (0.0375) (0.122) (0.107)
Interaction 0.0654∗ 0.266∗∗ -0.0293 0.0679∗ -0.00458 0.0527
(0.0267) (0.0943) (0.0363) (0.0293) (0.0581) (0.0540)
SELF TRAVEL - Participation
Real Price Gas ($) 1.094 1.058 1.497∗∗∗ 0.990 0.996 0.911
(1.48) (0.47) (3.45) (-0.09) (-0.02) (-0.50)
Public Trans Usage (%) 1.057∗∗ 1.044 1.156∗∗∗ 1.008 0.995 1.066
(2.69) (1.48) (6.76) (0.31) (-0.19) (1.55)
Interaction 0.998 1.008 0.967∗∗∗ 1.019∗ 1.017 0.992
(-0.41) (0.71) (-3.93) (2.19) (1.56) (-0.51)
Observations 42795 7418 9796 7151 4898 7500
SELF TRAVEL - Conditional Duration
Real Price Gas ($) 0.220 0.757 1.054 -0.904 -0.504 0.650
(0.345) (1.224) (0.772) (0.529) (0.528) (0.595)
Public Trans Usage (%) 0.247 -0.00826 0.791 0.0617 -0.113 0.522∗
(0.159) (0.310) (0.486) (0.106) (0.150) (0.243)
Interaction 0.0264 0.333∗∗ -0.175 0.0627 0.118 -0.150
(0.0362) (0.121) (0.156) (0.0576) (0.0633) (0.0907)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.13: Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Mode
Without NY, CHI, BOS, SF, DC metros
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -5.069∗∗∗ -5.550 -1.934 -4.180 -10.76∗ -5.102
(1.135) (2.785) (2.475) (3.969) (4.379) (2.978)
Public Trans Usage -1.220 -3.325∗ 0.277 0.432 -2.758 -2.817
(0.730) (1.269) (2.130) (1.843) (2.191) (1.518)
Interaction 0.338 0.876 -0.247 -0.706 1.168 1.236
(0.264) (0.566) (0.729) (0.782) (0.932) (0.654)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.277 -0.482 0.380 -1.052 -0.419 0.853
(0.404) (1.335) (0.584) (0.598) (0.687) (0.871)
Public Trans Usage -0.0590 -0.615 0.531 -0.362 -0.0198 0.487
(0.316) (0.614) (0.381) (0.367) (0.549) (0.396)
Interaction 0.265 0.787∗ 0.0716 0.233 0.136 -0.0324
(0.143) (0.319) (0.173) (0.169) (0.244) (0.158)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.433 -0.139 0.269 -0.673 -0.820 -0.596
(0.458) (1.594) (0.843) (0.765) (1.152) (1.044)
Public Trans Usage 0.0427 -0.242 0.952∗ 0.254 -0.0344 -0.261
(0.298) (0.789) (0.408) (0.504) (1.071) (0.549)
Interaction 0.299∗ 0.891∗ -0.0000367 0.00815 0.155 0.242
(0.129) (0.344) (0.175) (0.234) (0.454) (0.241)
Observations 35854 6593 8593 6282 4186 5781
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.14:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Purpose
Without NY, CHI, BOS, SF, DC metros
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
ALL TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -6.224∗∗∗ -6.477∗ -1.300 -8.015 -9.779 -7.507
(1.281) (2.735) (2.600) (4.006) (5.201) (4.749)
Public Trans Usage -1.274 -2.116 2.720 -1.827 -2.522 -4.631
(0.751) (1.782) (2.628) (1.956) (3.027) (2.474)
Interaction 0.867∗∗ 1.501 -0.733 0.534 1.360 2.406∗
(0.274) (0.771) (0.931) (0.833) (1.358) (1.011)
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.421 1.416 -0.765 -0.219 0.279 -0.740
(0.763) (1.250) (1.410) (1.846) (2.579) (1.961)
Public Trans Usage 0.653 1.614 0.584 0.298 0.471 0.752
(0.532) (0.879) (1.020) (1.172) (1.411) (0.745)
Interaction -0.0522 -0.313 0.109 -0.113 -0.00800 -0.149
(0.204) (0.342) (0.426) (0.487) (0.563) (0.335)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.568∗∗∗ -6.958∗∗ -0.253 -3.005 -8.507∗ -6.804∗
(1.045) (2.314) (1.732) (2.353) (3.370) (2.993)
Public Trans Usage -1.307∗ -2.417 1.569 -0.612 -2.493 -3.585∗
(0.630) (1.366) (1.641) (1.277) (1.645) (1.408)
Interaction 0.587∗ 0.923 -0.539 0.187 1.186 1.823∗∗
(0.238) (0.555) (0.634) (0.604) (0.713) (0.577)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -1.235 -0.934 -0.282 -4.791 -1.551 0.0374
(0.975) (1.792) (2.413) (2.970) (3.256) (3.561)
Public Trans Usage -0.620 -1.314 0.567 -1.513 -0.500 -1.798
(0.499) (1.596) (1.775) (1.585) (2.108) (2.197)
Interaction 0.332 0.890 -0.303 0.459 0.183 0.732
(0.189) (0.722) (0.671) (0.659) (0.922) (0.866)
Observations 35854 6593 8593 6282 4186 5781
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.15:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Mode
With Density Controls
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.721∗∗∗ -2.757 -4.570∗ -4.271 -10.20∗∗∗ -0.733
(0.898) (2.869) (1.845) (2.882) (2.867) (2.255)
Public Trans Usage -0.966∗∗∗ -0.865 -2.097∗∗ 0.614 -1.455∗∗∗ -0.915∗
(0.204) (0.470) (0.682) (0.471) (0.413) (0.383)
Interaction 0.232∗∗∗ -0.110 0.636∗ -0.522∗∗ 0.506∗∗ 0.291∗
(0.0609) (0.181) (0.294) (0.187) (0.151) (0.137)
Pop. Density 0.519 1.29 1.64 -1.30 1.37 0.458
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.417) (1.07) (1.16) (0.859) (0.989) (0.868)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.231 0.672 1.763∗ -0.755 -1.320∗ 0.482
(0.273) (1.080) (0.719) (0.535) (0.595) (0.700)
Public Trans Usage 0.351∗∗∗ -0.156 1.374∗ 0.204 -0.0941 0.680∗∗∗
(0.0851) (0.273) (0.516) (0.127) (0.255) (0.110)
Interaction 0.0649 0.405∗∗ -0.263 0.133 0.180 -0.112
(0.0457) (0.128) (0.160) (0.0825) (0.100) (0.0733)
Pop. Density 0.114 0.949∗ -0.193 -0.364 -0.419 -0.0336
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.185) (0.363) (0.176) (0.212) (0.349) (0.146)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.304 1.225 1.593 -1.079 -1.069∗ 0.789
(0.341) (1.320) (0.862) (0.627) (0.488) (0.706)
Public Trans Usage 0.360 0.0356 1.413∗ -0.0429 -0.154 0.780∗∗
(0.204) (0.321) (0.539) (0.179) (0.249) (0.258)
Interaction 0.0152 0.304∗ -0.337 0.169 0.163 -0.215∗
(0.0440) (0.136) (0.194) (0.0984) (0.0881) (0.0915)
Pop. Density 0.600∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 0.256 0.0568 0.280 0.0690
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.169) (0.496) (0.179) (0.187) (0.263) (0.306)
Observations 42014 7324 9657 7076 4943 7457
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.16:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Purpose
With Density Controls
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
ALL TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.522∗∗∗ -2.367 -3.152 -6.131∗ -9.835∗∗ -0.247
(1.031) (3.200) (1.967) (2.628) (3.652) (3.462)
Public Trans Usage -0.149 -0.291 0.195 0.375 -1.112 0.332
(0.163) (0.774) (0.417) (0.510) (0.847) (0.426)
Interaction 0.329∗∗∗ 0.301 0.317 -0.0755 0.727∗ 0.140
(0.0934) (0.357) (0.195) (0.175) (0.300) (0.245)
Pop. Density 0.702 3.14∗∗ 0.610 -0.271 -0.105 0.0442
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.487) (0.986) (1.44) (1.25) (1.37) (0.643)
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.180 1.239 0.123 0.255 -0.734 -0.718
(0.469) (0.825) (0.917) (1.373) (1.815) (1.287)
Public Trans Usage 0.258∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.358∗ 0.632∗∗ -0.0889 0.00473
(0.111) (0.189) (0.157) (0.191) (0.223) (0.339)
Interaction -0.0144 -0.186∗ -0.00346 -0.159 0.0836 0.0609
(0.0556) (0.0811) (0.0685) (0.104) (0.109) (0.180)
Pop. Density 0.721∗∗ 0.789 0.994∗ 0.492 0.245 1.46∗∗
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.225) (0.439) (0.455) (0.601) (0.859) (0.418)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -3.622∗∗∗ -4.202∗ -2.133 -3.314∗ -8.279∗∗ -0.202
(0.793) (1.788) (1.644) (1.641) (2.505) (2.247)
Public Trans Usage -0.414∗ -0.476 -0.147 -0.421 -1.072∗∗∗ 0.0899
(0.159) (0.519) (0.736) (0.304) (0.244) (0.390)
Interaction 0.240∗∗∗ 0.235 0.162 0.107 0.780∗∗∗ -0.0688
(0.0633) (0.235) (0.346) (0.150) (0.139) (0.215)
Pop. Density 0.314 0.994 0.274 0.431 -1.05 1.18
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.196) (0.787) (0.538) (0.691) (0.860) (0.782)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.721 0.597 -1.142 -3.072 -0.822 0.673
(0.727) (2.288) (1.858) (1.965) (1.811) (2.345)
Public Trans Usage 0.00655 -0.428 -0.0160 0.164 0.0491 0.237
(0.106) (0.582) (0.481) (0.427) (0.577) (0.384)
Interaction 0.104 0.253 0.159 -0.0234 -0.137 0.148
(0.0631) (0.252) (0.222) (0.193) (0.197) (0.173)
Pop. Density -0.333 1.36∗ -0.658 -1.19∗ 0.702 -2.60∗
(,000s per sq. mi.) (0.370) (0.626) (0.881) (0.461) (0.961) (0.974)
Observations 42014 7324 9657 7076 4943 7457
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.17:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Mode
Using Passenger Miles Per Capita
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.618∗∗∗ -2.700 -4.784∗ -3.506 -10.88∗∗∗ -0.735
(0.826) (2.896) (1.894) (3.103) (2.898) (2.279)
Pass. Miles per cap. -0.0202∗∗ -0.0139 -0.0429 0.0180 -0.0358∗∗∗ -0.0191
(0.00667) (0.0120) (0.0225) (0.0131) (0.00980) (0.0104)
Interaction 0.00566∗∗ -0.00327 0.0150 -0.0152∗∗ 0.0144∗∗ 0.00723
(0.00195) (0.00521) (0.00878) (0.00548) (0.00435) (0.00408)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.0325 0.166 1.616 -0.776 -1.143 0.438
(0.290) (1.123) (0.805) (0.575) (0.645) (0.678)
Pass. Miles per cap. 0.00742∗∗ -0.00536 0.0299∗ 0.00327 -0.00170 0.0158∗∗∗
(0.00244) (0.00811) (0.0144) (0.00348) (0.00683) (0.00303)
Interaction 0.00204 0.0116∗∗ -0.00591 0.00317 0.00418 -0.00265
(0.00126) (0.00367) (0.00405) (0.00236) (0.00276) (0.00193)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.0332 0.508 1.302 -1.242 -1.179∗ 0.673
(0.366) (1.358) (0.945) (0.715) (0.501) (0.714)
Pass. Miles per cap. 0.00888 0.00175 0.0324∗ -0.00115 -0.00312 0.0185∗
(0.00512) (0.0104) (0.0149) (0.00501) (0.00563) (0.00705)
Interaction 0.000970 0.00977∗ -0.00769 0.00396 0.00435 -0.00495
(0.00109) (0.00431) (0.00489) (0.00286) (0.00221) (0.00250)
Observations 42795 7441 9842 7230 5028 7587
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.18:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Purpose
Using Passenger Miles Per Capita
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
ALL TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.477∗∗∗ -3.044 -3.526 -5.399 -9.847∗ 0.267
(0.959) (3.013) (2.007) (2.925) (3.674) (3.467)
Pass. Miles per cap. -0.00102 -0.000518 0.00643 0.0158 -0.0268 0.0104
(0.00377) (0.0190) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0189) (0.0131)
Interaction 0.00813∗∗ 0.00952 0.00738 -0.00511 0.0180∗ 0.00343
(0.00269) (0.00883) (0.00566) (0.00571) (0.00757) (0.00713)
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.342 1.172 -0.355 0.0997 -0.839 -0.530
(0.483) (0.860) (1.022) (1.349) (1.807) (1.436)
Pass. Miles per cap. 0.00843∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ -0.000720 0.00458
(0.00244) (0.00479) (0.00411) (0.00412) (0.00720) (0.00819)
Interaction -0.0000908 -0.00503∗ -0.000136 -0.00330 0.00230 0.00160
(0.00138) (0.00202) (0.00198) (0.00227) (0.00339) (0.00446)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -3.524∗∗∗ -4.554∗ -1.920 -3.021 -8.112∗∗ -0.211
(0.761) (1.773) (1.579) (1.738) (2.539) (2.330)
Pass. Miles per cap. -0.0101∗∗ -0.0120 -0.00321 -0.00642 -0.0321∗∗∗ 0.00442
(0.00373) (0.0145) (0.0186) (0.00901) (0.00772) (0.0118)
Interaction 0.00621∗∗∗ 0.00750 0.00400 0.00113 0.0200∗∗∗ -0.000988
(0.00144) (0.00649) (0.00847) (0.00467) (0.00497) (0.00610)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.611 0.338 -1.250 -2.478 -0.896 1.008
(0.776) (2.246) (1.808) (2.157) (1.963) (2.385)
Pass. Miles per cap. 0.000617 -0.00725 -0.00191 0.00600 0.00604 0.00140
(0.00372) (0.0153) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0120)
Interaction 0.00200 0.00706 0.00352 -0.00295 -0.00435 0.00282
(0.00207) (0.00651) (0.00539) (0.00485) (0.00510) (0.00526)
Observations 42716 7429 9821 7218 5023 7579
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.19:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Mode
Using Operating Expenses Per Capita
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
CAR TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.798∗∗∗ -2.975 -5.058∗ -2.837 -10.96∗∗∗ -1.355
(0.879) (3.110) (2.362) (3.502) (3.115) (2.402)
Op. Expenses per cap. -0.0365∗ -0.0318 -0.0746 0.0315 -0.0593∗∗ -0.0385
(0.0158) (0.0239) (0.0488) (0.0279) (0.0214) (0.0216)
Interaction 0.00983∗ -0.00330 0.0245 -0.0283∗ 0.0227∗ 0.0148
(0.00476) (0.0105) (0.0198) (0.0116) (0.00995) (0.00824)
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.00303 -0.269 1.794 -0.803 -1.367 0.757
(0.297) (1.178) (0.986) (0.655) (0.743) (0.680)
Op. Expenses per cap. 0.0136∗ -0.00903 0.0531 0.00707 -0.00639 0.0310∗∗∗
(0.00591) (0.0171) (0.0293) (0.00651) (0.0110) (0.00668)
Interaction 0.00354 0.0216∗∗ -0.0101 0.00508 0.00791 -0.00579
(0.00215) (0.00745) (0.00803) (0.00450) (0.00475) (0.00351)
SELF TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) 0.0405 0.0694 1.575 -1.162 -1.425∗ 0.848
(0.404) (1.417) (1.111) (0.870) (0.552) (0.828)
Op. Expenses per cap. 0.0165 0.00356 0.0585 0.00201 -0.00790 0.0329∗
(0.0109) (0.0206) (0.0297) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0150)
Interaction 0.00160 0.0189∗ -0.0135 0.00551 0.00835 -0.00871
(0.00220) (0.00797) (0.00940) (0.00601) (0.00419) (0.00523)
Observations 42716 7429 9821 7218 5023 7579
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.20:
Effect of Gas Prices and Public Transportation on Travel Time† by Purpose
Using Operating Expenses Per Capita
ALL $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
ALL TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -4.602∗∗∗ -3.230 -3.484 -5.303 -10.13∗ -0.194
(1.033) (3.077) (2.117) (3.251) (3.915) (3.716)
Op. Expenses per cap. -0.000320 0.00301 0.0144 0.0251 -0.0476 0.0147
(0.00788) (0.0371) (0.0245) (0.0284) (0.0355) (0.0283)
Interaction 0.0136∗ 0.0165 0.0110 -0.00853 0.0296 0.00830
(0.00575) (0.0170) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0157) (0.0146)
WORK TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.247 1.434 -0.274 0.391 -0.898 -0.544
(0.510) (0.910) (1.110) (1.403) (1.866) (1.611)
Op. Expenses per cap. 0.0157∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0217∗ 0.0317∗∗ -0.00224 0.00722
(0.00584) (0.00872) (0.00924) (0.00976) (0.0126) (0.0166)
Interaction -0.000731 -0.00952∗ -0.000722 -0.00702 0.00392 0.00262
(0.00283) (0.00362) (0.00463) (0.00505) (0.00575) (0.00823)
LEISURE TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -3.777∗∗∗ -5.157∗ -1.395 -2.877 -8.666∗∗ -0.702
(0.788) (1.969) (1.758) (1.899) (2.789) (2.461)
Op. Expenses per cap. -0.0184∗ -0.0263 0.00470 -0.00885 -0.0582∗∗ 0.00319
(0.00719) (0.0301) (0.0361) (0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0226)
Interaction 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0163 0.00211 0.000574 0.0346∗∗ 0.00131
(0.00269) (0.0130) (0.0164) (0.00954) (0.0117) (0.0114)
OTHER TRAVEL
Real Price Gas ($) -0.579 0.493 -1.815 -2.816 -0.568 1.053
(0.865) (2.526) (1.937) (2.346) (2.120) (2.725)
Op. Expenses per cap. 0.00236 -0.00571 -0.0119 0.00232 0.0128 0.00433
(0.00734) (0.0317) (0.0227) (0.0216) (0.0234) (0.0260)
Interaction 0.00293 0.00974 0.00960 -0.00209 -0.00892 0.00436
(0.00417) (0.0141) (0.0108) (0.00944) (0.00935) (0.0115)
Observations 42716 7429 9821 7218 5023 7579
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Travel time is measured in minutes per average day.
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Table 3.21: Yearly Welfare Incidence of a 25 cent increase in real gas prices
ACS Metro Area $0-$25K $25-$50K $50-$75K $75K-$100K $100K+
PT Usage
0.0% Welfare Loss ($) 102.95 134.67 127.57 141.83 153.08
WL/Income 0.82% 0.35% 0.20% 0.16% 0.10%
2.5% Incidence ($) 100.28 127. 53 129.36 136.80 149.59
WL/Income 0.80% 0.34% 0.21% 0.16% 0.10%
5.0% Incidence ($) 97.61 120.59 131.15 131.77 146.41
WL/Income 0.78% 0.32% 0.21% 0.15% 0.10%
10.0% Incidence ($) 102.95 106.51 134.73 121.72 139.72
WL/Income 0.82% 0.28% 0.22% 0.14% 0.09%
Observations 7410 9785 7142 4872 7480
Welfare Loss measured in (dollars) lost per year from a base price of $2.50 per gallon.
Loss to Income ratio is measured at the midpoint income of each bin and $150K for the last bin.
CHAPTER IV
Employment and Intra-household Time Allocation
4.1 Introduction
The loss of employment by one partner in a dual-headed household has numerous
effects on the well-being of both parties. The loss of income can lead to a reduction
in consumption for the entire household, and both individuals must reorganize the
time usage of the household. No longer does the employed partner have several hours
of each day devoted to paid work activity, and thus he or she must spend time on
other activities such as more leisure or more household production if market work
is no longer an option. The other spouse may feel the need to work more to make
up for the loss income of the other spouse and may be able to spend less time in
household production, depending on the time use of the unemployed partner. Al-
ternatively more overall household production time may be needed as the household
shifts towards more time intensive production activities.
The paper examines the effect of unemployment on the time use patterns of both
partners in a household, with separate effects calculated for each sex and for weekday
and weekend time use. I utilize multiple empirical specifications and construct pre-
dictions for the time use of unsurveyed partners to determine marginal effects using
the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Across most specifications, I find consistent
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estimates that females respond to partner unemployment by working 80-90 minutes
per week more, with only small changes to leisure. Household production, however,
declines by about 2 hours per week. Males respond similarly, taking on about 50-70
minutes per week. Own work time declines by about 32-35 hours per week for women
and 36-39 hours a week for men. Additional household production is the result of
one-half to two-thirds of this time for women and about one-third to one-half of this
time for men. Adding income as controls has minimal effect on the average estimates,
but there is indication that the effect of partner’s unemployment differs by income.
I also attempt to estimate the effect of a change in a partner’s employment status
on own time use but find only small responses for both sexes.
The economic significance of examining the effect of unemployment on time use is
shown in two related strains of literature that examine household dynamics. When
an income-producing member of a household loses his or her job, the family is then
tasked with identifying alternate ways to meet the expenditure needs of its mem-
bers. If an alternate job cannot be procured, a utility-maximizing household, in the
traditional neo-classical framework such as first described in Becker (1965), have a
variety of options from which they can draw. They may choose to utilize existing
savings or borrow against future earnings, they can reduce expenditures by changing
leisure choices or identifying more time-intensive means of household production, or
other household members can seek to increase their own labor supply.
This was detailed more broadly by Gronau (1977) who sought to emphasize the
importance of treating home production and home leisure separately from each other.
Consumption is modeled to be a combination of goods and services and time spent
consuming them, but the goods and services themselves can be either produced
with home production time or purchased in the market using income derived from
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time spent in market work. In this context, home production and market work are
substitutes for each other since they both generate the goods and services which are
complementary to leisure time.
A question that still remains however is how consumption and time use decisions
are tied together within households. The literature examining the effect of unemploy-
ment on a household has mainly focused on labor supply models, with the predicted
resulting positive impact on spousal work hours being termed the “Added Worker
Effect”. The concept is important because such behavioral changes allow a household
to self-insure against unemployment in addition to public unemployment insurance
(Ashenfelter, 1980; Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980, 1982; Lundberg, 1985; Cullen and
Gruber, 2000). Evidence for an Added Worker Effect was usually found to be existent
but quite small and many times not statistically different from zero (Spletzer, 1997).
Cullen and Gruber (2000) noted that unemployment insurance itself was found to
crowd out increases in spousal labor supply and Bingley and Walker (2001) found
similar evidence examining UK unemployment insurance programs. Those authors
found means-based unemployment benefits based on household income reduced the
labor supply of women with unemployed husbands. Related, Krueger and Mueller
(2010) find that time spent on job search activities declines with benefit generosity
and increases as benefits are set to expire utilizing the time use data used in this pa-
per, and Güler and Taskin (2013) find that home production time falls with increases
in unemployment benefits.
The implication for many of these studies is that when considering the reduction
in household production and increases in spousal labor supply that result from un-
employment benefits, said benefits crowd out these alternative household methods
of insuring against welfare losses due to unemployment. However, the economic in-
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dications of whether household production is a substitute for market work is still
questionable. Using American data, Burda and Hamermesh (2010) find increases
in household production generated by unemployment were between one-eighth and
one-half the reduction in market work time in Italy, Australia and Germany; for
America, this ratio was about 31%. Cyclical unemployment, however, is more likely
to result in higher household production than long-term. Most recently, Aguiar et al.
(2011) use ATUS data during the recent recession to determine how lost work hours
were allocated, identifying 30-40% are spent on increases in household production.
There have also been a series of papers examining the effect of macroeconomic
unemployment on time use as well as evidence these effects can be dramatically dif-
ferent depending on the culture or country. A paper utilizing the Spanish Time Use
Survey by Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2010) sought to determine the impact of unemploy-
ment on household production as well as how the regional unemployment situation
helped shaped that impact. They found only a small, but significant portion of time
that would have otherwise been spent working is spent on household production
(about 20%) with the majority devoted to leisure time. Their larger contribution
however was identifying evidence that higher unemployment rates coincide with in-
crease levels of household production for the unemployed. Ahn et al. (2005) find
even larger effects of own-unemployment on home production. Conversely, Lee et al.
(2011) find little effect on reduced hours worked on increased household production,
however they were examining exogenous reductions in market work generated by
legal reductions in the work week in Japan and Korea.
Most of these papers, however, only examine time use behavior of a single re-
spondent. In this paper, I seek to examine the combination of the added worker
effect as well as the intra-household effects (if any) that an increase in household
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production might arise. Note, household production resulting from lower income
does not necessarily result in it being performed by the unemployed; while produc-
tion occurring because unemployment reduces opportunity costs, prior specialization
still might be a factor in potential increases. The effect of unemployment on spousal
time use then is an interesting and theoretically and empirically ambiguous question
which informs the general question of the substitutability of household production
and market work.
Much of the past work on household labor supply has examined the effect of rela-
tive wages on intra-household bargaining over consumption and time use, examining
tests of unitary vs. collective models of household labor supply (Fortin and Lacroix,
1997; Chiappori et al., 2002; Blundell et al., 2007). Most find difficulty reconciling
the unitary model with strong empirical data suggesting some bargaining and au-
tonomy in decision making separate from the household. They also find increasing
bargaining positions can increase women’s labor supply (and vice versa). Bloemen
et al. (2010) examine Italian couples using dual surveys and identify education levels
of both the mother and father positively affect the time spent with children for the
father, and trends change significantly between weekend and weekday. Child care
and household production in general is larger with younger child presence.
Using time use data in particular has grown in recent years as the American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) has aged and collected more waves. Friedberg and Webb (2006)
estimate similar aspects of bargaining and use changes in time use to test bargaining
models based on the effect of spousal relative wages. Utilizing leisure time as a
measure of utility, they find higher relative wages for women result in more time
spent in leisure and less time in household production. Such bargaining effects, they
also conclude, are largest for childless couples, where gains are potentially greater
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due to less demand for household production. Bittman et al. (2003) found similar
effects in Australian data, but only when the male-to-female wage ratio was greater
than one and Daunfeldt and Hellström (2007) use Swedish data to examine the
determinants of participation in different household activities, identifying wages and
age as significant predictors.
The empirical part of this paper has two parts, one which estimates the effect of
own and partner employment status on time use and a second which uses a synthetic
measure of spousal time use to determine the marginal effects of changes in spousal
time use on own time use. A large increase in unallocated hours due to unemployment
is likely to be divided primarily between leisure and household production and it is
an open empirical question as to how much of each will be allocated. For partner
unemployment, own time use in work may increase due to the added worker effect
and it is possible partner’s increase in household production may allow for a decline in
their own production. Income effects, however, may necessitate an increase in time-
intensive household production which could even increase own time in such activities;
therefore, the expected change in household production for partner unemployment
is unclear.
The estimation of marginal effects necessitates a different discussion on expecta-
tion of changes. The estimation here specifically omits the joint decision, and without
actual data on spousal time use, this may not be possible anyway. The estimation
procedure below looks at the changes in own time use as if the spousal time use were
independent. While this is a very strong assumption, the use of artificial data allows
the measurement of average changes to such behavior with fewer concerns about en-
dogeneity. Admittedly, some, if not most, of the measured effect will be from not a
direct response to a change in spousal time use, but rather reflect the totality of the
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joint household and individual utility maximization decisions as they are averaged
across the population.
If there is an added worker effect, it is unclear how that marginal increase work
time would have an effect on other time uses. There may be an increase in leisure
activity and a decrease in household production as the household shifts to more more
costly, less time-intensive household production (relative to no change in spousal work
time) or such work time could be taken from the sleep and personal maintenance
time with no change in spousal or even household leisure or household production
time. One could expect an added worker effect would be larger for those with higher
incomes who may have more flexibility in their choice of work hours, but due to the
income effect, they may not necessarily have as much need for the higher income.
Indeed, I find some empirical evidence both of these could be true resulting in U-
shaped curve of estimates of the added worker with respect to income for males.
An increase in spousal leisure time may lead to an increase in own leisure time
if there exists complementarities, which has been suggested based on the findings of
Hamermesh (2002); Hamermesh et al. (2008). It is unclear what would be the effect
of an increase in marginal spousal household production as a priori, it is unclear
whether such activity is a net substitute for own household production or if there
exists complementarities such as when a couple washes dishes together. If it is a new
substitute, then we would expect a possible increase in either own leisure or work
time.
4.2 Data
To explore the impact of unemployment on household time use, I utilize the
American Time Use Survey (ATUS) from 2003-2010. Each respondent of the ATUS
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is informed of an upcoming day during which they are asked to keep a time diary
of each activity they perform, its duration and location and whomever the respon-
dent was with at the time. The sample is drawn from outgoing Current Population
Survey (CPS) cohorts, which allow researchers to match ATUS and CPS data. Only
one adult from each household is asked to respond, however, so interviews for both
partners in a couple are not available. For the time period I analyze, there were
112,038 diaries recorded; of these, 60,217 respondents reported a cohabiting partner
for which CPS and ATUS survey data were available.
The sample was nationally representative but stratified by day of the week, with
roughly a quarter of the sample diaries taken for Saturday and Sunday each and a
tenth of the sample for each weekday. The BLS provides survey files that include
the amount of total time each respondent spends in each activity. In addition,
ATUS provides a variety of demographic and household information collected at
the time of the survey as well as many reported from the final month of the CPS.
Own employment at the time of the survey is recoded to Employed, Unemployed
or Not in the Labor Force1. Spousal unemployment is more difficult to ascertain
as the ATUS does not ask questions that differentiate between those with partners
who are unemployed but still in the labor force and those not in the labor force.
Unemployment was constructed by coding those partners who reported either being
employed or unemployed (in the labor force) during the CPS-8 interview 2-6 months
prior AND coded as not employed in the ATUS. This has the potential of casting a
wider net as it would also include those not in the labor force. As such, unemployment
rates for partners are much higher than for the diary respondents. Those who were
not in the labor force and are now unemployed are considered to still be not in the
1Employed is divided into actively working and employed but absent from work and Unemployed is split between
those who are without a job or laid off from a job with likely expectation of rehire. These are collapsed to compare
with the spousal group for which this division is not recorded.
131
labor force for my purposes. The reasoning behind this choice was that this group
did not experience a change in employment status that would affect household time
use.
Each of the following analyses is performed separately for male and female and for
weekday and weekend. Summary sample demographic statistics are reported for the
population in Tables ?? and 4.2. Summary statistics grouped by income category
are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Males are more likely to be employed full time
and women are more likely to be employed part time. In addition to differences
in employment, there are substantial differences of demographic characteristics by
income level. Income is negatively correlated with the likelihood of being black,
hispanic or living in a non-metropolitan area. This could be provide evidence omitted
variable bias may be a concern. If the physical size of a household’s residence affects
leisure and household production choices, this would introduce bias in the estimates
of coefficients of variables which are correlated. It is unclear which direction overall
omitted variable bias would be for each variable, but it is a potential source of concern
with the data.
I aggregate the time use data into three categories, consisting of Work2, Leisure3
and Household Production4. Activities types which do not fall into these categories
include personal care, education and time spent traveling or on the telephone5. The
type of activity recorded is based on the primary activity in which the respondent
2ATUS code 05 consisting of time spent on work, income-generating activities and job search activities
3ATUS codes 12-15 consisting of Socialising, any leisure activity, sports and exercise, religious activity and vol-
unteer activity.
4ATUS codes 2-4 and 7-10, consisting of household maintenance, care for household and non-household members,
and time spent shopping and or acquiring professional, personal, household and government services
5Transportation and some telephone activities are considered activities which can be performed in service of
another activity. While an argument could be made for including them as part of the total amount of time devoted
to work, leisure and household production, I choose not to. This reflects a desire for the activity times to reflect the
time devoted specifically towards the income generation, utility generation or time-money transformation that these
three activities represent.
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reports participating.6 As such, the ATUS will under-report such activities7.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the mean average times spent in each category as well
as the proportion of the sample whom participated in any activity within those
categories. It is unsurprising that respondents in households with higher incomes
work more on average, but the timing of household production is very different based
on income. Weekday household production declines with income, while weekend
household production increases with income. This may be due to higher degrees
of market-substitution for household production which occurs on weekdays versus
weekends.
Abraham et al. (2006) detail other issues involved with data collection for the
ATUS citing the length and burden of the survey. They suggest non-response bias
could be introduced if those who respond to the survey have time habits which
differ from respondents. For example, ATUS respondents were much more likely
to be volunteers based on linking them back to a CPS Volunteer Supplement. In
addition, ATUS is exclusively a computer assisted telephone interview survey, given
after participation in the CPS. This increases the difficulty in reaching respondents,
and unlike the CPS, a specific member of the household is selected for response.
Respondents who are unemployed, less educated, young, Hispanic and black all have
lower response rates, primarily though lower contact rates. As such, the ATUS
sample will have an unemployment rate that is lower than the population rate at
large. While I do not correct for that source of bias, results of any study using ATUS
data should be interpreted with this in mind.
Additionally, there is a history of worry about the quality of labor statistics with
6For example, if a person is reading articles online with a laptop while also watching television, only one activity,
whichever the respondent states as primary, will be recorded. Listening to the radio or music is known to be
chronically underreported since the vast majority of such activity is performed as a secondary activity.
7Although I am not making use of this aspect of the data, one noteworthy exception is that the ATUS interviewer
will specifically ask and record secondary activities as they relate to child-care where appropriate.
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regards to their ability to capture the underground economy8, there is no present
validation study regarding the accuracy of the self-reported time use diaries. It
should be noted that while ATUS interviewers do not ask questions related to the
specifics of income-producing activities, they do probe respondents when they are
unclear as to if a respondent is being paid for an activity or not as well as ask for
the location of all activities. That said, the vast majority of the time reported in
the Work category for the unemployed consists of job-search activities9, indicating
respondents who are truthfully reporting their time use activities with substantial
income-producing time in underground activities are properly coded as part-time
or full-time workers. If respondents are purposefully misreporting income producing
activities as other types of time use such as sleeping, leisure, or household production,
this could bias the estimates of the effect of unemployment on those activities. This
is particularly so, if they choose a time use mix that is substantially different from the
activities of actual non-working unemployed respondents. Note the error here is not a
misreporting of what unemployed people do, but a misclassification of the respondent
as unemployed. That said, as these respondents have been primed through several
rounds of CPS questions and have continued to participate in the ATUS, it seems
unlikely this would be a substantial source of error in the data.
4.3 Empirical Estimation
4.3.1 Effect of Spousal Employment Status
I perform two different estimations to calculate the interaction of spousal employ-
ment on household time use. I first use an OLS estimation of the following equation:
Ti = β0 + β1FTEi + β2PTEi + β3UNi + β4FTEPi + β5PTEPi + β6UNPi+
8Gutmann (1978) and McDonald (1984) provide early examples of attacks and defenses of the data on these
grounds
9The mean time in Work activities for all unemployed respondents with partners is 29.9 minutes per day and the
mean time in job search activities for the same group is 23.3 minutes per day.
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γ1Xi + γ2XPi + γ3Hi + γ4Ti, (4.1)
where FTE, PTE and UN represent indicators for full-time employment, part-time
employment and unemployment for the respondent and their partner. Each coef-
ficient estimate is thus calculated relative to those not in the labor force. X and
Xp are individual characteristics of the respondent and partner including age, age
squared, education and indicators for black and hispanic. Hi includes household level
characteristics of the presence of any children, a child under the age of 5 and a child
under the age of 10 as well as the state and metropolitan status of the household. Ti
includes several controls for the date of the diary: the day, week, month and year of
the survey and an indicator if the day of the survey was a holiday. The time and lo-
cation based regressors along with race and education characteristics are unreported
in the following regression results.
When confronted with data that include a large number of zero points or where
the dependent variables are otherwise limited in some manner, the Tobit statistical
model is frequently employed to model the underlying relationships. This is the
procedure by which Connelly and Kimmel (2009b) use to construct their estimates of
spousal time use in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model. The Tobit specification,
however, assumes the likelihood of participating in an activity and the amount of
time spent in an activity are the result of the same underlying decision process
(Stewart, 2009) This is unlikely to be true for time use in a number of cases. As
Stewart (2009) explains, where there are large numbers of non-participation, Tobit
performs poorly relative to OLS in generating unbiased and consistent results. The
authors also found that OLS performs well, but might still be problematic since a
linear specification permits prediction of time use that are negative, which is not
possible.
135
Using Swedish data, Daunfeldt and Hellström (2007) come to a similar conclusion
and utilize a Cragg model to estimate the determinants of time use for various
household production activities. The empirical strategy developed in Cragg (1971)
appears to be a theoretically nice fit for time use data. Instead of a regressor forced to
have the same directional affect on the probability of participation and the duration
of activity, the Cragg model separately models both decisions Burke (2009). In
particular, the model combines a probit with the truncated normal when the variable
of interest t is positive:




where s is an indicator equal to 1 if t is positive and 0 otherwise. In the above
model, γ is the vector by which x1 affects the probability of participation and β is
the vector by which x2 affects the amount of time spent in an activity. Of note, if
x1 = x2 and γ = β/σ, then this is equivalent to the Tobit model (Burke, 2009; Cragg,
1971). Using the same covariates, I thus perform this two-part Cragg estimation that
separately estimates the participation and time length decisions.
Since a continuous income variable is not readily available for the respondents, I
repeat each of the above regressions by including income controls based on income
categories which are provided for about 90% of the sample in the ATUS data10.
Coefficient estimates are reported relative to those making between $0 and $30,000.
Additionally, both the OLS and Cragg estimations are run on each income category
subsample separately to determine if there is a differential impact on each of the
coefficient estimates.
10These categories are classified by $0-$30,000, $30,000-$50,000, $50,000-$75,000, $75,000-$100,000 and above
$100,000
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Table 4.7 presents the difference between the coefficients of full employment and
unemployment (reported in weekly hours) for both respondents and partners for
each of the respondent time use values. Table 4.8 present the same estimates when
income controls are utilized. Full estimation results for the OLS regressions, with
and without income controls, are found in Tables 4.9 - 4.12. Tables 4.13 - 4.16 report
the Cragg estimates of the effect on unconditional time use. These are calculated by
generating predicted values for the sample and then calculating the marginal effects
on the probability of activity participation and on the amount of reported activity
time conditional on activity participation. The product of these two values gives the
marginal effect on the unconditional activity time. Bootstrapped standard errors are
reported.
A loss in employment leads to 32-35 less hours of work per week for women and
36-39 hours less work per week for men when looking at the OLS and Cragg esti-
mations, which are roughly consistent with expectations, providing some validity to
the empirical strategy. We see larger own-unemployment reductions in work time
for men, as expected because they spent more time in work on average. With this
increase in available time, about two-thirds to one-half is spent in household pro-
duction for women and one-half to one-third for men. This provides evidence that
unemployment does not lead to all extra time sleeping and watching television, al-
though the remainder of the time is mostly spent in leisure activities. Additionally,
such values are consistent with those found in Aguiar et al. (2011).
The impact of a change in employment by a respondent’s spouse has a small, but
statistically significant impact on labor supply of about an hour and half increase
for females and about an hour for males per week. This is entirely consistent with
previous literature on the Added Worker Effect. This effect is larger for women than
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men which may reflect higher flexibility for labor supply choice or a higher need for
the household to replace the earnings of a male partner. These regressions include the
sex of the partner, and tables 4.9-4.15 do seem to suggest those with male partners
work less on weekdays for both sexes.
It is quite likely that a reduction of 2-3 hours per week of household work due to
partner unemployment for both men and women does allow for this increased labor
supply. As the amount of household production reduced by respondents whose part-
ner is unemployed is much smaller than the increase by the unemployed respondents,
it is likely that this extra production represents new household work as opposed to
purely taking on the partner’s responsibilities. This indicates either a substitution of
household production for income from market work or a shift of household produc-
tion time from the future for larger prospects that are not related to normal daily or
weekly maintenance. There is little evidence of any noticeable impact of a partner’s
unemployment on leisure time.
Of note, the existence of children significantly increases the amount of household
production and decreases leisure time for both sexes on weekdays and weekends.
Changes are much smaller for men than women, however; having a child under the
age of 5 increases household production time by 16.6 hours weekly for females and
by 9.0 hours weekly for males 11. Similarly, leisure time is reduced by 8.5 hours for
women and only 5.6 hours for men. Work time does not significantly change much
except for mothers of children under the age of 5 on weekdays. Additionally, women
with same sex partners work considerably more (7.0 hours a week) with most of
that time (6.1 hours) coming from a reduction in household production. Males in
same sex couples have the opposite direction, working less and spending more time in
11Calculated by adding the three children-related coefficients 5 times for weekeday and 2 times for weekend and
then dividing by 60
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household production, however the effects are smaller and not statistically significant.
Marginal effects from the Cragg estimation are similar, generating less leisure for
more household production during weekdays for females and more reduction of leisure
for males.
The addition of income controls does not substantially change the estimates of
the coefficients from the estimation procedures or the difference between full-time
employment and unemployment. There is some small indication it increases the
measure of the added worker effect, particularly for men. This may be due to male
partner unemployment occurring more likely in households at income levels which
see lower added worker effects. Differences generated by income could be a result of
either differences in the desire for more spousal work time or differences in the ability
to obtain more spousal work time. I explore these potential differences by performing
an OLS estimation separately for each income level12. Calculated estimates of the
time use effects of full employment to unemployment are plotted in Figure 4.1. Bars
indicating 95% confidence intervals are included.
There does not appear to be substantial variation across income levels with respect
to time use changes resulting from own unemployment, except for a couple key
observations. Females of higher incomes report more of their time in household
production and less in leisure than those of lower incomes. This may be the result
of those households substituting market-based household production for one’s own.
This is consistent with the idea that higher income households would be more likely
to obtain market-based household production. Interestingly, this observation does
not seem to be generated for men indicating women are more likely to peform this
substitution as a result of unemployment than man are.
12Note the sample size is now being split three ways (by gender, weekday/weekend and income), in addition to
losing about 12% of the sample through omitted income. Each regression only includes about 2500-3000 observations.
As such, the Cragg estimation procedure fails to converge for several of the subsamples.
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The impact of partner’s unemployment does seem to generate an added worker
effect that differs across income levels. The point estimate for females in households
reporting income over $100,000 is double that of those making below $75,000. Sample
sizes generate standard errors which are too large to confirm a statistical significance,
but this would seem to be an economically significant difference. Females in this in-
come group also experience more household production less of a decline in household
production than those making less. While the added worker effect is smaller for
men, there is also an indication that the added worker effect for males also increases
with income, although there is also an increase for those making less than $30,000
as well. This would be consistent with the idea that partners of the unemployed in
households with high levels of income are more likely to either want to or be able to
work more hours. Male workers in poor households are also more likely to illustrate
an added worker effect compared to those in middle-income households, while this
difference does not seem to be illustrated for females. Males in poor households also
exhibit substantially less household production relative to the rest of the population.
4.3.2 Marginal Effect of Spousal Time Use
With the results of the estimation procedure above, it is then possible to construct
out-of-sample predictions of spousal hours in each of the three activities of work,
leisure and household production. These constructions are necessary because the
ATUS asks of a diary from only one selected member of a household. From this,
I estimate the average and marginal effect an additional minute of partner activity
has on one’s own activity.
Connelly and Kimmel (2009a) discuss the fatality of not having dual diaries from
a household. Using their model from Connelly and Kimmel (2009c) of the effect
of relative wages on spousal time and child care, they jointly estimate time use us-
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ing in-sample respondents for the out-of-sample spouses. Additionally, they use a
propensity score matching system to “marry” two respondents with characteristics
similar to each others’ spouses. Using German data that include spousal diaries,
they evaluate the usefulness of each approach, determining that there are costs and
benefits in the constructed or matched data versus actual data (which do not exist for
ATUS). Matching models generate more variation and can lead to fewer significant
results and different results that predicted or actual data, although they argue the
ATUS matches are of higher quality than the tested German data. Predicted out-
of sample constructions generate results which are also less significant than actual
data, but are generally consistent. They also note that actual spousal data is not
necessarily the best option because of the endogeneity in jointly-considered house-
hold time choices and possible preferences for (or against) coordination, depending
on the questions being asked. The estimate using the propensity score matching pro-
cedure, however, would seem highly dependent on the choice of matching procedure.
Connelly and Kimmel (2009c) predict the gender of the spouse, but do not indicate
why matching on “male-ness” would be the best suited variable of interest.
I do construct out-of-sample spousal time use by utilizing the previous Cragg
estimation results (without the income indicators) to then estimate the probability
of participation for spousal activity, the expected value of time conditional on activity
participation from the truncated regression and then multiply the two to generate
an estimate of the unconditional time use in work, leisure and household production
for each spouse. The process generates means for the predictions of spousal time use
which are very close to those of the sample itself.
Again, I perform an OLS regression and and a two-part Cragg estimation on
the sample with the constructed spousal time use to estimate the marginal effect
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of spousal time use. Endogeneity with the time use of the respondent may still a
factor, but because these are constructed, out-of-sample time uses, concerns should
be minimal. The OLS is of the form:
Ti = β0 + β1FTEi + β2PTEi + β3UNi + β4ŴorkPi + β5L̂eisureP i+
β6 ̂HHProdPi+ γ1Xi + γ2XPi + γ3Hi + γ4Ti, (4.3)
with the two-part Cragg estimation using the same covariates.
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 present a summary of the regressions reporting just the
coefficient estimates for spousal time use from for each of the three own-time uses.
Results are presented in minutes changed by the respondent per one hour change
in spousal time. The magnitudes generated by the OLS and Cragg estimations are
slightly high relative to the results from the first part, but most are consistently
signed. The marginal effects are all of the same sign as the effects seen in Table 4.7.
The magnitudes calculated using the OLS regression from the Cragg estimates are
likely unreasonably high, but may be plausible if marginal activity is more likely to
be dependent on spousal behavior.
Full results from the OLS regressions using the Cragg estimators are found in
Tables 4.19 and 4.20. Results from the Cragg estimation using the Cragg estimators
are found in Tables 4.21 and 4.22. Results from own-employment time use coefficients
are not substantially different from the other estimations.
Some interesting stories emerge from these results. For both males and females,
weekday time use is much less responsive to the marginal time use of their partner
relative to weekends. This is likely due to individuals being more likely to be in
set routines during weekdays with less observed and less possible variability in time
use choices. Females do respond to an increase in an hour worked by their partner
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by participating in about 5 minutes more of their own work according to the OLS
regression, although this is not seen in the Cragg regression. This sign of the effect
of partner leisure time on female work and leisure time is in opposite directions
during weekdays, but they are not precisely estimated. The same sign difference
occurs in the result for the male time use. Different signs could occur in the two
specifications if the the probability of work is increased as a result of partner leisure
time, but the conditional work time falls. An hour of partner household production
on weekdays, however, is related with higher female labor supply of 6-9 minutes.
Although imprecisely estimated, this may also result in lower household production
for females by 3-5 minutes. Marginal male household production seems strongly
related to an hour of partner’s household production, falling by about 13 minutes
during weekdays under both specifications.
On weekends, many of these relationships change. Partner work results in less
female work and more female leisure. Partner leisure also generates less female
work and quite a bit more female leisure. One hour of partner leisure results in 20
minutes of additional female leisure according to the OLS regression and 15 minutes
according to the Cragg regression. The results suggest high complementarity of
leisure on weekends, echoing the research in Hamermesh (2002). Additionally, an
hour of partner household production is associated with declines in market work for
females of 12 minutes, an increase in leisure of 11 minutes and a decrease in household
production of 17 minutes when looking at the OLS estimates, although standard
errors are somewhat high for each estimate. Although the estimate for leisure is
imprecise, the estimate for the effect on own household production is almost a full
half hour using the Cragg procedure, suggesting significant substitutability between
partner’s household production on the weekend, by which the female respondent can
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increase time in leisure, sleep or other personal activities.
Male work and household production is much more responsive to the time use
decisions of their partner relative to those time use categories for females, but their
leisure time is much less responsive. An hour of partner work is associated with
11 more minutes of male work during the week and 22 minutes of work on the
weekends according the OLS estimates using predicted spousal time use. Incidentally,
men spend less time in household production as a result indicating income effects
which may work to reduce the time demands on household production. There is
some evidence female leisure may even reduce male leisure during the week, and
an hour of weekend leisure for females only results in 11 minutes fewer for males,
indicating male response to female leisure is much more muted. That said, an hour
of household production on the weekend by a partner reduces a male’s production
by almost the exact same amount as the effect on female. While this paper does not
go into detail about the nature of the household production utilized by each gender,
a more close analysis of the data could possibly yield the nature of the household
production activities that are affected by these seemingly intra-household transfers
of responsibility given it appears strong substitutability between the spouses. This,
however, could also be an indication of the asynchronicities in the timing of household
work, as such an effect does not show up on during the weekday.
4.4 Discussion
In this paper, like past research, I do not find any evidence for a strong added
worker effect, but I do calculate a small positive influence for unemployment on
spousal labor supply. This measures to be about 1-1.5 hours per week. Controlling
for income appears to increase this measurement by a small amount and higher levels
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of income are associated with higher added worker effects. Increases in household
production by spouses due to unemployment do not lead to subsequent large declines
in own household production, however each extra hour on household production by
the spouse can lead to crowd out one’s own production by 15-30 minutes for men all
days of the week and for women on weekends.
Although this paper does not model a bargaining process, the empirical evidence
found suggests other related insights to the time allocation process for a household.
There appear to exist large complementarities to leisure. I do not include wage or
income data, but the coefficient estimates for education do not show any noticeable
difference between partner’s responses to the bargaining power of spouses based on
education as found in Connelly and Kimmel (2009b). Additionally, at least on the
margin, household production time by a partner does substitute for such time use
by the other.
Although we use the same data but different methodologies, my results and those
found in Aguiar et al. (2011) find similar measures of the proportion of foregone work
hours allocated toward household production. The estimates found in this paper may
be slightly larger than theirs, but I include child care in my measure, which they
separately distinguish. Regardless, both are important findings because they begin
to dispel the notion that unemployment generates substantial “free time” consisting
of mostly leisure activity. While this is still partly true, the increase in household
production suggests both a shift towards non-market means of household work and
possibly a desire to “stay busy.” Of course, examining data which focused solely on
couples and during a time period of economic instability may contribute to such
findings. Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2010) specifically found evidence that unemployed
persons are more likely to spend time in household production (versus leisure) when
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overall unemployment is higher.
Income does not appear to provide substantial variation on the hours changed
as a result of respondent’s unemployment except for in households making above
$100,000. Males see less differences in work time in this income range, indicating they
likely spending much more time in job search activities. If unemployment benefits
are smaller relative to their household income level, they have a larger incentive to
spend time looking for a job. They might also have the resources to not be required
to substitute their own time for household production. This effect, however, is unique
to male respondents. Female respondents in this income range see higher levels of
household production relative to other income groups and no difference in the change
in work time. Since income is calculated at the household level, this is likely the result
of men being more likely to be the main bread winner in households making over
$100,000, but an interesting future research question would be to see if this effect
is consistent regardless of the division of the source of household income. While
research such as Friedberg and Webb (2006) and Connelly and Kimmel (2009c) has
examined the effect of relative household wages, they come to different conclusions
regarding whether this generate substantial differences in non-market time use, and
neither directly examine the impact of household unemployment.
This research also has implications for unemployment insurance generosity. In
addition to findings that they slow job searches, unemployment insurance generos-
ity decreases home production by the recipient (Güler and Taskin, 2013). This is
consistent with theory that suggests such insurance payments may be used to pur-
chase market-based substitutes for home production. This also generate significant
rethinking of measures of a country’s economic well-being. Home production does
not contribute to GDP in the same way market-based substitutes would, but to the
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extent it is utilizing idle resources of the unemployed, it could promote confidence,
skill retention and avoidance of malaise that could cloud future job prospects. Addi-
tionally, different types of unemployment together to develop a large enough sample,
there is theoretical and empirical reasons why different types of unemployment can
lead to different types of behavioral adjustment. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) notes
consumption changes are smaller for those who are laid off and face potential recall
than those who are unemployed due to firing, such as with white collar workers and
preliminary research by myself suggests such behavior is somewhat reflected in time
use data as well. It will be useful to develop this research by better identifying how
impacts differ short-term unemployed, long-term unemployed and laid-off workers
or how responses differ by the industry or profession. The time use changes of the
increasing number of individuals in recent years who have involuntarily moved from
full time to part time work can also provide a source of measuring the psychological
and economic impact of the labor market changes following the Great Recession.
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4.5 Figures and Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Sample Statistics by Day and Gender : Part 1
Female Male Full
Weekday Weekend Weekeday Weekend Sample
% Black 0.0715 0.0688 0.0749 0.0795 0.0735
(0.258) (0.253) (0.263) (0.271) (0.261)
% Hispanic 0.123 0.132 0.118 0.129 0.125
(0.328) (0.338) (0.322) (0.335) (0.331)
% Metro area 0.797 0.801 0.799 0.810 0.802
(0.402) (0.399) (0.401) (0.393) (0.399)
FT Employment
Self 0.428 0.439 0.714 0.730 0.570
(0.495) (0.496) (0.452) (0.444) (0.495)
Partner 0.681 0.688 0.413 0.420 0.558
(0.466) (0.463) (0.492) (0.494) (0.497)
PT Employment
Self 0.191 0.187 0.0642 0.0580 0.129
(0.393) (0.390) (0.245) (0.234) (0.335)
Partner 0.0932 0.0895 0.183 0.187 0.135
(0.291) (0.285) (0.386) (0.390) (0.342)
Unemployed
Self 0.0338 0.0347 0.0323 0.0317 0.0332
(0.181) (0.183) (0.177) (0.175) (0.179)
Partner 0.0509 0.0524 0.0653 0.0614 0.0572
(0.220) (0.223) (0.247) (0.240) (0.232)
Age
Age (self) 45.53 45.22 48.33 47.58 46.60
(14.04) (14.04) (14.31) (14.33) (14.23)
Age (partner) 47.85 47.47 46.03 45.28 46.71
(14.40) (14.39) (14.07) (14.03) (14.27)
N 15758 15963 14246 14250 60217
Sample proportions provided, except for age; sd in parentheses
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Table 4.2: Summary Sample Statistics by Day and Gender : Part 2
Female Male Full
Weekday Weekend Weekeday Weekend Sample
HS degree
HS Degree (self) 0.910 0.904 0.897 0.892 0.901
(0.287) (0.295) (0.304) (0.310) (0.299)
HS D0egree (partner) 0.887 0.880 0.905 0.906 0.894
(0.316) (0.325) (0.293) (0.291) (0.308)
BA degree
Self 0.352 0.350 0.372 0.374 0.361
(0.478) (0.477) (0.483) (0.484) (0.480)
Partner 0.358 0.349 0.350 0.357 0.353
(0.480) (0.477) (0.477) (0.479) (0.478)
Post-grad degree
Self 0.119 0.117 0.149 0.149 0.133
(0.324) (0.322) (0.356) (0.356) (0.339)
Partner 0.139 0.137 0.116 0.123 0.129
(0.346) (0.344) (0.321) (0.328) (0.335)
Male Partner 0.996 0.995 0.00358 0.00484 0.526
(0.0656) (0.0679) (0.0597) (0.0694) (0.499)
Any HH Child 0.596 0.597 0.572 0.596 0.590
(0.491) (0.491) (0.495) (0.491) (0.492)
Child 5 or under 0.291 0.299 0.281 0.294 0.292
(0.454) (0.458) (0.449) (0.456) (0.455)
Child 10 or under 0.447 0.451 0.425 0.448 0.443
(0.497) (0.498) (0.494) (0.497) (0.497)
N 15758 15963 14246 14250 60217
Sample proportions provided, except for age; sd in parentheses
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Table 4.3: Summary Sample Statistics by Income : Part 1
$0- $30,000- $50,000- $75,000- $over Full
$30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $100,000 Sample
% Black 0.116 0.0835 0.0646 0.0531 0.0416 0.0735
(0.320) (0.277) (0.246) (0.224) (0.200) (0.261)
% Hispanic 0.285 0.170 0.0911 0.0619 0.0542 0.125
(0.452) (0.376) (0.288) (0.241) (0.226) (0.331)
% Metro area 0.715 0.739 0.788 0.864 0.915 0.802
(0.451) (0.439) (0.408) (0.343) (0.279) (0.399)
FT Employment
Self 0.349 0.502 0.628 0.686 0.703 0.570
(0.477) (0.500) (0.483) (0.464) (0.457) (0.495)
Partner 0.334 0.503 0.615 0.670 0.692 0.558
(0.472) (0.500) (0.487) (0.470) (0.462) (0.497)
PT Employment
Self 0.129 0.135 0.132 0.127 0.123 0.129
(0.335) (0.342) (0.338) (0.333) (0.329) (0.335)
Partner 0.139 0.137 0.139 0.134 0.130 0.135
(0.346) (0.344) (0.346) (0.341) (0.337) (0.342)
Unemployed
Self 0.0596 0.0402 0.0311 0.0225 0.0171 0.0332
(0.237) (0.197) (0.174) (0.148) (0.130) (0.179)
Partner 0.0848 0.0636 0.0525 0.0453 0.0422 0.0572
(0.279) (0.244) (0.223) (0.208) (0.201) (0.232)
Age
Self 47.74 46.56 45.12 44.94 45.91 46.60
(18.01) (15.76) (13.19) (11.39) (10.53) (14.23)
Partner 47.98 46.79 45.22 45.01 45.89 46.71
(18.12) (15.81) (13.22) (11.39) (10.49) (14.27)
N 9408 10763 12277 10599 10138 60217
Sample proportions provided, except for age and time use; standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.4: Summary Sample Statistics by Income : Part 2
$0- $30,000- $50,000- $75,000- $over Full
$30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $100,000 Sample
HS degree
Self 0.690 0.870 0.954 0.983 0.991 0.901
(0.463) (0.336) (0.209) (0.130) (0.0933) (0.299)
Partner 0.677 0.860 0.947 0.982 0.989 0.894
(0.468) (0.347) (0.224) (0.131) (0.106) (0.308)
BA degree
Self 0.0933 0.183 0.334 0.529 0.695 0.361
(0.291) (0.386) (0.472) (0.499) (0.461) (0.480)
Partner 0.0940 0.172 0.325 0.521 0.685 0.353
(0.292) (0.378) (0.468) (0.500) (0.465) (0.478)
Post-grad degree
Self 0.0223 0.0484 0.0968 0.198 0.316 0.133
(0.148) (0.215) (0.296) (0.398) (0.465) (0.339)
Partner 0.0232 0.0437 0.0934 0.196 0.307 0.129
(0.150) (0.204) (0.291) (0.397) (0.461) (0.335)
Any HH Child 0.527 0.558 0.615 0.641 0.677 0.590
(0.499) (0.497) (0.487) (0.480) (0.468) (0.492)
Child 5 or under 0.316 0.298 0.308 0.295 0.292 0.292
(0.465) (0.457) (0.462) (0.456) (0.455) (0.455)
Child 10 or under 0.430 0.433 0.465 0.467 0.486 0.443
(0.495) (0.496) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.497)
N 9408 10763 12277 10599 10138 60217
Sample proportions provided, except for age and time use; standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.5: Mean Average Times and Participation Rates for Weekdays (min/day)
Full $0- $30,000- $50,000- $75,000- above
Sample Females Males $30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $100,000
Work 284.1 220.7 354.3 175.8 250.4 309.5 338.4 356.7
(267.9) (247.6) (272.0) (245.2) (266.6) (263.2) (262.2) (261.7)
Leis 248.1 235.4 262.1 310.4 271.9 235.2 211.1 202.1
(185.1) (170.2) (199.4) (213.1) (195.5) (173.4) (157.8) (151.9)
HHPr 212.0 276.4 140.9 233.0 218.5 208.2 203.7 196.9
(190.9) (199.0) (152.8) (201.0) (194.0) (186.1) (186.5) (184.4)
Pr(Work) 0.604 0.512 0.705 0.396 0.539 0.656 0.710 0.739
(0.489) (0.500) (0.456) (0.489) (0.499) (0.475) (0.454) (0.439)
Pr(Leis) 0.958 0.959 0.957 0.964 0.960 0.962 0.954 0.953
(0.200) (0.197) (0.202) (0.187) (0.197) (0.191) (0.210) (0.211)
Pr(HHPr) 0.919 0.972 0.860 0.907 0.914 0.925 0.927 0.925
(0.273) (0.165) (0.347) (0.290) (0.281) (0.264) (0.261) (0.263)
N 30004 15758 14246 4688 5305 6151 5241 4982















Table 4.6: Mean Average Times and Participation Rates for Weekends (min/day)
Full $0- $30,000- $50,000- $75,000- above
Sample Females Males $30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $100,000
Work 71.79 51.04 95.04 68.90 74.20 76.51 72.35 67.04
(173.0) (143.1) (198.7) (173.2) (180.0) (178.5) (171.1) (159.7)
Leis 363.3 333.5 396.7 398.3 375.6 358.7 341.5 333.0
(203.3) (186.5) (215.7) (221.2) (208.2) (200.6) (190.2) (185.4)
HHPr 248.5 288.6 203.4 213.6 235.4 251.8 270.3 277.1
(190.9) (188.6) (183.1) (191.7) (189.4) (190.4) (189.8) (185.2)
Pr(Work) 0.245 0.194 0.302 0.183 0.209 0.254 0.273 0.311
(0.430) (0.395) (0.459) (0.387) (0.407) (0.435) (0.446) (0.463)
Pr(Leis) 0.976 0.977 0.975 0.976 0.978 0.976 0.974 0.977
(0.153) (0.151) (0.156) (0.154) (0.148) (0.155) (0.158) (0.151)
Pr(HHPr) 0.921 0.963 0.874 0.876 0.918 0.928 0.943 0.948
(0.270) (0.189) (0.332) (0.330) (0.274) (0.259) (0.232) (0.222)
N 30213 15963 14250 4720 5458 6126 5358 5156
















Table 4.7: Time Use Effects of Full Employment to Unemployment
(Hours per week change in each activity)
Work Leisure HH Production
OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG
FEMALE
Self -34.67 -32.70 12.23 12.35 17.69 21.13
(0.35) (1.09) (0.35) (0.33) (0.38) (0.36)
Partner 1.37 1.50 0.51 0.51 -2.23 -2.05
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46)
MALE
Self -36.36 -38.27 14.56 13.49 16.14 12.70
(0.52) (1.84) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41) (0.38)
Partner 0.80 1.13 0.14 0.19 -2.44 -2.28
(0.36) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) (0.30)
Estimates constructed from 5 times the weekday coefficients plus
twice the weekend coefficients divided by 60 to convert to hours.
Bootstrapped standard errors report for Cragg estimates.
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Table 4.8:
Time Use Effects of Full Employment to Unemployment with income controls
(Hours per week change in each activity)
Work Leisure HH Production
OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG
FEMALE
Self -34.41 -32.51 11.65 11.80 17.64 20.86
(0.37) (1.12) (0.37) (0.32) (0.40) (0.41)
Partner 1.53 1.74 0.13 0.12 -2.17 1.98
(0.40) (0.42) (0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.47)
MALE
Self -36.07 -38.80 14.41 13.51 15.93 12.53
(0.56) (2.21) (0.50) (0.48) (0.44) (0.41)
Partner 1.27 1.59 -0.01 0.03 -2.34 -2.22
(0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.31) (0.35)
Estimates constructed from 5 times the weekday coefficients plus
twice the weekend coefficients divided by 60 to convert to hours.
Bootstrapped standard errors report for Cragg estimates.
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Table 4.9:
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Females
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 403.2∗∗∗ -131.5∗∗∗ -215.4∗∗∗ 82.86∗∗∗ -55.30∗∗∗ -18.70∗∗∗
(3.373) (3.050) (3.409) (2.852) (3.635) (3.695)
FT employment (partner) 2.278 -19.28∗∗∗ 35.20∗∗∗ -0.202 -24.22∗∗∗ 25.61∗∗∗
(4.871) (4.404) (4.924) (4.182) (5.330) (5.418)
PT employment (self) 202.0∗∗∗ -72.89∗∗∗ -106.9∗∗∗ 70.49∗∗∗ -36.39∗∗∗ -30.08∗∗∗
(3.923) (3.547) (3.966) (3.335) (4.250) (4.320)
PT employment (partner) 12.18∗ -27.54∗∗∗ 28.20∗∗∗ 10.20∗ -15.90∗ 5.857
(5.849) (5.289) (5.912) (5.033) (6.415) (6.520)
Unemployed 18.44∗ -2.853 -14.24 4.677 -10.08 9.059
(7.555) (6.831) (7.637) (6.271) (7.993) (8.125)
Unemployed (partner) 11.41 -16.66∗∗ 18.46∗ 18.09∗∗ -15.43∗ 0.522
(7.104) (6.423) (7.181) (5.952) (7.586) (7.711)
Male partner -71.71∗∗∗ 1.009 62.44∗∗ -32.75∗ 15.68 26.46
(19.92) (18.01) (20.13) (16.13) (20.56) (20.90)
Age (Self) 1.885 -2.743∗∗ 7.350∗∗∗ -1.384 -3.253∗∗ 7.500∗∗∗
(1.131) (1.023) (1.143) (0.947) (1.207) (1.227)
Age (Partner) -1.079 -0.385 0.344 0.339 -1.898 2.332
(1.139) (1.030) (1.152) (0.959) (1.223) (1.243)
Age2 (Self) -0.0265∗ 0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗ 0.00994 0.0472∗∗∗ -0.0749∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.00960) (0.0122) (0.0124)
Age2 (Partner) 0.0126 -0.00124 0.000539 -0.00155 0.0101 -0.0150
(0.0112) (0.0101) (0.0113) (0.00943) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Any HH Child -7.021 -18.77∗∗∗ 45.42∗∗∗ 1.234 -24.75∗∗∗ 32.93∗∗∗
(4.310) (3.897) (4.356) (3.654) (4.657) (4.733)
Child under 5 -15.29∗∗∗ -28.86∗∗∗ 64.61∗∗∗ 1.722 -39.20∗∗∗ 63.50∗∗∗
(4.305) (3.892) (4.351) (3.633) (4.631) (4.707)
Child under 10 -6.291 -20.69∗∗∗ 36.05∗∗∗ -5.366 -18.78∗∗∗ 36.50∗∗∗
(4.792) (4.333) (4.844) (4.077) (5.196) (5.282)
Observations 15758 15758 15758 15963 15963 15963
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.10:
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Females
with Income Indicators
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 401.3∗∗∗ -129.3∗∗∗ -215.4∗∗∗ 84.53∗∗∗ -53.17∗∗∗ -21.72∗∗∗
(3.643) (3.274) (3.634) (3.068) (3.897) (3.952)
FT employment (partner) -2.371 -18.12∗∗∗ 37.18∗∗∗ 2.899 -20.86∗∗∗ 22.52∗∗∗
(5.387) (4.840) (5.373) (4.598) (5.840) (5.924)
PT employment 201.2∗∗∗ -71.01∗∗∗ -106.4∗∗∗ 71.25∗∗∗ -34.07∗∗∗ -31.96∗∗∗
(4.189) (3.764) (4.178) (3.553) (4.512) (4.577)
PT employment (partner) 9.857 -27.77∗∗∗ 30.72∗∗∗ 11.31∗ -12.70 5.846
(6.357) (5.712) (6.341) (5.452) (6.925) (7.024)
Unemployed 21.33∗∗ -6.746 -16.59∗ 2.381 -10.01 10.12
(8.119) (7.296) (8.098) (6.598) (8.381) (8.501)
Unemployed (partner) 8.448 -18.64∗∗ 20.89∗∗ 22.14∗∗∗ -15.72 -1.966
(7.702) (6.920) (7.681) (6.370) (8.092) (8.207)
Male Partner -64.90∗∗ 2.883 60.89∗∗ -32.49 32.36 13.06
(21.08) (18.94) (21.03) (17.00) (21.60) (21.91)
Age 1.661 -2.609∗ 7.318∗∗∗ -0.949 -3.653∗∗ 7.563∗∗∗
(1.224) (1.100) (1.221) (1.017) (1.292) (1.311)
Age (partner) -1.702 0.642 0.425 0.459 -1.168 1.700
(1.225) (1.101) (1.222) (1.027) (1.304) (1.323)
Age2 -0.0247∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0721∗∗∗ 0.00593 0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0764∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0132) (0.0134)
Age2 (partner) 0.0186 -0.0122 -0.000184 -0.00274 0.00116 -0.00820
(0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.0129) (0.0131)
Any HH Child -5.600 -20.29∗∗∗ 46.60∗∗∗ 1.813 -24.32∗∗∗ 32.74∗∗∗
(4.624) (4.155) (4.612) (3.886) (4.936) (5.007)
Child under 5 -14.83∗∗ -30.19∗∗∗ 65.34∗∗∗ 1.309 -41.22∗∗∗ 64.72∗∗∗
(4.544) (4.083) (4.532) (3.821) (4.853) (4.922)
Child under 10 -9.422 -20.40∗∗∗ 38.44∗∗∗ -3.391 -18.95∗∗∗ 36.24∗∗∗
(5.098) (4.581) (5.085) (4.310) (5.475) (5.553)
HH Income $30k-$50k 4.259 -4.489 -1.473 -5.417 -4.444 3.809
(4.748) (4.266) (4.736) (3.922) (4.982) (5.054)
HH Income $50k-$75k 16.59∗∗∗ -7.604 -9.873∗ -16.56∗∗∗ -5.763 14.00∗∗
(4.969) (4.465) (4.956) (4.147) (5.267) (5.342)
HH Income $75k-$100k 14.48∗∗ -15.70∗∗ -5.485 -23.79∗∗∗ -11.61∗ 23.20∗∗∗
(5.487) (4.931) (5.473) (4.560) (5.792) (5.875)
HH Income $100k+ 28.44∗∗∗ -19.33∗∗∗ -13.54∗ -20.53∗∗∗ -16.16∗ 28.92∗∗∗
(6.013) (5.403) (5.997) (4.965) (6.307) (6.397)
Observations 13841 13841 13841 14177 14177 14177
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.11:
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Males
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 443.4∗∗∗ -230.8∗∗∗ -135.4∗∗∗ 123.5∗∗∗ -120.6∗∗∗ 7.569
(5.678) (4.752) (4.223) (5.723) (6.033) (5.238)
FT employment (partner) -11.66∗∗ -5.272 25.89∗∗∗ -2.799 -8.999∗ 19.33∗∗∗
(4.259) (3.564) (3.168) (4.241) (4.470) (3.881)
PT employment (self) 237.2∗∗∗ -150.4∗∗∗ -70.58∗∗∗ 96.96∗∗∗ -92.66∗∗∗ 4.268
(7.711) (6.454) (5.735) (8.008) (8.440) (7.328)
PT employment (partner) -6.115 -1.392 14.18∗∗∗ -0.00690 -10.91∗ 13.44∗∗
(4.973) (4.162) (3.699) (4.951) (5.219) (4.531)
Unemployed 51.25∗∗∗ -83.19∗∗∗ 39.98∗∗∗ 13.15 -52.78∗∗∗ 53.21∗∗∗
(10.30) (8.617) (7.658) (10.42) (10.98) (9.533)
Unemployed (Partner) -4.651 -6.110 2.112 3.641 -2.682 5.687
(7.048) (5.898) (5.242) (7.230) (7.621) (6.616)
Male Partner -38.42 12.81 3.592 9.757 -30.38 17.63
(27.09) (22.68) (20.15) (23.31) (24.57) (21.33)
Age (Self) -0.109 -2.386∗ 3.966∗∗∗ 1.343 -3.602∗ 6.195∗∗∗
(1.384) (1.158) (1.029) (1.364) (1.437) (1.248)
Age (Partner) 2.676∗ 0.990 -0.658 -2.023 0.522 1.083
(1.353) (1.133) (1.006) (1.341) (1.414) (1.227)
Age2 -0.00717 0.0304∗∗ -0.0403∗∗∗ -0.00661 0.0337∗ -0.0621∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0123)
Age2 (Partner) -0.0265 -0.00934 0.0127 0.0114 0.00220 -0.00655
(0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0124)
Any HH Child 2.092 -15.97∗∗∗ 10.59∗∗ 2.833 -4.613 10.47∗
(5.317) (4.450) (3.954) (5.327) (5.615) (4.875)
Child under 5 -2.295 -11.33∗ 32.59∗∗∗ -4.447 -22.02∗∗∗ 43.40∗∗∗
(5.471) (4.579) (4.069) (5.330) (5.617) (4.877)
Child under 10 -6.438 -14.57∗∗ 29.30∗∗∗ -12.32∗ -23.78∗∗∗ 34.37∗∗∗
(6.047) (5.061) (4.497) (5.941) (6.261) (5.436)
Observations 14246 14246 14246 14250 14250 14250
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.12:
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Males
with Income Indicators
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 440.1∗∗∗ -228.5∗∗∗ -134.5∗∗∗ 126.3∗∗∗ -119.3∗∗∗ 3.626
(6.332) (5.226) (4.643) (6.305) (6.633) (5.764)
FT employment (partner) -15.24∗∗ -3.427 24.74∗∗∗ 1.777 -9.202 14.22∗∗∗
(4.662) (3.848) (3.419) (4.576) (4.814) (4.183)
PT employment 243.0∗∗∗ -154.2∗∗∗ -70.75∗∗∗ 99.48∗∗∗ -92.58∗∗∗ 4.434
(8.469) (6.990) (6.211) (8.532) (8.976) (7.800)
PT employment (partner) -7.879 -0.780 15.17∗∗∗ 3.766 -11.99∗ 10.01∗
(5.359) (4.424) (3.930) (5.273) (5.548) (4.821)
Unemployed 52.02∗∗∗ -80.45∗∗∗ 35.66∗∗∗ 14.51 -56.87∗∗∗ 55.96∗∗∗
(11.01) (9.089) (8.076) (11.12) (11.70) (10.17)
Unemployed (partner) -1.032 -5.779 -0.445 4.303 -3.472 7.038
(7.588) (6.263) (5.565) (7.712) (8.113) (7.050)
Male Partner -39.50 10.81 4.093 14.83 -40.90 23.35
(27.71) (22.87) (20.32) (24.06) (25.32) (22.00)
Age -0.720 -1.929 3.945∗∗∗ 1.596 -3.551∗ 5.793∗∗∗
(1.493) (1.233) (1.095) (1.471) (1.548) (1.345)
Age (partner) 2.634 1.302 -1.263 -1.035 0.237 0.828
(1.471) (1.214) (1.079) (1.445) (1.520) (1.321)
Age2 -0.00236 0.0264∗ -0.0398∗∗∗ -0.00909 0.0325∗ -0.0573∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0123) (0.0109) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0134)
Age2 (partner) -0.0260 -0.0125 0.0187 0.00258 0.00612 -0.00620
(0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0135)
Any HH Child -1.270 -13.83∗∗ 11.01∗∗ 1.383 -2.090 9.752
(5.729) (4.729) (4.201) (5.680) (5.975) (5.192)
Child under 5 -1.451 -11.55∗ 32.01∗∗∗ -3.086 -24.19∗∗∗ 43.01∗∗∗
(5.815) (4.800) (4.264) (5.598) (5.889) (5.117)
Child under 10 -5.611 -16.37∗∗ 29.44∗∗∗ -10.87 -24.14∗∗∗ 35.23∗∗∗
(6.452) (5.325) (4.731) (6.280) (6.607) (5.741)
HH Income $30k-$50k 5.401 -1.637 9.632∗ -11.22 -1.328 16.60∗∗
(5.898) (4.868) (4.325) (5.867) (6.172) (5.363)
HH Income $50k-$75k 8.586 -8.360 15.33∗∗∗ -16.12∗∗ 1.220 19.70∗∗∗
(6.203) (5.120) (4.549) (6.130) (6.449) (5.604)
HH Income $75k-$100k 20.03∗∗ -15.59∗∗ 10.54∗ -22.51∗∗∗ -4.811 32.49∗∗∗
(6.816) (5.626) (4.998) (6.730) (7.080) (6.152)
HH Income $100k+ 25.86∗∗∗ -10.88 7.446 -37.17∗∗∗ -3.875 34.34∗∗∗
(7.390) (6.100) (5.419) (7.325) (7.706) (6.696)
Observations 12526 12526 12526 12641 12641 12641
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.13:
Cragg Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Fe-
males
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 385.3∗∗∗ -131.3∗∗∗ -207.7∗∗∗ 126.5∗∗∗ -55.43∗∗∗ -17.90 ∗∗∗
(15.9) (2.83) (3.54) (6.82) (4.07) (3.348)
FT employment (partner) 4.477 -13.81∗∗ 31.67∗∗∗ 3.123 -22.52∗∗∗ 25.84∗∗∗
(5.000) (4.507) (5.474) (4.340) (5.595) (5.950)
PT employment 258.9∗∗∗ -64.51∗∗∗ -86.25∗∗∗ 116.8∗∗∗ -35.74∗∗∗ -28.93 ∗∗∗
(17.64) (3.26) (3.50) (7.53) (4.52) (4.12)
PT employment (partner) 16.04∗ -20.62∗∗∗ 24.44∗∗∗ 13.72∗ -13.70∗ 6.472
(6.46) (5.11) (6.55) (5.94) (6.07) (6.61)
Unemployed 38.81 -1.324 34.50∗∗∗ 11.86 -9.704 10.33
(21.79) (5.976) (6.97) (16.62) (8.18) (8.27)
Unemployed (partner) 16.74∗ -11.21 16.12 17.34∗∗ -13.72 3.252
(6.96) (7.135) (8.57) (5.76) (8.156) (9.495)
Male Partner -57.58∗∗ -1.550 109.6∗∗∗ -22.99 17.00 30.68
(20.61) (23.416) (26.107) (13.385) (30.90) (37.95)
Age 4.442∗∗ -1.647 6.485∗∗∗ -0.951 -2.883∗∗ 8.192∗∗∗
(1.303) (1.109 (1.139) (0.946) (1.048) (1.311)
Age (partner) -1.404 -0.400 0.578 0.655 -2.033 2.069
(1.186) (1.119) (1.146) (1.016) (1.197) (1.403)
Age2 -0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗ -0.0590∗∗∗ 0.00589 0.0422∗∗ -0.0830∗∗∗
(.01225) (0.00865) (0.01296) (0.01169) (0.01217) (0.01225)
Age2 (partner) 0.0168 -0.00107 -0.000994 -0.00442 0.0112 -0.0120
(0.01188) (0.00914) (0.01156) (0.01086) (0.01300) (0.01408)
Any HH Child -8.459∗ -19.22∗∗∗ 55.89∗∗∗ -0.445 -24.21∗∗∗ 34.76∗∗∗
(3.820) (3.640) (4.785) (3.967) (4.377) (4.476)
Child under 5 -13.48∗∗ -31.43∗∗∗ 59.33∗∗∗ 2.486 -41.51∗∗∗ 59.86∗∗∗
(3.874) (3.416) ( 3.727 ) (3.553) (4.666) (4.250)
Child under 10 -5.906 -23.50∗∗∗ 39.68 ∗∗∗ -3.110 -19.54∗∗∗ 35.73∗∗∗
(4.300) (4.858) (4.555) (4.089) (5.303) (5.113)
N 15758 15758 15758 15963 15963 15963
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.14:
Cragg Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Fe-
males with income controls
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 386.8∗∗∗ -128.6∗∗∗ -206.8∗∗∗ 124.8∗∗∗ -53.34∗∗∗ -20.95∗∗∗
(16.10) (3.74) (3.13) (8.65) (3.46) (3.86)
FT employment (partner) -0.642 -12.21∗∗ 33.50∗∗∗ 7.158 -19.35∗∗ 22.42∗∗∗
(5.64) (5.33) (4.52) (4.70) (6.91) (6.75)
PT employment 259.8∗∗∗ -62.55∗∗∗ -84.87∗∗∗ 114.2∗∗∗ -33.39∗∗∗ -30.82∗∗∗
(18.11) (3.31) (3.55) (6.67) (3.83) (4.47)
PT employment (partner) 12.93 -20.37∗∗∗ 26.76∗∗ 15.78∗ -10.72 6.425
(7.28) (5.85) (8.72) (6.21) (6.15) (8.42)
Unemployed 46.88 -4.618 30.69∗∗∗ -0.703 -9.178 11.02
(21.43) (5.50) (8.56) (19.44) (7.62) (9.33)
Unemployed (partner) 14.29 -12.88 18.45∗ 21.90∗∗∗ -14.12∗ 0.581
(8.60) (6.79) (9.25) (5.47) (7.00) (9.64)
Male Partner -52.81∗∗ -0.238 105.2∗∗∗ -23.67 33.77 14.57
(19.48) (16.57) (25.13) (13.30) (38.43) (28.36)
Age 4.100∗∗∗ -1.528∗∗ 6.407∗∗∗ -0.151 -3.205∗ 8.294∗∗∗
(1.1805) (0.9943) (1.1052) (1.0679) (1.3247) (1.3431)
Age (partner) -2.130 0.431 0.683 0.557 -1.376 1.411
(1.1228) (0.9945) (1.3398) (1.1004) (1.2724) (1.5140)
Age2 -0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0265 -0.0568∗∗∗ -0.00344 0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0849∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0099) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0133) (0.0149)
Age2 (partner) 0.0242 -0.00973 -0.00216 -0.00274 0.00314 -0.00491
(0.0139) (0.0115) (0.0151) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0131)
Any HH Child -6.961 -19.99∗∗∗ 57.65∗∗∗ -0.0691 -23.59∗∗∗ 34.87∗∗∗
(3.94) (4.84) (5.06) (3.21) (4.98) (6.03)
Child under 5 -14.27∗∗∗ -33.63∗∗∗ 59.71∗∗∗ 2.119 -43.65∗∗∗ 61.17∗∗∗
(4.23) (3.66) (4.49) (3.91) (4.56) (5.54)
Child under 10 -8.362 -22.88∗∗∗ 42.72∗∗∗ -1.789 -19.74∗∗∗ 35.84∗∗∗
(4.45) (4.39) (4.80) (4.05) (4.66) (4.51)
HH Income $30k-$50k 7.163 -3.150 -2.737 -5.659 -4.021 3.884
(5.69) (3.97) (5.30) (3.47) (5.43) (4.49)
HH Income $50k-$75k 18.33∗∗∗ -5.265 -11.17∗ -15.52∗∗∗ -5.195 14.46∗∗
(4.60) (4.86) (4.90) (3.42) (5.41) (5.24)
HH Income $75k-$100k 15.93∗∗∗ -14.78∗∗∗ -6.042 -22.49∗∗∗ -11.26 23.78∗∗∗
(5.39) (4.55) (4.57) (4.32) (6.28) (5.17)
HH Income $100k+ 27.01∗∗∗ -19.86∗∗∗ -13.36∗ -18.71∗∗∗ -16.07∗∗ 29.26∗∗∗
(6.32) (4.74) (6.33) (4.64) (5.68) (6.39)
N 13841 13841 13841 14177 14177 14177
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.15:
Cragg Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Males
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 450.7∗∗∗ -184.1∗∗∗ -119.0∗∗∗ 219.2∗∗∗ -114.0∗∗∗ 8.857
(26.45) (4.40) (4.23) (27.29) (5.51) (5.695)
FT employment (partner) -9.539∗ -3.791 23.38∗∗∗ -3.760 -8.653 19.15
(4.256) (3.442) (3.08) (3.73) (4.56) (3.87)
PT employment 288.5∗∗∗ -102.9∗∗∗ -52.78∗∗∗ 196.7∗∗∗ -85.31∗∗∗ 6.500
(28.27) (6.48) (5.34) (22.70) (9.635) (7.47)
PT employment (partner) -4.366 -0.429 13.16∗∗∗ 0.519 -10.75∗ 13.45
(5.183) (3.928) (3.734) (4.435) (5.150) (4.672)
Unemployed 62.21∗ -49.76∗∗∗ 16.28∗∗ 42.12 -45.19∗∗ 51.75
(30.96) (7.19) (5.70) (34.23) (14.222) (10.03)
Unemployed (partner) 0.772 -3.965 0.760 4.423 -2.480 7.266
(7.435) (6.077) (5.603) (7.335) (7.180) (6.665)
Male Partner -34.91 12.13 1.420 16.43 -29.97 19.71
(31.51) (33.37) (21.62) (27.61) (33.68) (18.63)
Age 2.379 -1.704 3.005 1.323∗ -3.504∗ 6.987
(1.614) (1.234) (1.223) (1.479) (1.513) (1.501)
Age (partner) 3.672∗ 0.719 0.0322 -1.017 0.552 1.169
(1.584) (1.129) (0.870) (1.381) (1.441) (1.386)
Age2 -0.0360∗ 0.0229∗ -0.0296∗ -0.00716 0.0319∗ -0.0713
(0.016) (0.011) (0.0117) (0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Age2 (partner) -0.0398∗ -0.00738 0.00687 0.00113 0.00193 -0.00795
(0.0163) (0.0095) (0.00894) (0.01692) (0.0133) (0.0167)
Any HH Child -2.278 -15.09∗∗ 11.83∗ 1.036 -4.286 11.96
(5.405) (4.464) (4.461) (4.908) (5.762) (5.273)
Child under 5 -1.389 -13.54∗ 32.42∗∗∗ -3.797 -23.07∗∗∗ 40.06
(4.224) (5.283) (4.387) (5.392) (6.260) (4.370)
Child under 10 -7.260 -18.60∗∗ 33.63∗∗∗ -9.680 -24.80∗∗∗ 32.68
(6.526) (5.389) (4.346) (6.080) (7.082) (4.997)
N 14246 14246 14246 14250 14250 14250
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.16:
Cragg Estimates of the Effect of Employment Status on Time Use for Males
with income controls
(Minutes per day change in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment 458.5∗∗∗ -180.6∗∗∗ -116.8∗∗∗ 218.7∗∗∗ -112.4∗∗∗ 5.747
(29.10) (5.04) (3.46) (23.31) (5.94) (7.10)
FT employment (partner) -12.69∗∗ -1.883 22.02∗∗∗ 0.833 -8.933 14.20∗∗∗
(4.91) (4.00) (3.59) (3.81) (5.18) (3.81)
PT employment 301.1∗∗∗ -105.5∗∗∗ -52.54∗∗∗ 195.4∗∗∗ -84.96∗∗∗ 7.403
(34.41) (7.09) (6.18) (25.97) (10.44) (8.77)
PT employment (partner) -5.716 0.294 14.24∗∗∗ 4.070 -11.83 9.878∗
(5.83) (4.65) (3.80) (4.56) (6.21) (4.04)
Unemployed 63.40 -48.00∗∗∗ 13.75∗ 42.51 -49.50∗∗∗ 55.40∗∗∗
(44.05) (7.31) (6.73) (35.79) (13.26) (10.38)
Unemployed (partner) 4.266 -3.810 -2.416 6.013 -3.332 8.583
(7.63) (6.14) (6.00) (5.80) (9.76) (8.83)
Male Partner -36.65 11.14 1.436 22.15 -40.77 25.65
(29.10) (44.93) (21.54) (23.70) (33.54) (18.93)
Age 2.230 -1.352 3.045 1.356 -3.436 6.442∗∗∗
(1.4500) (1.2540) (1.1841) (1.6855) (1.8491) (1.4657)
Age (partner) 3.315∗ 1.047 -0.560 0.383 0.232 1.107
(1.4832) (1.0826) (1.1492) (1.3107) (1.6891) (1.4606)
Age2 -0.0370∗∗ 0.0201 -0.0295∗∗ -0.00670 0.0305∗ -0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0141)
Age2 (partner) -0.0351 -0.0109 0.0125 -0.0132 0.00623 -0.00983
(0.0182) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0176) (0.0166) (0.0147)
Any HH Child -4.896 -12.43∗∗ 12.35∗∗∗ -0.572 -1.764 11.36
(5.72) (4.77) (3.74) (5.83) (5.95) (5.93)
Child under 5 -1.094 -14.32∗ 31.69∗∗∗ -3.153 -25.24 39.82∗∗∗
(6.49) (6.06) (4.50) (5.83) (6.51) (4.30)
Child under 10 -6.443 -20.21∗∗∗ 33.70 -8.082 -25.11∗∗∗ 33.78∗∗∗
(5.02) (5.76) (5.34) (5.45) (6.64) (5.68)
HH Income $30k-$50k 5.525 0.0230∗∗∗ 7.287 -13.63∗ -0.575 18.31∗∗∗
(6.81) (4.89) (4.35) (5.68) (5.73) (5.64)
HH Income $50k-$75k 8.386∗∗ -6.594 12.93 -17.82∗∗ 1.926 21.31∗∗∗
(5.94) (4.80) (4.88) (6.35) (4.97) (5.94)
HH Income $75k-$100k 18.50∗∗∗ -14.94∗ 9.173 -24.60∗∗∗ -4.172 32.90∗∗∗
(5.79) (6.74) (4.73) (6.03) (6.30) (6.61)
HH Income $100k+ 24.82∗∗ -10.20 5.332 -39.60∗∗∗ -3.228 34.89∗∗∗
(8.09) (6.59) (5.54) (8.31) (7.28) (6.96)
N 12526 12526 12526 12641 12641 12641
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported.































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.17: Marginal Effects of Partner’s Time Use on Female Time Use
Work Leisure HH Prod.
OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG
WEEKDAY
Partner Work 4.86 -1.29 -2.86 -4.25 1.22 0.74
(2.05) (3.13) (1.85) (1.94) (2.07) (2.12)
Partner Leisure 3.91 -6.77 2.63 -3.55 -3.76 -2.10
(3.46) (5.96) (3.13) (3.11) (3.50) (2.12)
Partner HH Production 9.24 6.18 -6.72 -3.47 -2.86 -5.50
(3.68) (4.58) (3.32) (4.22) (3.71) (4.03)
WEEKEND
Partner Work -5.18 -12.70 7.56 4.06 1.06 -6.58
(5.02) (3.75) (5.02) (4.80) (5.11) (5.85)
Partner Leisure -4.59 -14.04 19.74 14.99 -12.00 -20.33
(4.69) (4.97) (5.97) (4.91) (6.06) (6.09)
Partner HH Production 11.70 4.14 10.92 5.19 -16.62 -28.30
(5.35) (5.44) (6.78) (6.47) (6.90) (7.34)
Estimates report the effect (in minutes per day) of a one hour per day increase
of partner time use on own time use.
OLS and bootstrapped Cragg standard errors reported.
Bolded estimates are significant at the 95% level.
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Table 4.18: Marginal Effects of Partner’s Time Use on Male Time Use
Work Leisure HH Prod.
OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG OLS CRAGG
WEEKDAY
Partner Work 11.10 0.75 -0.62 -3.94 -7.26 -5.15
(2.95) (3.79) (2.47) (2.33) (2.20) (2.08)
Partner Leisure 12.42 -7.71 0.67 -10.35 -12.06 -4.59
(6.30) (7.61) (5.28) (6.42) (4.69) (4.30)
Partner HH Production 16.14 8.64 -0.37 -0.25 -13.44 -13.30
(4.22) (4.62) (3.53) (4.07) (3.14) (2.74)
WEEKEND
Partner Work 22.08 13.23 0.64 -2.91 -8.70 -19.64
(6.78) (7.21) (7.200 (7.23) (6.24) (5.37)
Partner Leisure 25.86 19.24 11.34 6.77 -26.34 -37.39
(10.26) (10.48) (10.80) (11.77) (9.36) (9.91)
Partner HH Production 21.06 10.66 6.18 1.16 -16.92 -34.07
(10.20) (10.41) (10.80) (10.42) (9.36) (8.51)
Estimates report the effect (in minutes per day) of a one hour per day increase
of partner time use on own time use.
OLS and bootstrapped Cragg standard errors reported.
Bolded estimates are significant at the 95% level.
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Table 4.19:
OLS Estimates on Activity Time of Females with Predicted Partner Time
Use
(Minutes per day spent in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod.n Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 400.6∗∗∗ -129.1∗∗∗ -213.9∗∗∗ 78.01∗∗∗ -55.68∗∗∗ -14.80∗∗∗
(3.735) (3.378) (3.775) (3.424) (4.361) (4.434)
PT employment (self) 200.7∗∗∗ -72.11∗∗∗ -105.7∗∗∗ 67.38∗∗∗ -35.39∗∗∗ -28.80∗∗∗
(4.015) (3.631) (4.059) (3.635) (4.630) (4.708)
Unemployed (self) 19.11∗ -2.910 -13.74 4.388 -11.06 9.606
(7.574) (6.851) (7.657) (6.308) (8.036) (8.170)
Pred. Partner Work Time 0.0810∗ -0.0477 0.0203 -0.0864 0.126 0.0176
(0.0341) (0.0309) (0.0345) (0.0657) (0.0837) (0.0851)
Pred. Partner Leisure Time 0.0651 0.0438 -0.0626 -0.0765 0.329∗∗∗ -0.200∗
(0.0577) (0.0522) (0.0583) (0.0781) (0.0995) (0.101)
Pred. Partner HH Prod. Time 0.154∗ -0.112∗ -0.0477 0.195∗ 0.182 -0.277∗
(0.0613) (0.0554) (0.0619) (0.0891) (0.113) (0.115)
Male Partner -72.42∗∗∗ -0.774 64.78∗∗ -19.11 -2.877 31.49
(19.96) (18.05) (20.18) (17.23) (21.95) (22.32)
Age 1.662 -2.737∗∗ 7.375∗∗∗ -1.688 -3.283∗∗ 7.837∗∗∗
(1.140) (1.031) (1.152) (0.954) (1.215) (1.235)
Age (partner) -1.457 0.0972 0.539 -1.037 -2.177 3.433∗
(1.189) (1.076) (1.203) (1.144) (1.457) (1.482)
Age2 -0.0255∗ 0.0436∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ 0.0118 0.0452∗∗∗ -0.0752∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.00967) (0.0123) (0.0125)
Age2 (partner) 0.0165 -0.00654 -0.00144 0.0128 0.0131 -0.0270
(0.0118) (0.0107) (0.0120) (0.0114) (0.0145) (0.0147)
Any HH children -8.323 -16.27∗∗∗ 44.84∗∗∗ -1.544 -25.68∗∗∗ 35.56∗∗∗
(4.473) (4.046) (4.522) (3.805) (4.847) (4.928)
Child age 5 or under -19.50∗∗∗ -24.76∗∗∗ 65.64∗∗∗ -8.605 -39.30∗∗∗ 70.99∗∗∗
(4.819) (4.359) (4.872) (5.315) (6.771) (6.884)
Child age10 or under -9.373 -16.87∗∗∗ 36.47∗∗∗ -14.96∗∗ -15.56∗ 41.34∗∗∗
(5.193) (4.697) (5.250) (5.273) (6.717) (6.830)
Observations 15758 15758 15758 15963 15963 15963
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.20:
OLS Estimates for Activity Time of Males with Predicted Partner Time
Use
(Minutes per day spent in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 436.6∗∗∗ -230.4∗∗∗ -130.6∗∗∗ 124.5∗∗∗ -118.6∗∗∗ 4.242
(6.576) (5.507) (4.891) (8.346) (8.800) (7.640)
PT employment (self) 232.8∗∗∗ -150.0∗∗∗ -68.23∗∗∗ 97.86∗∗∗ -90.56∗∗∗ 0.446
(8.418) (7.049) (6.261) (8.296) (8.746) (7.593)
Unemployed (self) 46.73∗∗∗ -83.04∗∗∗ 42.63∗∗∗ 12.81 -50.17∗∗∗ 49.59∗∗∗
(10.53) (8.815) (7.829) (10.57) (11.14) (9.675)
Pred. Partner Work Time 0.185∗∗∗ -0.0103 -0.121∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.0106 -0.145
(0.0492) (0.0412) (0.0366) (0.113) (0.120) (0.104)
Pred. Partner Leisure Time 0.207∗ 0.0111 -0.201∗ 0.431∗ 0.189 -0.439∗∗
(0.105) (0.0880) (0.0782) (0.171) (0.180) (0.156)
Pred. Partner HH Prod. Time 0.269∗∗∗ -0.00610 -0.224∗∗∗ 0.351∗ 0.103 -0.282
(0.0704) (0.0589) (0.0523) (0.170) (0.180) (0.156)
Male Partner -35.53 11.81 1.989 -5.637 -32.99 27.44
(27.74) (23.23) (20.63) (25.83) (27.24) (23.64)
Age -0.114 -2.365∗ 3.994∗∗∗ 1.229 -3.442∗ 6.031∗∗∗
(1.384) (1.159) (1.030) (1.451) (1.529) (1.328)
Age (partner) 1.082 1.047 0.521 -2.981 0.379 1.707
(1.488) (1.246) (1.107) (1.985) (2.093) (1.817)
Age2 -0.00737 0.0304∗∗ -0.0406∗∗∗ -0.00540 0.0329∗ -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0126)
Age2 (partner) -0.0127 -0.0101 0.00342 0.0163 0.000724 -0.00710
(0.0155) (0.0129) (0.0115) (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0193)
Any HH children -5.226 -15.45∗∗ 16.42∗∗∗ 2.370 -3.678 8.608
(6.519) (5.459) (4.848) (8.738) (9.213) (7.998)
Child age 5 or under -11.06 -10.67 39.63∗∗∗ -10.69 -21.46 44.48∗∗∗
(7.804) (6.535) (5.804) (13.99) (14.75) (12.81)
Child age10 or under -10.66 -14.05∗ 32.53∗∗∗ -15.68 -24.09∗ 35.84∗∗∗
(6.973) (5.839) (5.186) (9.280) (9.784) (8.494)
Observations 14246 14246 14246 14250 14250 14250
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.21:
Cragg Estimates on Activity Time of Females with Predicted Partner Time
Use
(Minutes per day spent in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 381.6∗∗∗ -131.1 ∗∗∗ -205.1∗∗∗ 123.0 ∗∗∗ -54.77∗∗∗ -11.60 ∗
(15.9) (3.61) (3.74) (6.99) (4.22) (4.93)
PT employment (self) 257.3∗∗∗ -64.69∗∗∗ -84.48∗∗∗ 114.7∗∗∗ -34.25 ∗∗∗ -26.30∗∗∗
(15.14) (3.50) (3.20) (8.80) (4.47) (4.29)
Unemployed (self) 37.88 -2.30 36.73 ∗∗∗ 13.00 -9.86 12.65
(21.22) (6.55) (7.17) (15.76) (8.26) (7.60)
Pred. Partner Work Time -0.0215 -0.0708∗ 0.0123 -0.212∗∗ 0.0677 -0.110
(0.0522) (0.0324) (0.0353) (0.0624) (0.0800) (0.0975)
Pred. Partner Leisure Time -0.113 -0.0592 -0.0349 -0.234 ∗ 0.250∗∗ -0.339∗∗
(0.0994) (0.0518) (0.0353) (0.083) (0.082) (0.101)
Pred. Partner HH Prod. Time 0.103 -0.0579 -0.0917 0.0690 0.0865 -0.472∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.0703) (0.0671) (0.0907) (0.108) (0.122)
Male Partner -55.29∗∗ -0.638 110.9 ∗∗ -1.458 0.529 38.34
(20.97) (24.20) (31.99) (15.43) (31.98) (31.46)
Age 4.597 ∗∗∗ -1.445 6.510∗∗∗ -1.343 -2.906∗∗ 8.530∗∗∗
(1.31) (1.030) (1.041) (1.175) (1.106) (1.296)
Partner’s Age -1.985 -0.484 1.027 -0.300 -1.824 4.242∗
(1.175) (0.995) (0.985) (0.984) (1.642) (1.503)
Age2 -0.0596 ∗∗∗ 0.0259 -0.0588 ∗∗∗ 0.00953 0.0406∗∗∗ -0.0825∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0100) (0.0138) (0.01066) (0.01388) (0.0094)
Partner Age2 0.0230 0.0000894 -0.00588 0.00597 0.00953 -0.0343
(0.0131) (0.0114) (0.0096) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0185)
[.5em]Any HH Child -11.54 ∗∗ -18.91∗∗∗ 56.47∗∗∗ -1.894 -24.29 ∗∗∗ 39.30∗∗∗
(4.062) (3.996) (5.184) (3.294) (4.799) (5.090)
Child aged 5 or less -18.41∗∗∗ -30.46∗∗∗ 62.25∗∗∗ -6.468 -39.26∗∗∗ 72.41 ∗∗∗
(4.680) (5.306) (4.717) (4.573) (7.02) (7.98)
Child aged 10 or less -10.96 ∗ -23.15 ∗∗∗ 41.83∗∗∗ -13.88∗∗ -15.61∗ 42.48 ∗∗∗
(5.18) (4.39) (4.32) (4.71) (6.60) (7.66)
N 15758 15758 15758 15963 15963 15963
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.22:
Cragg Estimates on Activity Time of Males with Predicted Partner Time
Use
(Minutes per day spent in each activity)
Weekday Weekend
Work Leisure HH Prod. Work Leisure HH Prod.
FT employment (self) 443.4∗∗∗ -186.9∗∗∗ -112.0∗∗∗ 222.2 ∗∗∗ -111.7∗∗∗ 8.73
(26.73) (5.025) (3.74) (28.05) (7.15) (7.58)
PT employment (self) 281.6 ∗∗∗ -106.4∗∗∗ -47.49∗∗∗ 198.4∗∗∗ -83.33∗∗∗ 3.45
(28.21) (7.10) (5.70) (26.86) (10.32) (7.51)
Unemployed (self) 58.08 -51.66∗∗∗ 20.23 ∗∗∗ 43.24 -42.52 49.43∗∗∗
(34.02) (8.97) (5.27) (28.08) (21.97) (9.59)
Pred. Partner Work Time 0.0125 -0.0656 -0.0858∗ 0.221 -0.0484 -0.327∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.0388) (0.0347) (0.1202) (0.1204) (0.090)
Pred. Partner Leisure Time -0.129 -0.173 -0.0765 0.321 0.113 -0.623∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.107) (0.0717) (0.1746) (0.196) (0.1652)
Pred. Partner HH Prod. Time 0.144 -0.00412 -0.222 ∗∗∗ 0.178 0.0193 -0.568∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.0679) (0.0457) (0.1734) (0.1736) (0.1418)
Male Partner -20.98 20.47 -4.471 3.892 -30.99 31.93
(33.60) (31.02) (22.312) (26.22) (40.18916) (23.2702)
Age 2.255 -1.752 3.148 ∗∗ 1.457 -3.271 ∗ 7.228∗∗∗
(1.380) (1.432) (1.432) (1.074) (1.559) (1.2013)
Age (Partner) 2.259 0.228 1.507 -1.341∗ 0.725 3.250
(1.581) (1.173) (1.024) (1.669) (1.987) (1.945)
Age2 -0.0361∗ 0.0225 -0.0303∗∗ -0.00782 0.0305 -0.0736 ∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0119) (0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0122) (0.0136)
Partner Age2 -0.0237 -0.000024 -0.00700 0.00119 -0.00178 -0.0212
(0.0195) (0.01142) (0.0103) (0.02308) (0.0204) (0.017)
Any HH Child -10.90 -18.32 ∗∗ 20.61∗∗∗ 3.558 -2.451 14.92 ∗
(6.984) (5.834) (4.60) (8.7486) (9.196) (7.201)
Child aged 5 or less -14.35 -19.26 ∗∗ 43.46∗∗∗ -3.594 -19.88 53.36 ∗∗∗
(7.978) (6.22) (6.234) (12.810) (13.226) (13.58)
Child aged 10 or less -15.21∗ -22.50∗∗ 39.59∗∗∗ -9.082 -23.64∗ 40.76 ∗∗∗
(6.10) (6.628) (4.74) (7.943) (9.627) (7.376)
N 14246 14246 14246 14250 14250 14250
Unreported regressors include education, black and hispanic indicators for both partners,
as well as controls for day of week, month, year and state.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation provides important findings into the impact of certain govern-
mental policies and behavior related to time use. The first finding is how difficult it is
to show that place-based economic development programs are sufficient in providing
an economic boost to rural areas. To be certain, the time frame on the study was lim-
ited and only looked at federal based programs, but a variety of national economic
trends and regional economic development theory suggest that such programs are
not likely to be successful. That said, the organizational incentives provided by the
Enterprise Community program may have generated sufficient regional institutional
development in these areas that can provide long term benefits.
Another finding revolved around the empirical result that higher levels of public
transportation attractiveness, while certainly leading to more time spent in pub-
lic transportation, does not lead to lower car-based commuting time. In addition,
frequently policies which seek to improve public transportation attractiveness and
those which may raise gas prices can have dampening effects on each other. That is,
the marginal effect of each at lowering car usage or increasing public transportation
usage can be reduced by the other’s impact. Transportation policy, thus, should be
made keeping in mind these interaction effects and the strong difficulty of inducing
170
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switching to public transportation from driving for commuting based activities.
The final paper utilizes time use data to examine the impact of spousal unemploy-
ment and are consistent with other studies in finding a very small, but statistically
significant impact of about an hour per week added worker effect. I also construct
estimates of partner spousal time use where data do not exist to calculate marginal
impacts, finding strong leisure complementarity between partners and some substi-
tutability of household production. These findings are all consistent with previous
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Güler, Bülent and Temel Taskin, “Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out Home
Production,” European Economic Review, 2013, 62 (1), 1–16.
Gutmann, Peter M., “Are the Unemployed, Unemployed?,” Financial Analysts Journal,
1978, 34 (5), 26–29.
Haire, A. and R. Machemehl, “Impact of Rising Fuel Prices on US Transit Ridership,”
Transportation Research Record, 2007, 1992, 11–19.
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